T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
scripts/generate_image.py:2- Finding
Unpinned Runtime Dependencies Allow Supply-Chain Substitution
- Content
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=3.10" # dependencies = [ # "openai>=1.0.0", # "requests", # "pillow>=10.0.0", # ] # /// ``` ### Technical Analysis The script uses PEP 723 inline dependency metadata and is intended to be executed with `uv run`. The declared dependencies are not pinned to exact, audited versions: - `requests` has no version constraint. - `openai` and `pillow` have minimum versions but no upper bounds. - No lockfile or package integrity hashes are present in the audited project. Consequently, dependency resolution may install package versions that differ from those available when the skill was reviewed. Python packages execute code during installation and import, so a compromised package release, dependency-confusion event, malicious transitive dependency, or incompatible future release could execute arbitrary code. The direct package names do not appear to be typographical imitations. The risk arises from mutable dependency resolution rather than evidence that the currently named packages are malicious. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises a declared package, one of its transitive dependencies, or the package distribution channel. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious version that satisfies the skill's broad dependency constraints. 3. A user invokes the documented `uv run` command in an environment where that version has not already been securely locked and cached. 4. `uv` resolves and installs the malicious or compromised release. 5. Malicious package code executes during installation or when imported by `generate_image.py`. 6. The code runs with the operating-system privileges and environment access of the user invoking the skill. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could provi ...[truncated 554 chars]- Remediation
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