Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill openly creates public share-link documents through Memyard and stores a local agent key, with no hidden code or unrelated persistence found.
Install this only if you are comfortable with content being sent to Memyard and created documents being public to anyone who has the share link. Avoid using it for private, regulated, or confidential material unless that public sharing model is acceptable, and protect or delete the stored agent key if you no longer use the service.
Although the metadata says documents are viewable at shareable links, the skill does not present a strong, explicit warning that created content is public to anyone with the link. In practice, users may assume cloud documents are private by default, so this omission materially increases the chance of publishing sensitive content.
The skill describes automatic registration and local persistence of an agent key in the user's home directory but does not present this as a prominent user warning. Because the key authorizes future API actions, silently storing it can create a lasting trust boundary change and expose the user to unintended account linkage or credential theft if the host is later compromised.
The skill description is broadly scoped as a general-purpose public document creation/editing capability without clear trigger boundaries or user-consent gating. In an agent setting, this can cause the skill to be invoked for routine writing tasks and silently route user content to an external third-party service, increasing accidental data disclosure risk.
The skill instructs the agent to automatically register and persist credentials on first use, but does not define strict activation boundaries or require explicit user approval beforehand. This creates a risk of unconsented account creation, secret generation, and durable local state changes triggered by an otherwise ordinary document request.
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
"message": "Store this key securely. It will not be shown again." }
Ensure `<HOME>/.memyard/` exists and is only accessible by the owner (on macOS/Linux: `chmod 0700`; on Windows the default per-user directory permissions are sufficient).
Persist to `<HOME>/.memyard/agent_config.json` (on macOS/Linux: `chmod 0600`):
```json
{
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
}
Ensure `<HOME>/.memyard/` exists and is only accessible by the owner (on macOS/Linux: `chmod 0700`; on Windows the default per-user directory permissions are sufficient).
Persist to `<HOME>/.memyard/agent_config.json` (on macOS/Linux: `chmod 0600`):
```json
{
"base_url": "<base_url>",
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
KEY="<agent_key>"
# 2. Propose a write (create doc)
PLAN=$(curl -s -X POST "$BASE/plan" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"doc_type":"document","title":"Hello","intended_operation":"create","content_summary":"Meeting notes"}')
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
# 3. If approved, execute with payload
if echo "$PLAN" | jq -e '.approved_plan' > /dev/null; then
PLAN_ID=$(echo "$PLAN" | jq -r '.approved_plan.plan_id')
DOC=$(curl -s -X POST "$BASE/execute" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"plan_id\":\"$PLAN_ID\",\"payload\":{\"title\":\"Hello\",\"content\":\"First paragraph.\"}}")
No suspicious patterns detected.