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Security audit

luci-upload

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill does what it claims by uploading media to memories.ai, but it can transmit any readable local file path plus time/location metadata without media validation or a final confirmation step.

Review before installing. Only use this skill with specific media files you intend to upload to memories.ai, and be aware it may transmit the file contents, filename, timestamp, coordinates, and API key-authenticated request to the service. Avoid invoking it on broad or ambiguous file requests, and prefer adding media-type validation and an explicit confirmation step before upload.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/run.py:194
Finding

Arbitrary Local File Upload Due to Missing Media Validation

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
Findings (9)

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.environ.get (line 212, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/run.py (reported line 105)May include surrounding context.

python
url = f"https://nominatim.openstreetmap.org/search?{params}"
    req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"User-Agent": "luci-upload-skill/1.0"})
    try:
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10) as resp:
            results = json.loads(resp.read())
        if results:
            return float(results[0]["lat"]), float(results[0]["lon"])

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.environ.get (line 212, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The script reads a secret API key from the environment or .env and sends it in an Authorization header to an external service, while also uploading the local media file and associated time/location metadata. This is expected functionality, but it is still a real security/privacy-sensitive operation because compromise of the destination service, misconfiguration, or accidental use could disclose sensitive media, location history, and credentials.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/run.py (reported line 218)May include surrounding context.

python
})

    try:
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=300) as resp:
            return json.loads(resp.read())
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
        error_body = e.read().decode() if e.fp else ""

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/run.py (reported line 27)May include surrounding context.

python
UPLOAD_PATH = "/serve/luci/api/manual/upload"
USERINFO_API = API_HOST + "/serve/api/userinfo"

ENV_FILE = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))), ".env")


def _load_env():

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/run.py (reported line 31)May include surrounding context.

python
def _load_env():
    """Load MEMORIES_AI_KEY from .env file next to the skill root."""
    if not os.path.exists(ENV_FILE):
        return None
    with open(ENV_FILE) as f:

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill uses shell execution, reads environment secrets, and sends data over the network, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope or permissions boundaries. That increases the chance an agent invokes it with broader capabilities than intended, making secret exposure, unintended file access, or external transmission harder to govern and audit.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The invocation text includes broad triggers like 'upload media,' 'add a video/photo to their memory,' or 'send a file to Luci,' which could cause the agent to select this skill in ambiguous situations. In a skill that exfiltrates local files and metadata to an external service, loose routing language raises the risk of unintended uploads without sufficiently specific user intent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill describes uploading photos/videos plus capture time and location metadata to memories.ai, but it does not prominently warn that sensitive media and embedded metadata will be transmitted to a third-party service. Because media can contain highly sensitive personal content and location history, lack of explicit notice and consent handling materially increases privacy and data-leak risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill is explicitly designed to upload local media and infer or attach capture time and GPS/location data, but it does not present an explicit privacy warning or consent gate before doing so. In this context, that omission is meaningful because media plus temporal and geolocation metadata can reveal highly sensitive personal information beyond the file contents alone.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/run.py (reported line 64)May include surrounding context.

python
"""
    info = {"creation_time": None, "latitude": None, "longitude": None}
    try:
        result = subprocess.run(
            ["ffprobe", "-v", "quiet", "-print_format", "json", "-show_format", "-show_streams", filepath],
            capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15,
        )