T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
references/api.md:160- Finding
Arbitrary Host Bind Mounts Violate the Documented Filesystem Boundary
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a coherent Docker-management helper, but it gives agents high-impact container authority with several under-scoped safety gaps users should review first.
Install only if you trust the WAGMIOS backend and will use least-privilege, per-host API keys. Prefer loopback-only or HTTPS/VPN access for remote hosts, avoid broad docker-group membership for general users, review compose files and bind mounts before starting apps, and do not allow agents to print container environment values that may contain secrets.
references/api.md:160Arbitrary Host Bind Mounts Violate the Documented Filesystem Boundary
references/docker-install.md:78Docker Group Membership Grants Root-Equivalent Access Beyond the Skill’s Needs
references/api.md:3Remote API Keys May Be Transmitted Over Plaintext HTTP
references/api.md:83System Metrics Endpoint Is Documented as Unauthenticated
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
DELETE /api/images/{id}
Required Scope: images:write
Requires user confirmation before executing.
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
sudo apt-get install ca-certificates curl gnupg lsb-release
# Add Docker GPG key
sudo mkdir -p /etc/apt/keyrings
curl -fsSL https://download.docker.com/linux/ubuntu/gpg | sudo gpg --dearmor -o /etc/apt/keyrings/docker.gpg
# Add Docker repo
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
sudo apt-get install ca-certificates curl gnupg lsb-release
# Add Docker GPG key
sudo mkdir -p /etc/apt/keyrings
curl -fsSL https://download.docker.com/linux/ubuntu/gpg | sudo gpg --dearmor -o /etc/apt/keyrings/docker.gpg
# Add Docker repo
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
sudo apt-get install ca-certificates curl gnupg lsb-release
# Add Docker GPG key
sudo mkdir -p /etc/apt/keyrings
curl -fsSL https://download.docker.com/linux/ubuntu/gpg | sudo gpg --dearmor -o /etc/apt/keyrings/docker.gpg
# Add Docker repo
Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
# Add Docker GPG key
sudo mkdir -p /etc/apt/keyrings
curl -fsSL https://download.docker.com/linux/ubuntu/gpg | sudo gpg --dearmor -o /etc/apt/keyrings/docker.gpg
# Add Docker repo
echo "deb [arch=$(dpkg --print-architecture) signed-by=/etc/apt/keyrings/docker.gpg] https://download.docker.com/linux/ubuntu $(lsb_release -cs) stable" | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/docker.list
Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
# Add Docker GPG key
sudo mkdir -p /etc/apt/keyrings
curl -fsSL https://download.docker.com/linux/ubuntu/gpg | sudo gpg --dearmor -o /etc/apt/keyrings/docker.gpg
# Add Docker repo
echo "deb [arch=$(dpkg --print-architecture) signed-by=/etc/apt/keyrings/docker.gpg] https://download.docker.com/linux/ubuntu $(lsb_release -cs) stable" | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/docker.list
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
User: "Delete the postgres container"
Agent: GET /api/auth/status
Agent: GET /api/containers → find container ID
Agent: DELETE /api/containers/{id}/delete → SCOPE_REQUIRED
Agent: "I can't delete containers — your key is missing the `containers:delete` scope.
To enable it: Settings → Agent Permissions → toggle ON → Save.
Let me know when you've enabled it."
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
User: "Delete the postgres container"
Agent: GET /api/auth/status
Agent: GET /api/containers → find container ID
Agent: DELETE /api/containers/{id}/delete → SCOPE_REQUIRED
Agent: "I can't delete containers — your key is missing the `containers:delete` scope.
To enable it: Settings → Agent Permissions → toggle ON → Save.
Let me know when you've enabled it."
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
User: "Delete the postgres container"
Agent: GET /api/auth/status
Agent: GET /api/containers → find container ID
Agent: DELETE /api/containers/{id}/delete → SCOPE_REQUIRED
Agent: "I can't delete containers — your key is missing the `containers:delete` scope.
To enable it: Settings → Agent Permissions → toggle ON → Save.
Let me know when you've enabled it."
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
User: "Delete the postgres container"
Agent: GET /api/auth/status
Agent: GET /api/containers → find container ID
Agent: DELETE /api/containers/{id}/delete → SCOPE_REQUIRED
Agent: "I can't delete containers — your key is missing the `containers:delete` scope.
To enable it: Settings → Agent Permissions → toggle ON → Save.
Let me know when you've enabled it."
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
---
name: wagmios
description: Give your OpenClaw agent a homelab. Use when managing Docker containers, installing marketplace apps, or any Docker-related tasks on behalf of the user. Scope-based API key permissions — agent can only do what the key allows. On Linux, Docker requires sudo — without root access, WAGMIOS is the only safe interface for agent homelab control. Supports multi-machine management — one agent can manage multiple WAGMIOS instances across different hosts, each with its own scoped key. Requires X-API-Key header on every request (user provides at runtime). Includes Docker installation check and startup validation.
---
# WAGMIOS
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
---
name: wagmios
description: Give your OpenClaw agent a homelab. Use when managing Docker containers, installing marketplace apps, or any Docker-related tasks on behalf of the user. Scope-based API key permissions — agent can only do what the key allows. On Linux, Docker requires sudo — without root access, WAGMIOS is the only safe interface for agent homelab control. Supports multi-machine management — one agent can manage multiple WAGMIOS instances across different hosts, each with its own scoped key. Requires X-API-Key header on every request (user provides at runtime). Includes Docker installation check and startup validation.
---
# WAGMIOS
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
---
name: wagmios
description: Give your OpenClaw agent a homelab. Use when managing Docker containers, installing marketplace apps, or any Docker-related tasks on behalf of the user. Scope-based API key permissions — agent can only do what the key allows. On Linux, Docker requires sudo — without root access, WAGMIOS is the only safe interface for agent homelab control. Supports multi-machine management — one agent can manage multiple WAGMIOS instances across different hosts, each with its own scoped key. Requires X-API-Key header on every request (user provides at runtime). Includes Docker installation check and startup validation.
---
# WAGMIOS
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
---
name: wagmios
description: Give your OpenClaw agent a homelab. Use when managing Docker containers, installing marketplace apps, or any Docker-related tasks on behalf of the user. Scope-based API key permissions — agent can only do what the key allows. On Linux, Docker requires sudo — without root access, WAGMIOS is the only safe interface for agent homelab control. Supports multi-machine management — one agent can manage multiple WAGMIOS instances across different hosts, each with its own scoped key. Requires X-API-Key header on every request (user provides at runtime). Includes Docker installation check and startup validation.
---
# WAGMIOS
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
---
name: wagmios
description: Give your OpenClaw agent a homelab. Use when managing Docker containers, installing marketplace apps, or any Docker-related tasks on behalf of the user. Scope-based API key permissions — agent can only do what the key allows. On Linux, Docker requires sudo — without root access, WAGMIOS is the only safe interface for agent homelab control. Supports multi-machine management — one agent can manage multiple WAGMIOS instances across different hosts, each with its own scoped key. Requires X-API-Key header on every request (user provides at runtime). Includes Docker installation check and startup validation.
---
# WAGMIOS
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
---
name: wagmios
description: Give your OpenClaw agent a homelab. Use when managing Docker containers, installing marketplace apps, or any Docker-related tasks on behalf of the user. Scope-based API key permissions — agent can only do what the key allows. On Linux, Docker requires sudo — without root access, WAGMIOS is the only safe interface for agent homelab control. Supports multi-machine management — one agent can manage multiple WAGMIOS instances across different hosts, each with its own scoped key. Requires X-API-Key header on every request (user provides at runtime). Includes Docker installation check and startup validation.
---
# WAGMIOS
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
---
name: wagmios
description: Give your OpenClaw agent a homelab. Use when managing Docker containers, installing marketplace apps, or any Docker-related tasks on behalf of the user. Scope-based API key permissions — agent can only do what the key allows. On Linux, Docker requires sudo — without root access, WAGMIOS is the only safe interface for agent homelab control. Supports multi-machine management — one agent can manage multiple WAGMIOS instances across different hosts, each with its own scoped key. Requires X-API-Key header on every request (user provides at runtime). Includes Docker installation check and startup validation.
---
# WAGMIOS
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
---
name: wagmios
description: Give your OpenClaw agent a homelab. Use when managing Docker containers, installing marketplace apps, or any Docker-related tasks on behalf of the user. Scope-based API key permissions — agent can only do what the key allows. On Linux, Docker requires sudo — without root access, WAGMIOS is the only safe interface for agent homelab control. Supports multi-machine management — one agent can manage multiple WAGMIOS instances across different hosts, each with its own scoped key. Requires X-API-Key header on every request (user provides at runtime). Includes Docker installation check and startup validation.
---
# WAGMIOS
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
---
name: wagmios
description: Give your OpenClaw agent a homelab. Use when managing Docker containers, installing marketplace apps, or any Docker-related tasks on behalf of the user. Scope-based API key permissions — agent can only do what the key allows. On Linux, Docker requires sudo — without root access, WAGMIOS is the only safe interface for agent homelab control. Supports multi-machine management — one agent can manage multiple WAGMIOS instances across different hosts, each with its own scoped key. Requires X-API-Key header on every request (user provides at runtime). Includes Docker installation check and startup validation.
---
# WAGMIOS
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
---
name: wagmios
description: Give your OpenClaw agent a homelab. Use when managing Docker containers, installing marketplace apps, or any Docker-related tasks on behalf of the user. Scope-based API key permissions — agent can only do what the key allows. On Linux, Docker requires sudo — without root access, WAGMIOS is the only safe interface for agent homelab control. Supports multi-machine management — one agent can manage multiple WAGMIOS instances across different hosts, each with its own scoped key. Requires X-API-Key header on every request (user provides at runtime). Includes Docker installation check and startup validation.
---
# WAGMIOS
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
---
name: wagmios
description: Give your OpenClaw agent a homelab. Use when managing Docker containers, installing marketplace apps, or any Docker-related tasks on behalf of the user. Scope-based API key permissions — agent can only do what the key allows. On Linux, Docker requires sudo — without root access, WAGMIOS is the only safe interface for agent homelab control. Supports multi-machine management — one agent can manage multiple WAGMIOS instances across different hosts, each with its own scoped key. Requires X-API-Key header on every request (user provides at runtime). Includes Docker installation check and startup validation.
---
# WAGMIOS
The container config endpoint is described as returning the full configuration including environment variables, volumes, and ports, but the documentation does not warn that environment values commonly contain secrets such as API keys, database passwords, or tokens. In an agent setting, exposing and potentially echoing these values can lead to credential disclosure across conversations, logs, downstream tools, or prompt-injected exfiltration paths.
The API documents state-changing container lifecycle operations (start, stop, restart) without requiring or even recommending an explicit user confirmation step. In an agent context, this increases the chance that an LLM could disrupt running services, cause downtime, or restart sensitive workloads based on ambiguous prompts or prompt injection, especially since this skill is specifically designed for remote Docker management.
The marketplace start flow invokes docker compose up -d, which can pull images and launch one or more containers, but the documentation lacks a user-facing warning about the effects of starting software from a compose file. In this agent-operated homelab context, that omission is risky because it may lead to unreviewed code execution, unintended network exposure, resource consumption, or deployment of third-party images without informed user approval.
The Ubuntu/Debian instructions begin by removing existing Docker-related packages without a nearby warning about what may be uninstalled or disrupted. In an agent skill context, users may follow commands verbatim, so omitting an explicit warning increases the risk of unintended service interruption or package removal on systems already using container tooling.
No suspicious patterns detected.