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Security audit

LurkAPI: Video transcripts

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill coherently uses LurkAPI to retrieve and analyze requested video transcripts, with disclosed authentication and credit costs.

LurkAPI receives the video links and creator identifiers you select, and requests consume account credits. Keep your API key out of chat and review batch costs. The bundled instructions were fully reviewed; live service behavior and provider data-retention practices were not verified.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

Profile lookup could support discovering a creator's videos, but the supplied code only requests Nike's profile and shows no connection to selecting videos or extracting what they say. Its demonstrated purpose is therefore materially different from the declared workflow. The API request and API-key usage are not independently suspicious.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 18)May include surrounding context.

Without MCP (Codex, Cursor, scripts), every tool is GET https://api.lurkapi.com plus its path, with the same params as a query string (URL-encoded) and the key from LURKAPI_API_KEY in the x-api-key header:

bash
curl -s "https://api.lurkapi.com/v1/tiktok/profile?handle=nike" -H "x-api-key: $LURKAPI_API_KEY"

If LURKAPI_API_KEY isn't set but LURKAPI_KEY is (the name older docs used), use that. Raw answers are big: pipe them through jq to keep the fields you need. No key yet? Ask the user to create one at https://lurkapi.com/dashboard (100 free credits on sign-up, then a balance below 25 tops back up to 25 every day) and to set LURKAPI_API_KEY in their shell. Never ask for the key in the chat, and never print it.

The workflow sends user-supplied video links and creator identifiers to LurkAPI without a user-facing privacy warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The workflow instructs the agent to submit video URLs and creator handles to LurkAPI for transcription and listing. Although the API integration and credit costs are documented, the skill does not tell users that their supplied links and creator selections will be disclosed to a third-party service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.