MCP01
- Location
plugin/dist/a2a-client.js:285- Finding
Agent Card-controlled RPC endpoints receive configured credentials and handoff contents ## Remediation Suggestions 1. **Validate discovered endpoints before caching or using them.** - Default to same-origin HTTPS endpoints. - Reject HTTPS-to-HTTP downgrade. - Reject unsupported schemes, embedded URL credentials, and fragments. - Require explicit operator configuration for cross-origin RPC endpoints. 2. **Bind credentials to approved destinations.** - Associate tokens and sensitive headers with exact approved origins. - Do not forward discovery credentials to newly advertised origins automatically. - Configure separate credentials where legitimate cross-origin services require them. 3. **Control redirects.** - Disable automatic redirects for authenticated discovery and RPC requests, or validate every redirect destination before resending sensitive headers or request bodies. 4. **Restrict network reachability.** - Use destination allowlists and egress controls appropriate to the deployment. - Block loopback, link-local, private, and metadata-service destinations unless explicitly required and approved. 5. **Add regression tests.** - Cover malicious `supportedInterfaces`, top-level `url`, and `additionalInterfaces` values. - Verify rejection of cross-origin endpoints and transport downgrade. - Verify that neither bearer tokens nor custom authentication headers reach unauthorized destinations. - Cover discovery and RPC redirects. 6. **Respond to potential prior exposure.** - If an untrusted or compromised Agent Card was used, inspect outbound request records and rotate potentially disclosed credentials.
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
plugin/dist/a2a-client.js, lines 183–195, 285–315, 318–336, and 371–386
Vulnerability Type: Credential disclosure and server-side request forgery through unvalidated service discovery
Risk Level: High
Confidence: High; confirmed through static data-flow analysis. No dynamic exploit was executed.Vulnerable Code
The client constructs authentication headers using configured static headers and an environment-variable credential:
javascript buildHeaders(protocolVersion, includeJsonContentType = false) { const headers = { Accept: "application/json", ...(this.target.headers ?? {}), }; if (includeJsonContentType) { headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"; } if (protocolVersion === "1.0") { headers["A2A-Version"] = "1.0"; } if (this.target.authTokenEnvVar) { const token = process.env[this.target.authTokenEnvVar]?.trim(); if (!token) { throw new BridgeError("AUTH_LOGIN_REQUIRED", `Environment variable "${this.target.authTokenEnvVar}" is not set for A2A target "${this.target.targetId}".`, `Export ${this.target.authTokenEnvVar} before running handoffs to "${this.target.targetId}".`); } if (this.target.authHeaderName) { headers[this.target.authHeaderName] = token; } else { headers.Authorization = /^bearer\s+/i.test(token) ? token : `Bearer ${token}`; } } return headers; }For A2A v1.0, the Agent Card interface URL becomes the RPC destination without origin or HTTPS enforcement:
javascript return { name, version, protocolVersion: resolvedProto, rpcUrl: new URL(ifaceUrl, `${this.baseUrl}/`).toString(), streaming, };The corresponding A2A v0.3 selection also accepts a card-supplied destination:
javascript let rpcUrl = readString(card, "url") ?? this.baseUrl; const preferredTransport = (readString(card, "pref ...[truncated 5328 chars]
