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Security audit

Multi Platform Crosspost

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill broadly matches a blog cross-posting purpose, but it needs review because it can publish publicly and has unsafe webhook authentication, external content-sharing, and capability-disclosure gaps.

Install only if you are comfortable giving the workflow posting and email authority. Before enabling it with real credentials, move webhook authentication before any blog-admin or external requests, use stronger signed webhook authentication, validate slug/lang inputs, add a review step before public posting, make OpenAI processing explicit opt-in, sanitize email HTML, and align the documented platform list with what the workflows actually do.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (6)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
workflows/aethon-blog-crosspost.json:25
Finding

Webhook Authentication Occurs After a Privileged Internal API Request

Content
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Remediation
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T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
workflows/ink-blog-crosspost.json:25
Finding

Webhook Authentication Occurs After a Privileged Internal API Request

Content
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Remediation
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T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
workflows/aethon-blog-crosspost.json:119
Finding

Untrusted Article Content Can Influence Automatically Published LLM Output

Content
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String(t).toLowerCase().replace(/[^a-z0-9]/g,'')), published: true } }); return [{ json: { ...prev, ai, linkedin_text: ai.linkedin?.text || (prev.title + '\n\n' + prev.description + '\n\n#YourBrandHashtag'), devto_body: devtoBody, hashnode_body: hashnodeBody } }]; ``` The values are sent to publishing nodes: ```json { "person": "YOUR_LINKEDIN_PERSON_ID", "text": "={{ $json.linkedin_text }}\n\n{{ ...[truncated 2382 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
workflows/aethon-blog-crosspost.json:600
Finding

Raw Article and Model Output Are Embedded in HTML Email Without Sanitization

Content
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{{ ($json.ai?.substack?.body || $json.body || '').replace(/\n/g, '
') }}
``` Other dynamic model fields are also inserted into the HTML template: ```html
text
{{ $json.ai?.facebook?.text || 'Content generation failed' }}

{{ $json.canonical_url }}
``` ```html
text
{{ $json.ai?.reddit?.body || $json.description + '\n\nFull article: ' + $json.canonical_url }}
``` ### Technical Analysis Replacing newline characters with `
` does not sanitize HTML. If the article body or model response contains HTML tags, those tags become part of the email body. Email clients commonly block scripts, but dangerous and deceptive markup remains possible, including tracking pixels, externally loaded images, misleading links, hidden text, layout manipulation, and client-dependent active content. The model output is additionally influenced by untrusted article content, expanding the injection path. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker places crafted HTML in a source article or causes the LLM to reproduce crafted markup. 2. The cross-post workflow stores that content in `$json.body` or `$json.ai`. 3. The `Send Platform Content` node interpolates the value directly into its HTML template. 4. The configured SMTP service sends the resulting HTML message. 5. A notification recipient opens the message. 6. T ...[truncated 536 chars]
Remediation
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` prevents HTML interpretation; escaped content must be used inside all HTML elements. 7. Add test cases containing tags such as ``, ``, malformed markup, and encoded HTML to verify sanitization. ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
workflows/ink-blog-crosspost.json:272
Finding

Raw Blog Content Is Embedded in Substack HTML Email Without Sanitization

Content
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Ready to paste into Substack\n

Title: {{ $('Determine Platforms').first().json.title }}

\n

Canonical URL: {{ $('Determine Platforms').first().json.canonical_url }}

\n
\n
{{ $('Determine Platforms').first().json.body.replace(/\\n/g, '
') }}
\n
\n

Copy the content above and paste it into your Substack editor. Set the canonical URL to: {{ $('Determine Platforms').first().json.canonical_url }}

", "options": {} } ``` ### Technical Analysis The complete blog body is inserted into an HTML email after only replacing newline characters. No HTML escaping or sanitization is performed. A source article containing HTML can therefore alter the notification email's markup. Although modern email clients generally suppress JavaScript, the injected content may include remote images, tracking resources, misleading links, hidden content, or layout changes. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker creates or modifies a blog post containing crafted HTML. 2. The post is fetched by the workflow. 3. The attacker-controlled body reaches the `Email for Substack` node. 4. Newlines are changed to `
`, but existing markup remains intact. 5. The SMTP service sends the resulting message to `YOUR_NOTIFICATION_EMAIL`. 6. The recipient's email client renders the injected markup. ### Impact Assessment The vulnerability affects recipients of the configured Substack-re ...[truncated 210 chars]
Remediation
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other

Warning
Location
workflows/aethon-blog-crosspost.json:119
Finding

OpenAI Processing Is Described as Optional but Article Content Is Sent Unconditionally

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (10)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly automates distribution of full blog content to multiple third-party platforms and also emails formatted article content, but the introductory description does not prominently warn users about that external publication and data transmission. This can lead users to trigger the workflow without fully understanding that content, metadata, and possibly unpublished or sensitive material fetched from the blog admin API will be sent outside their primary environment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 133)May include surrounding context.

4. Trigger

bash
# Via webhook
curl -X POST https://your-n8n.com/webhook/blog-crosspost \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"slug": "my-article", "lang": "en", "platforms": "all", "_secret": "your-secret"}'

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes an 'Automatically cross-post' pipeline for 7+ named platforms including Twitter/X, Reddit, Substack, and Pinterest. In the workflow response and downstream logic, only LinkedIn, Dev.to, and Hashnode are actually auto-posted, while Twitter, Facebook, Reddit, and Substack are marked manual/content-ready, and there is no Pinterest handling anywhere in the file.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The workflow sends article content to OpenAI and later distributes generated and source-derived content through Slack and email, while also carrying full body text and AI outputs through workflow state. If the source post contains unpublished, sensitive, regulated, or inadvertently embedded secrets, the pipeline broadens exposure across multiple third-party services and internal channels.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · workflows/aethon-blog-crosspost.json (reported line 133)May include surrounding context.

json
{
      "parameters": {
        "method": "POST",
        "url": "https://api.openai.com/v1/chat/completions",
        "authentication": "predefinedCredentialType",
        "nodeCredentialType": "openAiApi",
        "sendBody": true,

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The workflow performs real side effects—posting to external platforms and sending Slack/email updates—after only a webhook-triggered secret check, with no explicit approval gate or human confirmation before publication. In a publishing automation context, this creates a meaningful risk of accidental or unauthorized distribution if the webhook secret is leaked, guessed, mishandled, or invoked by an internal system unexpectedly.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes a production-tested pipeline that automatically cross-posts to seven or more named platforms. In this file, the only real outbound publishing action is a LinkedIn post, and Substack is handled by sending an email for manual paste; the other named platforms are not implemented here despite status fields being recorded for some of them.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This JSON workflow posts content to LinkedIn and elsewhere in the flow sends full post bodies by email, but the file contains no user-facing disclosure, confirmation step, or explanatory comment warning that content will be transmitted to third-party services. Because this is a manifest-style workflow file rather than README documentation, there is no visible in-file warning to alert operators before cross-posting and emailing article content.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The manifest enumerates LinkedIn, Dev.to, Hashnode, Twitter/X, Reddit, Substack, and Pinterest. The AI prompt and later result handling include Facebook content generation and operational reporting, which expands platform scope beyond the declared description.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The workflow accepts a shared secret from the request body as its main authentication control for a webhook that triggers outbound posting and email actions. Body-based secrets are weaker than standard webhook authentication schemes because they are easier to mishandle, log, replay, or leak through upstream systems, and there is no signature, timestamp, or source verification shown here.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.