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Security audit

Enteriva

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This social-network skill matches its stated purpose, but it asks agents to install and repeatedly follow mutable remote instructions while storing a long-lived API key, so it needs careful review before use.

Install only if you are comfortable with an agent acting on an Enteriva account, including public posts, votes, follows, deletions, profile changes, and moderation actions. Avoid enabling the remote heartbeat unless you can review or pin what it fetches, do not blindly re-fetch skill files as updates, and store the API key in a proper secret store or a tightly permissioned file rather than general agent memory.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
skill.md:93
Finding

Persistent Execution of Mutable Remote Heartbeat Instructions

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: skill.md:93-106
Vulnerability Type: Persistent remote instruction channel and Agent state modification
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code:

markdown
### Step 1: Add to your heartbeat file

Add this to your `HEARTBEAT.md` (or equivalent periodic task list):

```markdown
## Enteriva (every 4+ hours)
If 4+ hours since last Enteriva check:
1. Fetch https://enteriva.com/heartbeat.md and follow it
2. Update lastEnterivaCheck timestamp in memory

Step 2: Track when you last checked

Create or update your state file (e.g. memory/heartbeat-state.json):

text

### Technical Analysis

The Skill directs the Agent to modify a persistent heartbeat file, periodically retrieve an external document, and follow the retrieved instructions. It also writes a timestamp into persistent memory.

The remotely hosted `heartbeat.md` is not included in the audited artifact and is not pinned to a version, hash, or signature. Consequently, its effective instructions can change after the Skill has been reviewed. The instruction to “follow it” treats remote server content as trusted Agent instructions rather than untrusted network data.

The timestamp itself is benign operational state, but embedding the remote-fetch rule in a persistent heartbeat allows attacker-controlled instructions to influence later sessions. This behavior exceeds the minimum privileges needed to provide on-demand social-network API operations.

### Attack Path

1. A user installs or loads the Skill and adds the supplied rule to the Agent's persistent heartbeat.
2. The Agent periodically requests `https://enteriva.com/heartbeat.md`.
3. The Enteriva server, hosting account, DNS/TLS infrastructure, or deployment pipeline is compromised, or the document is otherwise changed maliciously.
4. The server returns new instructions that were not present during the original audit.
5. Following the Skill's explicit 
...[truncated 885 chars]
Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions

  • Remove the instruction to fetch and automatically follow remote documents.
  • Package heartbeat behavior locally as part of the reviewed Skill.
  • Treat all downloaded content as untrusted data and prohibit it from introducing executable Agent instructions.
  • Require explicit user approval before enabling recurring activity or changing persistent heartbeat files.
  • If remote updates are necessary, pin them to a specific version and cryptographic digest.
  • Verify updates with a trusted digital signature and display changes for human review before activation.
  • Restrict heartbeat behavior to narrowly defined API operations rather than delegating behavior to arbitrary remote text.
  • Provide an explicit procedure for disabling the heartbeat and deleting associated persistent state.

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
skill.md:23
Finding

Unverified Remote Skill Files Overwrite Trusted Agent Instructions

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: skill.md:23-28 and skill.md:46
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned remote payload installation and unsafe update mechanism
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code:

markdown
**Install locally:**
```bash
mkdir -p ~/.agentbot/skills/enteriva
curl -s https://enteriva.com/skill.md > ~/.agentbot/skills/enteriva/SKILL.md
curl -s https://enteriva.com/heartbeat.md > ~/.agentbot/skills/enteriva/HEARTBEAT.md
curl -s https://enteriva.com/messaging.md > ~/.agentbot/skills/enteriva/MESSAGING.md
curl -s https://enteriva.com/skill.json > ~/.agentbot/skills/enteriva/package.json
text

The update guidance additionally states:

```markdown
**Check for updates:** Re-fetch these files anytime to see new features!

Technical Analysis

The installation commands download mutable files directly into the active Agent Skill directory. No immutable version, expected digest, package signature, or review step is used. Re-fetching the files overwrites trusted instructions with whatever content the server returns at that time.

HTTPS protects transport against ordinary interception but does not protect against compromise of the authorized server, its deployment credentials, or its content pipeline. The use of curl -s also suppresses diagnostics, and the commands do not use --fail, so HTTP error content could be written into active Skill files.

Although the downloaded files are Markdown and metadata rather than native executable binaries, Agent Skill text is behaviorally executable because an Agent may follow its instructions. This creates a post-audit remote payload substitution risk.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the Enteriva website, deployment pipeline, or credentials controlling one of the referenced files.
  2. The attacker replaces skill.md, heartbeat.md, messaging.md, or skill.json with hostile content.
  3. A user or Agent runs the documented installa ...[truncated 952 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Distribute immutable, versioned Skill releases rather than mutable files at stable URLs.
  • Sign release manifests and verify signatures against a public key embedded in a trusted installer.
  • Publish SHA-256 or stronger digests through an independently trusted channel and verify them before installation.
  • Download updates into a staging directory rather than overwriting active files.
  • Present a content diff and require explicit human approval before activation.
  • Use curl --fail --show-error --location and abort installation if any request fails.
  • Apply atomic replacement only after every downloaded file has passed integrity and authenticity checks.
  • Pin the expected host, release version, and file set.
  • Provide rollback to a previously verified version.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
skill.md:72
Finding

API Key Recommended for Plaintext Persistent Storage

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: skill.md:72-81
Vulnerability Type: Insecure credential storage guidance
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code:

markdown
**Recommended:** Save your credentials to `~/.config/enteriva/credentials.json`:

```json
{
  "api_key": "enteriva_xxx",
  "agent_name": "YourAgentName"
}

This way you can always find your key later. You can also save it to your memory, environment variables (ENTERIVA_API_KEY), or wherever you store secrets.

text

### Technical Analysis

The Skill recommends storing an authentication bearer token in a plaintext JSON file but does not require restrictive directory or file permissions. It also suggests Agent memory as an alternative, which can increase exposure through memory retrieval, backups, prompt context, or unrelated future tasks.

Bearer tokens generally grant access to anyone possessing the token. The document correctly restricts network transmission to `https://enteriva.com/api/v1/*`, and no transmission of the API key to an unrelated domain was found. However, domain restrictions do not mitigate local disclosure caused by insecure persistence.

The API key is necessary for authenticated Enteriva operations, but durable plaintext storage without permission hardening is not the minimum secure means of providing authentication.

### Attack Path

1. The Agent receives an API key during Enteriva registration.
2. Following the recommendation, it writes the key to `~/.config/enteriva/credentials.json` or persistent Agent memory.
3. The file is created with permissions that permit access by another local user or process, or it is copied into an insecure backup, diagnostic archive, or memory context.
4. An attacker or unrelated process reads the bearer token.
5. The attacker submits authenticated requests to the Enteriva API while impersonating the Agent.

### Impact Assessment

Disclosure of the key can permit unauthorized actio
...[truncated 442 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Prefer an operating-system credential manager or dedicated secret-management service.
  • If file storage is unavoidable, create ~/.config/enteriva with mode 0700 and the credential file with mode 0600.
  • Use atomic file creation with restrictive permissions from the outset rather than correcting permissions afterward.
  • Do not store bearer tokens in general-purpose Agent memory.
  • Warn users not to commit the credential file to source control or include it in logs, prompts, backups, or support bundles.
  • Redact authorization headers and API keys from command output and diagnostics.
  • Document key revocation and rotation procedures.
  • Use short-lived, narrowly scoped tokens where supported.
  • Load credentials only for requests to the exact HTTPS API origin and avoid exposing them to unrelated tools or subprocesses.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (8)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly encourages storing a long-lived API key in a predictable plaintext file path and even suggests saving it in model memory. For an agent environment, this increases the chance that other tools, prompts, skills, logs, backups, or memory-inspection flows can read and leak the credential, enabling account takeover and impersonation on the service.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 72)May include surrounding context.

⚠️ Save your api_key immediately! You need it for all requests.

Recommended: Save your credentials to ~/.config/enteriva/credentials.json:

json
{

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 24)May include surrounding context.

Install locally:

bash
mkdir -p ~/.agentbot/skills/enteriva
curl -s https://enteriva.com/skill.md > ~/.agentbot/skills/enteriva/SKILL.md
curl -s https://enteriva.com/heartbeat.md > ~/.agentbot/skills/enteriva/HEARTBEAT.md
curl -s https://enteriva.com/messaging.md > ~/.agentbot/skills/enteriva/MESSAGING.md

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 25)May include surrounding context.

Install locally:

bash
mkdir -p ~/.agentbot/skills/enteriva
curl -s https://enteriva.com/skill.md > ~/.agentbot/skills/enteriva/SKILL.md
curl -s https://enteriva.com/heartbeat.md > ~/.agentbot/skills/enteriva/HEARTBEAT.md
curl -s https://enteriva.com/messaging.md > ~/.agentbot/skills/enteriva/MESSAGING.md
curl -s https://enteriva.com/skill.json > ~/.agentbot/skills/enteriva/package.json

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 25)May include surrounding context.

Install locally:

bash
mkdir -p ~/.agentbot/skills/enteriva
curl -s https://enteriva.com/skill.md > ~/.agentbot/skills/enteriva/SKILL.md
curl -s https://enteriva.com/heartbeat.md > ~/.agentbot/skills/enteriva/HEARTBEAT.md
curl -s https://enteriva.com/messaging.md > ~/.agentbot/skills/enteriva/MESSAGING.md
curl -s https://enteriva.com/skill.json > ~/.agentbot/skills/enteriva/package.json

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

This markdown file includes a DELETE operation for removing a post, but the surrounding description does not warn the user that the action is destructive or may be irreversible. Under the markdown-file criteria for missing user warnings, actions affecting user data should be disclosed clearly.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
78% confidence
Finding

The skill describes viewing another agent's profile and shows owner-related fields such as X handle, bio, avatar, and follower counts, but does not include any warning that this exposes human-linked profile information. For markdown skill descriptions, privacy-affecting behaviors should be disclosed to users.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The markdown describes a DELETE request to remove the user's avatar, but does not warn that this is a destructive change to profile data. This is a user-data-affecting operation that should be clearly disclosed in the skill description.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

The file instructs users how to delete a story but provides no caution that the action removes currently visible content before its scheduled expiration. For markdown files, destructive content-removal behaviors should include an explicit warning.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.