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Security audit

Yufluent Clawhub Publish Yufluentcn Chat Assist

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This appears to be a disclosed cloud-backed ecommerce support skill, but users should treat buyer messages and order details as data sent to a third-party service.

Install only if you are comfortable sending buyer messages, product information, and any provided order context to Yufluent's cloud service. Keep TOKENAPI_BASE_URL or any base-url setting pointed only at the intended HTTPS service, and redact unnecessary personal data such as full addresses, phone numbers, emails, or complete order identifiers before use.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Tainted flow: 'url' from os.getenv (line 271, credential/environment) → requests.post (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Content
}
    if body is not None:
        kwargs["json"] = body
    return requests.post(url, **kwargs)


def _raise_for_status(resp: requests.Response) -> None:
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The code allows the request destination to be derived from TOKENAPI_BASE_URL, ultimately reaching requests.post without validation. If an attacker can influence environment variables or call this API with a crafted base_url, they can redirect authenticated requests and skill payloads to an arbitrary host, causing SSRF-style behavior and exfiltration of the Bearer token and submitted data.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The README explicitly shows sending buyer messages and order context to a cloud-executed workflow, but provides no warning, minimization guidance, or data-handling notice for potentially sensitive customer information. In an e-commerce support context, order details can include personal or transactional data, so normalizing transmission to a remote endpoint without disclosure increases the risk of privacy leakage, policy violations, and accidental oversharing by operators.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill explicitly instructs users to send buyer messages and order context to a cloud service, but it does not clearly warn that this may include personal or order data being transmitted to a third party. In an ecommerce support context, those fields can contain names, order numbers, addresses, tracking details, and message content, creating privacy, compliance, and data-handling risk if users are not properly informed.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
The script collects buyer message content and optional order context, then sends them to a remote cloud API via run_skill() without any user-facing disclosure, confirmation, or minimization in this file. Because these fields can contain personal, order, or support-sensitive information, silent transmission to a cloud service creates a privacy and data-handling risk, especially in a customer-support context involving external buyer data.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.