Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a coherent Ciderbox/Orchard usage guide, with user-directed VM and secret-handling commands that deserve caution but are aligned with its stated purpose.
Install only if you intend to let agents manage local Apple container VMs. Treat 'chop' commands as destructive to running Ciderbox environments, and avoid 'secrets push --all' unless every running tree and workload is trusted; prefer short-lived, least-privilege credentials and rotate them after use.
Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
gofmt -w internal/cli/*.go
go test ./...
cd /tmp && rm -rf ciderbox-init-smoke && mkdir ciderbox-init-smoke
cd /tmp/ciderbox-init-smoke && git init -q && ciderbox init
This markdown file includes cleanup commands like ciderbox chop and later ciderbox orchard chop --yes, which imply destructive teardown of running VMs, but the skill description does not explicitly warn users that these commands will irreversibly terminate environments. Under the markdown-specific warning rule, behaviors affecting system state should be disclosed clearly.
The secrets workflow instructs users to push credentials into running trees without any warning about trust boundaries, secret lifetime, or the risk of distributing credentials to multiple agent-controlled VMs. In the orchard context, those trees execute tasks and may process untrusted repositories or prompts, so broad secret propagation increases the chance of credential exposure or misuse.