T02 · Agent Memory Poisoning
- Location
SKILL.md:38- Finding
Unvalidated Conversation Input Can Poison Persistent Identity Memory
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 38-40
Vulnerability Type: Persistent memory poisoning through unvalidated identity updates
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Content
The audited passage states, in English translation:
markdown ### Real-Time Identity Updates When you tell the Agent that you changed jobs, changed roles, or made any other identity change, the new information takes effect immediately without waiting or restarting. Old identity information is archived rather than overwritten.Technical Analysis
The Skill instructs the Agent to make conversationally supplied identity changes effective immediately and preserve them across sessions. It does not define authentication, confirmation, provenance validation, trust boundaries, or restrictions on which conversations may modify persistent identity records.
Consequently, untrusted or inaccurate conversational input may be treated as authoritative identity data. Archiving rather than deleting the previous value also causes attacker-controlled or erroneous information to remain in long-term storage. Subsequent memory consolidation may further reinforce that information.
The project contains only
SKILL.md; no implementation was available to verify backend authorization controls, storage encryption, retention limits, or the precise influence of stored identity records. The finding therefore concerns the unsafe behavior explicitly specified by the Skill and does not establish operating-system compromise or arbitrary code execution.Attack Path
- An attacker obtains the ability to interact with the Agent, contributes content through an untrusted conversation, or causes attacker-controlled text to be processed as user input.
- The attacker submits a false identity statement, such as a claim that the user has changed roles, organizations, responsibilities, or preferences.
- Following the Skill instruction, the Agent make ...[truncated 1202 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Require explicit user confirmation before committing identity, employment, role, authorization, or other sensitive profile changes to persistent memory.
- Restrict persistent-memory mutation to authenticated first-party conversations and reject updates originating from retrieved documents, quoted text, tool output, shared channels, or other untrusted sources.
- Store provenance metadata with every record, including source, timestamp, conversation identifier, confidence, and whether the content is a direct statement or an AI-generated inference.
- Treat stored memories exclusively as data. Never interpret remembered text as system instructions, authorization grants, tool permissions, or safety-policy overrides.
- Use a pending-update workflow for sensitive changes and display the old and proposed values before approval.
- Preserve an auditable version history while allowing users to inspect, correct, delete, and permanently purge inaccurate records.
- Apply retention limits and data minimization so that only necessary identity fields are stored.
- Ensure memory retrieval favors verified, recent records and exposes conflicts instead of silently replacing trusted information.
- Add tests covering prompt injection, impersonation, shared-session contamination, conflicting identity claims, and poisoning through quoted or retrieved content.
- Protect the underlying memory service with strong authentication, authorization, encryption in transit and at rest, and tenant isolation.
