T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
Error
- Location
- SKILL.md:15
- Finding
- External Native Executables Are Downloaded and Executed Without Independent Authenticity Verification## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 15–22 and 193–199 **Vulnerability Type**: Remote payload retrieval and execution **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```yaml metadata: openclaw: emoji: "\U0001F419" requires: anyBins: - octoflow install: - id: github-release kind: download url: https://github.com/octoflow-lang/octoflow/releases/download/v1.5.8/ bins: [octoflow] label: "Download OctoFlow v1.5.8 from GitHub Releases (4.5 MB, zero dependencies)" ``` ```markdown | Platform | File | SHA-256 | |----------|------|---------| | Windows x64 | [octoflow-v1.5.8-x86_64-windows.zip](https://github.com/octoflow-lang/octoflow/releases/download/v1.5.8/octoflow-v1.5.8-x86_64-windows.zip) | `2b26049565a2bfd2b1c4a1c103f2a64cd864dd14da619bd7be750ad3c6b356f2` | | Linux x64 | [octoflow-v1.5.8-x86_64-linux.tar.gz](https://github.com/octoflow-lang/octoflow/releases/download/v1.5.8/octoflow-v1.5.8-x86_64-linux.tar.gz) | `d7306fc1f5a9a733a66ae3a4d5f3b145670efa7a079302935d867b4b75551845` | | macOS (Apple Silicon) | [octoflow-v1.5.8-aarch64-macos.tar.gz](https://github.com/octoflow-lang/octoflow/releases/download/v1.5.8/octoflow-v1.5.8-aarch64-macos.tar.gz) | `33808c330dc5f08eb0008b52ecfb5f0ea532fb71b1c6996075c09b33dc5d8fd2` | Verify: `sha256sum octoflow-v1.5.8-*` (full checksums in [SHA256SUMS.txt](https://github.com/octoflow-lang/octoflow/releases/download/v1.5.8/SHA256SUMS.txt)). ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill's declared functionality requires an external native OctoFlow executable. The installation metadata instructs the host to download this executable from a GitHub release under the publisher's account. Because the binary is not included in the audited project, its implementation and the documented sandbox, telemetry, storage, and network restrictions cannot be verified through this audit. SHA-256 hashes reduce accide ...[truncated 2475 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Change automated installation metadata to use an immutable, platform-specific artifact URL rather than a release directory. 2. Require verification of every downloaded artifact before extraction or execution. Installation must fail closed on any verification error. 3. Sign release artifacts with Sigstore, minisign, or an equivalent mechanism and pin the expected signing identity or public key independently of the release repository. 4. Publish provenance attestations covering the source revision, build workflow, build environment, and resulting artifact digest. 5. Provide source code and reproducible-build instructions so users can independently validate that release binaries correspond to reviewed source. 6. Keep trusted hashes or signing-key fingerprints in a separately controlled and reviewed channel instead of relying only on a checksum file hosted alongside the binaries. 7. Document that the downloaded binary is native code running with the user's ambient privileges and that its internal sandbox does not sandbox the executable itself. 8. Consider distributing through a package ecosystem that supports signed metadata, immutable versions, and transparent provenance verification.
