Sportfolio.Market

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Sep 12, 2026 · 1:08 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

The skill is coherent and purpose-aligned, but its login examples could expose a user API token through shell history or process logs.

Review the token-handling instructions before installing. Use this skill only with a user-scoped, revocable Sportfolio token, avoid pasting live tokens into commands that may be saved in shell history or logs, and prefer an interactive prompt or other non-logged credential mechanism if the CLI supports it. Confirm any staged gameplay action manually before execution.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Insecure Skill Coding Practices: Finds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:53

Finding

User API Token Exposed Through Command-Line Arguments

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:53, SKILL.md:60, and SKILL.md:66
Vulnerability Type: Credential exposure through command-line arguments
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

bash

npm run cli -- auth login --token <your-token> --base-url https://www.sportfolio.market

bash

npm run cli -- auth login --token <your-token> --base-url http://127.0.0.1:5000

bash

node packages/sportfolio-cli/bin/sportfolio.mjs auth login --token <your-token> --base-url https://www.sportfolio.market

Technical Analysis

The documented authentication workflow instructs users to place a user API token directly in a command-line argument. Sensitive command-line arguments may be retained in shell history, terminal-session logs, command auditing systems, or diagnostic output. Depending on the operating system and process configuration, they may also be temporarily visible through process-inspection interfaces while the command is running.

This practice conflicts with the instruction at SKILL.md:23 to avoid placing tokens in shell history or logs. The placeholder itself is not a hardcoded secret, but users following the examples would replace it with a live bearer token.

Attack Path

1. A user creates a user-scoped Sportfolio API token.
2. The user follows one of the documented commands and substitutes the live token for <your-token>.
3. The shell records the command in history, or another local monitoring or diagnostic mechanism captures the process arguments.
4. An attacker with access to the affected local account, history files, terminal logs, process telemetry, or command-auditing records extracts the token.
5. The attacker submits the token to the documented Sportfolio MCP endpoint or uses it through the repository-local CLI.
6. The attacker accesses capabilities available within the compromised user's account boundary, including immediate reads and any exposed account operations. Gameplay mutations remain subject ...[truncated 1001 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

1. Replace the --token examples with an interactive authentication command that reads the token from a hidden, non-echoing prompt.
2. Add support for reading the token from standard input or a protected credential store, ensuring that the value is never printed or logged.
3. If environment-variable authentication is supported, document it only as a secondary option and warn that environment variables can also leak through child processes, diagnostics, crash reports, or misconfigured telemetry.
4. Ensure the CLI redacts authorization headers and token values from normal output, errors, debug logs, exception traces, and telemetry.
5. Store persistent credentials using operating-system credential facilities or a configuration file with restrictive permissions rather than plaintext command history.
6. Document token revocation and rotation steps for users who previously entered tokens directly on the command line.
7. Add automated documentation checks that reject examples containing sensitive options such as --token <value>.

A safer interface would resemble:

bash

npm run cli -- auth login --base-url https://www.sportfolio.market
# The CLI then obtains the token through a hidden interactive prompt.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep