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Security audit

自我智能改进体

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This browser-automation skill is coherent, but it asks users to handle live browser sessions and install mutable global tooling without enough safety guidance.

Review this before installing. Use it only in an isolated environment, avoid loading real admin sessions unless necessary, treat saved auth JSON, cookies, and storage values as secrets, delete them after use, and prefer a pinned local install over the documented global npm install.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:197
Finding
Unpinned Global npm Package Installation## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 197–199 **Vulnerability Type**: Supply-chain exposure through an unpinned third-party dependency **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```bash npm install -g agent-browser agent-browser install # Download Chromium agent-browser install --with-deps # Linux: + system deps ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation instructions globally install `agent-browser` without specifying an exact package version or integrity hash. Consequently, the installed content depends on whichever release the npm registry resolves at installation time, rather than a version reviewed with this skill. An npm installation may execute package lifecycle scripts. After installation, the instructions invoke the package to download Chromium and, with `--with-deps`, install additional system dependencies. This expands the trust boundary from the skill itself to the current npm package release, its transitive dependencies, browser artifacts, and system-package sources. The audit found no evidence that the currently named package is malicious. The issue is that package takeover, registry compromise, or a malicious future release could alter the effective code after this skill has been reviewed. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the `agent-browser` npm package, its maintainer account, a transitive dependency, or the relevant distribution channel. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious release or causes dependency resolution to select malicious content. 3. A user follows the documented `npm install -g agent-browser` command. 4. npm retrieves the mutable package version and may execute attacker-controlled lifecycle code during installation. 5. Because installation is global, malicious content can affect the shared command environment. If installation or `--with-deps` is run with elevated privileges, the payload may inherit those privileges. 6. The user then invokes `agent-browser install ...[truncated 856 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin `agent-browser` to an exact reviewed version rather than allowing npm to resolve the latest release. 2. Record and verify package integrity using a lockfile and registry-provided integrity metadata. 3. Prefer a project-local installation over `npm install -g` to limit the package's scope and make dependency resolution reproducible. 4. Review the selected package version, transitive dependency tree, and lifecycle scripts before installation. 5. Disable lifecycle scripts during installation where compatible, and run any required setup step separately after review. 6. Execute installation as an unprivileged, isolated user or inside a disposable container or sandbox. 7. Pin and verify downloaded Chromium artifacts and document the trusted download source. 8. Avoid `--with-deps` unless necessary. When system dependencies are required, list and install reviewed, version-controlled packages through the operating system's trusted package-management process. 9. Add package provenance or signature verification and routine dependency vulnerability scanning to the release process.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill explicitly documents saving and loading browser auth state, as well as reading and modifying cookies and local storage, but provides no warning that these artifacts may contain active session tokens, authentication cookies, or other sensitive credentials. In an agent context, this increases the risk of credential reuse, accidental exfiltration, insecure storage, or cross-session privilege leakage if operators treat these files and commands as routine automation outputs.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.