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Security audit

Userorbit

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill appears to be a legitimate Userorbit API helper, but it grants broad authenticated authority over customer-facing content and subscriber data without clear safeguards.

Install only if you intend to let the agent operate a Userorbit workspace with an API key. Use a least-privilege Userorbit key if available, keep the environment variables private, and explicitly confirm deletes, publishes, subscriber changes, and project-level actions before allowing the agent to run them.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (14)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs use of shell and network capabilities via curl but does not declare any tool scope or allowed-tools restrictions. That increases the chance an agent can invoke broader-than-necessary capabilities, making misuse of credentials or unintended remote actions more likely.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill directs the agent to use API credentials and manage subscriber records, which likely include personal data, but provides no privacy, minimization, or secret-handling guidance. This raises the risk of exposing API keys, mishandling personal data, or performing subscriber actions without appropriate caution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 33)May include surrounding context.

Usage:

bash
curl -s -X POST "https://api.userorbit.com/api/v1/<endpoint>" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer ${USERORBIT_API_KEY}" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "x-team-id: ${USERORBIT_TEAM_ID}" \

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The skill documents destructive and state-changing operations such as delete, archive, restore, publish, pin, and update without requiring user confirmation or warning before execution. In an agent setting, this can lead to accidental content deletion, publication, or other irreversible changes from ambiguous prompts.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This code transmits data to an external network endpoint while attaching a bearer token and team identifier from environment variables. Although contacting the vendor API is expected for this skill, the combination of arbitrary endpoint selection and arbitrary POST body means the skill can exfiltrate data to the service or perform unauthorized modifications without additional safety checks.

Content

Scanner excerpt · api-helper.sh (reported line 6)May include surrounding context.

sh
# ABOUTME: Requires USERORBIT_API_KEY and USERORBIT_TEAM_ID to be set in environment
ENDPOINT="$1"
if [ -n "$2" ]; then BODY="$2"; else BODY='{}'; fi
exec curl -s -X POST "https://api.userorbit.com/api/v1/${ENDPOINT}" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer ${USERORBIT_API_KEY}" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "x-team-id: ${USERORBIT_TEAM_ID}" \

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This code transmits data to an external network endpoint while attaching a bearer token and team identifier from environment variables. Although contacting the vendor API is expected for this skill, the combination of arbitrary endpoint selection and arbitrary POST body means the skill can exfiltrate data to the service or perform unauthorized modifications without additional safety checks.

Content

Scanner excerpt · api-helper.sh (reported line 6)May include surrounding context.

sh
# ABOUTME: Requires USERORBIT_API_KEY and USERORBIT_TEAM_ID to be set in environment
ENDPOINT="$1"
if [ -n "$2" ]; then BODY="$2"; else BODY='{}'; fi
exec curl -s -X POST "https://api.userorbit.com/api/v1/${ENDPOINT}" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer ${USERORBIT_API_KEY}" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "x-team-id: ${USERORBIT_TEAM_ID}" \

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The helper performs an authenticated POST to an external service using environment-derived credentials and arbitrary request data, but provides no user-facing disclosure, confirmation, or guardrails. In an agent-skill context, this can cause silent transmission of sensitive data or unintended state-changing API actions on behalf of the user.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 24)May include surrounding context.

md
# Userorbit API Reference

Base URL: `https://api.userorbit.com/api/v1`

All endpoints use POST. Auth via `Authorization: Bearer $USERORBIT_API_KEY` header. Optionally add `x-team-id` header for multi-team users.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 33)May include surrounding context.

md
# Userorbit API Reference

Base URL: `https://api.userorbit.com/api/v1`

All endpoints use POST. Auth via `Authorization: Bearer $USERORBIT_API_KEY` header. Optionally add `x-team-id` header for multi-team users.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 42)May include surrounding context.

md
# Userorbit API Reference

Base URL: `https://api.userorbit.com/api/v1`

All endpoints use POST. Auth via `Authorization: Bearer $USERORBIT_API_KEY` header. Optionally add `x-team-id` header for multi-team users.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api.md (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

md
# Userorbit API Reference

Base URL: `https://api.userorbit.com/api/v1`

All endpoints use POST. Auth via `Authorization: Bearer $USERORBIT_API_KEY` header. Optionally add `x-team-id` header for multi-team users.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

This markdown file describes destructive operations such as roadmaps.delete, stages.delete, and force deletion of associated topics, but it does not include any warning about irreversible data loss or user-impacting behavior. Under the markdown criteria, destructive behaviors that could affect user data or system integrity should be disclosed to users.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The file lists many operations that can delete, archive, unpublish, or otherwise materially alter user-visible content and subscriber data, including articles.delete, article-collections.delete, subscribers.delete, and projects.delete, but provides no cautionary notice. In markdown documentation, omission of warnings for operations affecting data integrity or privacy is a reportable issue.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The API reference states that article language defaults to en, which imposes a language preference in the natural-language documentation without indicating user opt-in or a justified locale constraint. This can conflict with language/locale policy expectations when no choice or rationale is provided.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.