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Security audit

LurkAPI: Creator vetting

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill uses a clearly identified service to assess public creator data, with proportionate access and disclosed credit costs.

LurkAPI receives the creators you look up and spends API credits. Its [privacy policy](https://lurkapi.com/privacy) says it logs request parameters and retains your account's first request, so consider whether your shortlist is confidential. Keep the API key outside chat and set a credit budget. This review covers the skill instructions, not the external service or connector implementation.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

The workflow sends user-supplied creator identifiers to LurkAPI without a user-facing privacy warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The Gather workflow instructs the agent to submit creator handles and post URLs through LurkAPI. Although the API endpoint and authentication are documented, the skill does not instruct the agent to notify the user that these identifiers—and thus the targets of their vetting request—will be shared with a third-party service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 18)May include surrounding context.

Without MCP (Codex, Cursor, scripts), every tool is GET https://api.lurkapi.com plus its path, with the same params as a query string (URL-encoded) and the key from LURKAPI_API_KEY in the x-api-key header:

bash
curl -s "https://api.lurkapi.com/v1/tiktok/profile?handle=nike" -H "x-api-key: $LURKAPI_API_KEY"

If LURKAPI_API_KEY isn't set but LURKAPI_KEY is (the name older docs used), use that. Raw answers are big: pipe them through jq to keep the fields you need. No key yet? Ask the user to create one at https://lurkapi.com/dashboard (100 free credits on sign-up, then a balance below 25 tops back up to 25 every day) and to set LURKAPI_API_KEY in their shell. Never ask for the key in the chat, and never print it.