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Security audit

Nicky

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill mostly matches its payment purpose, but its optional API-key mode exposes broad account and credit-transfer controls beyond simply paying a request.

Install only if you are comfortable with an agent helping initiate Nicky crypto payments. Prefer using the unauthenticated public payment flow. Do not provide NICKY_API_KEY unless you intentionally want the agent to access broader Nicky account features, and require explicit confirmation before any credit transfer, account update, subaccount change, or webhook change. Expect your payer name and email to be sent to Nicky and shown to the payment receiver.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
The skill is presented as an anonymous public payment-flow integration, but it also advertises optional authenticated MCP access to broad private capabilities such as account management, billing, payment reports, and webhooks. That scope expansion is risky because an agent or host may over-request or misuse a supplied API key in ways unrelated to the user’s immediate intent, violating least privilege and increasing the chance of unauthorized account actions.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The private MCP tool list includes powerful operations like credit transfers, sub-account management, webhook creation/deletion, and user/account updates that are not necessary for paying a payment request. In a payment skill context, exposing these capabilities is especially dangerous because it creates an unnecessary path for high-impact account changes or fund movement if an API key is present, far beyond the user’s expected action of paying an invoice.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs the agent to collect payer name and email and transmit them to the service, but it does not require informing the user that this personal data will be shared with the payment receiver and platform. In a payment context this is sensitive because users may assume they are only authorizing a crypto transfer, not disclosure of identifying information, creating privacy and consent risk.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The API requires `payerName` and `payerEmail` and explicitly notes they are receiver-visible, but the reference does not require the agent to obtain informed user consent or warn that this personal data is sent to a third-party payment service and disclosed to the payee. In a no-auth anonymous payment flow, this increases privacy risk because users may assume the action is just a blockchain transfer rather than identity-sharing with both the platform and recipient.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.