T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:100- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Package Is Installed and Executed Without Integrity Verification
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 100-103; execution entry point inscripts/Start_QuantAll.py, lines 1-3
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain exposure through an unpinned dependency and package mirror
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
From
SKILL.md:text □ 2. pip installation: <skill-dir>/scripts/.venv/Scripts/python.exe -m pip install quantall -i https://pypi.tuna.tsinghua.edu.cn/simple □ 3. Create Start_QuantAll.py in the scripts directory: import os from QuantAll import Start_main Start_main(os.path.dirname(__file__))Corresponding code in
scripts/Start_QuantAll.py:python import os from QuantAll import Start_main Start_main(os.path.dirname(__file__))Technical Analysis
The installation command retrieves the latest package matching the name
quantallfrom a third-party package mirror. It does not specify an exact version, validate package hashes, use a reviewed lockfile, or otherwise authenticate the expected artifact.The installed package is then imported and its
Start_mainentry point is invoked. Python packages can execute code during installation, module import, and function invocation. Consequently, the effective executable code is mutable after this Skill has been audited.QuantAll is a declared functional dependency, so installing it is not inherently unauthorized. The vulnerability is the absence of supply-chain controls around installation and execution. The Skill itself does not contain evidence that the package or mirror is currently malicious.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the
quantallpackage release, one of its transitive dependencies, the configured mirror, or the relevant publisher account. - The attacker publishes or serves a malicious package version under the expected package name.
- A user follows the documented unpinned
pip install quantallcommand. - Pip selects the att ...[truncated 1135 chars]
- An attacker compromises the
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
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Pin QuantAll to a specifically reviewed version:
text python -m pip install "quantall==<approved-version>" -
Generate and distribute a requirements or lock file containing hashes:
text quantall==<approved-version> \ --hash=sha256:<verified-package-hash>Install it with:
text python -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt -
Pin and hash all transitive dependencies, not only the top-level package.
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Document the authoritative publisher, package index, expected version, and checksum. Use the authoritative index unless a mirror is operationally necessary.
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If a mirror is required, use a trusted synchronized mirror and verify downloaded artifacts against independently published hashes or signatures.
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Run the engine inside a dedicated virtual environment under a non-administrative account with access restricted to the required scripts, output directory, and market database.
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Review release changes before updating the pinned version, and perform dependency scanning or software-composition analysis as part of the update process.
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Avoid silently upgrading the dependency. Treat each version change as a separately reviewed deployment.
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