travel-destination-brochure

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Sep 10, 2026 · 4:44 PM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

The skill largely matches its travel-brochure purpose, but its setup guidance encourages unsafe remote installer execution and risky API-key handling.

Install only after removing the pipe-to-shell installer paths, using pinned dependencies where possible, and handling VLMRUN_API_KEY through a secure secret mechanism. Do not let an agent read .env files or print full API keys, and run image downloading in a constrained output directory because remote media is not strongly validated.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Insecure Dependencies: Introduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
• Insecure Skill Coding Practices: Finds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions

Findings (4)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error

• Location: README.md:48

Finding

Unverified Remote Installer Is Downloaded and Executed Directly

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: README.md:48-60; SKILL.md:49-64
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code

README.md:48-60:

powershell

# Windows (PowerShell)
pip install uv
# Or using installer
powershell -ExecutionPolicy ByPass -c "irm https://astral.sh/uv/install.ps1 | iex"

bash

# macOS/Linux
pip install uv
# Or using installer
curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh

SKILL.md:49-64:

powershell

# Using pip
pip install uv

# Or using PowerShell installer
powershell -ExecutionPolicy ByPass -c "irm https://astral.sh/uv/install.ps1 | iex"

bash

# Using pip
pip install uv

# Or using curl installer
curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh

Technical Analysis

Both installation guides instruct users to retrieve mutable code from an external URL and pass it directly to a command interpreter. The downloaded content is not pinned to a version, inspected, or verified using a checksum or cryptographic signature.

The PowerShell variant additionally starts a process with ExecutionPolicy ByPass. Although this does not necessarily grant administrative privileges, it removes a local script-execution safeguard for that process.

HTTPS authenticates the server connection but does not ensure that the retrieved installer remains identical to the version reviewed with this project. The effective code can change following an upstream account compromise, hosting compromise, dependency compromise, or unauthorized modification of the installer.

This behavior is not required for the Skill's core functionality because the same documentation already provides pip install uv as an alternative. It therefore exceeds the minimum-risk installation method necessary for the declared travel-brochure workflow.

Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises the upstream installer host, publi ...[truncated 940 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

1. Remove both pipe-to-interpreter installation alternatives from README.md and SKILL.md.
2. Prefer installation through a trusted package manager using an exact reviewed version:

   bash

   python -m pip install "uv==REVIEWED_VERSION"
   

3. If a standalone installer is necessary, split download and execution into separate steps.
4. Pin the installer to a versioned URL rather than a mutable generic endpoint.
5. Verify the downloaded artifact against a checksum or signature published through an independent trusted channel.
6. Avoid ExecutionPolicy ByPass; use an appropriately signed script and the least-permissive execution policy.
7. Tell users to inspect the downloaded script before execution and not to run installation commands from an elevated shell unless explicitly necessary.

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

• Location: scripts/simple_travel_brochure.py:2

Finding

Third-Party Dependencies Are Installed Without Version or Integrity Pinning

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: README.md:63-69; SKILL.md:94-101; scripts/geocode_city.py:2-5; scripts/fetch_commons.py:2-5; scripts/fetch_openstreetcam.py:2-5; scripts/run_travel_pipeline.py:2-5; scripts/simple_travel_brochure.py:2-5
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency resolution
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

README.md:63-69 and SKILL.md:94-101 install unconstrained package versions:

bash

# Install vlmrun CLI (required for video and travel plan generation)
uv pip install "vlmrun[cli]"

# Install requests (required for API calls)
uv pip install requests

Each Python script also contains an unconstrained PEP 723 dependency declaration, for example scripts/simple_travel_brochure.py:2-5:

python

# /// script
# requires-python = ">=3.10"
# dependencies = ["requests"]
# ///

Technical Analysis

The project does not pin exact dependency versions or provide a lockfile containing verified artifact hashes. Consequently, installation and uv run can resolve package releases that were not part of this audit.

This is a supply-chain exposure rather than evidence that the named packages are currently malicious. The risk arises because a future compromised, malicious, or unexpectedly incompatible release can be selected automatically. Python packages can execute code during installation, import, or CLI startup, so a compromised dependency may gain access to the invoking process's files, environment variables, and network permissions.

The broad vlmrun[cli] extra can also introduce a larger transitive dependency graph than a narrowly pinned runtime package.

Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises the publisher account, release pipeline, or a transitive dependency for one of the unconstrained packages.
2. A malicious package release is published under a version accepted by the unconstrained declarations.
3. A user runs the documented ...[truncated 655 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

1. Pin direct dependencies to exact reviewed versions.
2. Generate and commit a lockfile that includes all transitive dependencies.
3. Require package hashes where supported and verify packages against trusted indexes.
4. Keep PEP 723 declarations synchronized with the lockfile or replace ad hoc script resolution with a locked project environment.
5. Review the dependency tree introduced by vlmrun[cli] and install only the features required by this Skill.
6. Use automated vulnerability and provenance scanning for every dependency update.
7. Perform updates through reviewed pull requests rather than resolving the latest available releases at runtime.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning

• Location: scripts/fetch_commons.py:55

Finding

Remote Responses Can Trigger Unbounded and Unvalidated File Downloads

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: scripts/fetch_commons.py:55-65,109-129; scripts/fetch_openstreetcam.py:31-41,88-108; scripts/simple_travel_brochure.py:125-142
Vulnerability Type: Unrestricted remote URL retrieval and unsafe file ingestion
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

scripts/fetch_commons.py:55-65:

python

def download_file(url: str, path: Path) -> bool:
    try:
        r = requests.get(url, headers=HEADERS, timeout=30, stream=True)
        r.raise_for_status()
        path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
        with open(path, "wb") as f:
            for chunk in r.iter_content(chunk_size=8192):
                f.write(chunk)
        return True
    except Exception:
        return False

The URL is taken directly from the API response at scripts/fetch_commons.py:109-129:

python

ii = (p.get("imageinfo") or [None])[0]
if not ii:
    continue
url = ii.get("url") or ii.get("thumburl") or ""
if not url:
    continue
extmeta = ii.get("extmetadata") or {}
desc = (extmeta.get("ImageDescription") or {}).get("value") or ""
obj = (extmeta.get("ObjectName") or {}).get("value") or ""
caption = (obj or desc or p.get("title", "")).replace("File:", "").strip()
if len(caption) > 500:
    caption = caption[:497] + "..."
title = p.get("title", "File:unknown.jpg")
entry = {"index": i, "title": title, "url": url, "caption": caption or title}
if not args.no_download:
    fname = out_dir / safe_filename(title, i)
    if download_file(url, fname):
        entry["path"] = str(fname.resolve())
    else:
        entry["path"] = None

scripts/fetch_openstreetcam.py:31-41 contains equivalent unrestricted streaming:

python

def download_file(url: str, path: Path) -> bool:
    try:
        r = requests.get(url, headers=HEADERS, timeout=30, stream=True)
        r.raise_for_status()
        path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exi
...[truncated 3159 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

1. Permit only https URLs.
2. Allowlist documented Wikimedia and OpenStreetCam media hostnames.
3. Disable automatic redirects or validate the scheme and hostname after every redirect.
4. Reject responses whose declared Content-Length exceeds a conservative image-size limit.
5. Count streamed bytes and abort if the limit is exceeded, even when Content-Length is absent or false.
6. Require an allowlisted image MIME type and reject generic binary or executable content.
7. Decode the file with a maintained image library, enforce pixel and decompression limits, and re-encode it into a safe normalized format.
8. Download to a newly created temporary file and atomically move it only after successful validation.
9. Remove partial files following errors.
10. Apply separate upload limits before passing validated images to VLM Run.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:114

Finding

Documentation Encourages Reading, Printing, and Persisting Full API Keys

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:114-143; related diagnostic guidance in README.md:314-321
Vulnerability Type: Plaintext secret exposure through agent and terminal workflows
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

SKILL.md:114-143:

powershell

# Set for current session
Check .env file for api key

$env:VLMRUN_API_KEY="your-api-key-here"

# Set permanently (User-level)
[System.Environment]::SetEnvironmentVariable('VLMRUN_API_KEY', 'your-api-key-here', 'User')

bash

# Set for current session
export VLMRUN_API_KEY="your-api-key-here"

# Set permanently (add to ~/.bashrc or ~/.zshrc)
echo 'export VLMRUN_API_KEY="your-api-key-here"' >> ~/.bashrc
source ~/.bashrc

text

Read **.env** file to find api keys

bash

# Windows PowerShell
echo $env:VLMRUN_API_KEY

# macOS/Linux
echo $VLMRUN_API_KEY

Technical Analysis

Verifying that a credential exists does not require reading or printing its complete value. In an agent-oriented Skill, the instruction to read .env can unnecessarily place secret material into the agent's context, tool history, or audit logs. Printing the complete environment variable can expose it through terminal scrollback, shell recording, screenshots, CI logs, or shared transcripts.

The documentation also recommends persisting the key as plaintext in shell initialization files or the user-level environment. This increases the secret's lifetime and exposes it to processes and users capable of reading those locations.

The Python scripts themselves do not directly read .env or print the API key, and .env_template.txt contains placeholders only. The issue is therefore confined to unsafe operational instructions rather than confirmed automated exfiltration.

Attack Path

1. A user stores a real VLM Run API key in .env or an environment variable.
2. An agent follows the instruction to read .env, or a user follo ...[truncated 937 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

1. Remove instructions telling an agent to read .env files or retrieve API-key values.
2. Replace full-value diagnostics with presence-only checks:

   bash

   test -n "$VLMRUN_API_KEY" && echo "VLMRUN_API_KEY is set" || echo "VLMRUN_API_KEY is not set"
   

3. For PowerShell, test presence without displaying the value:

   powershell

   if ($env:VLMRUN_API_KEY) { "VLMRUN_API_KEY is set" } else { "VLMRUN_API_KEY is not set" }
   

4. Use an operating-system credential store, CI secret facility, or dedicated secret manager instead of shell profile files.
5. Ensure real .env files are excluded from version control and restricted using filesystem permissions.
6. Never pass API keys through command-line arguments because they can appear in process listings and shell history.
7. Redact secrets from logs and agent tool outputs.
8. Document key rotation and immediate revocation procedures for accidentally exposed credentials.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
• Tool Misuse: Tool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
• Rogue Agent: Self-Modification, Session Persistence

Findings (40)

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse
• Confidence: 97% confidence

Finding

The shell pipeline curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh is a classic command-chaining pattern that turns remote content into immediate code execution. In a skill README, this is especially risky because users may copy-paste it verbatim, allowing compromise of the local environment if the fetched script is malicious or tampered with.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 59)May include surrounding context.

macOS/Linux

pip install uv

Or using installer

curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh

text

3. **Install Dependencies**

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 98% confidence

Finding

The code only implements a Wikimedia Commons image fetcher/downloader. While this is one supporting piece of the declared workflow, it does not perform the core advertised functions: creating travel brochures/scenarios, generating travel videos, planning travel, or fetching OpenStreetCam imagery. The resource usage is narrower than declared, and the primary purpose of this code chunk is media retrieval/manifest creation rather than end-to-end travel content generation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 97% confidence

Finding

The code chunk implements only a narrow image-ingestion utility for OpenStreetCam. While this could be a supporting subcomponent of a larger travel brochure workflow, the declared purpose describes an end-user skill that builds destination scenarios/brochures from a city name and generates travel videos and plans using multiple data sources. None of those higher-level functions appear in this code. The resource access is also only partial relative to the description, since Wikimedia Commons is absent. This is therefore a material description-to-behavior mismatch rather than a minor implementation detail.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 98% confidence

Finding

There is a clear description-behavior mismatch. The declared purpose centers on travel content generation from city input using image sources and a VLM pipeline. The actual code performs only a geocoding utility function: it sends the city query to Nominatim, retrieves location search results, and outputs latitude/longitude and display name. This is at most a supporting subcomponent for a larger travel workflow, but on its own it does not implement the described primary functionality. It also accesses a different external resource (Nominatim/OpenStreetMap) than the declared OpenStreetCam/Wikimedia/VLM stack.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 95% confidence

Finding

The code substantially matches the imagery collection portion of the description: it geocodes a city, fetches OpenStreetCam and Wikimedia Commons images via helper scripts, and prepares a combined manifest. However, the declared purpose says the skill then uses vlmrun to generate a travel video and a travel plan, and implies creation of travel brochure/scenario outputs. This code does not call vlmrun at all; it only writes image paths and prints a 'next_step' instruction for a separate manual vlmrun invocation. So the implemented behavior is an asset-preparation pipeline, not the full brochure/video/travel-plan generation capability claimed in the description.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse
• Confidence: 93% confidence

Finding

Chaining a network fetch directly into shell execution is a classic arbitrary-code-execution anti-pattern. In an agent setting, this is especially dangerous because it encourages blind execution of remote content without verification or user review.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 63)May include surrounding context.

pip install uv

Or using curl installer

curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh

text

**Verify installation:**

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 99% confidence

Finding

The skill directs credential access by telling the user/agent to inspect a .env file for an API key. Credential retrieval from local files is highly sensitive and unnecessary for a brochure-generation skill, creating a real risk of unauthorized secret exposure.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 116)May include surrounding context.

Windows (PowerShell):

powershell

# Set for current session
Check .env file for api key

$env:VLMRUN_API_KEY="your-api-key-here"

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 98% confidence

Finding

The instructions explicitly tell the operator/agent to read local .env files to obtain API keys, which is unrelated to the minimum needs of generating a travel brochure. This encourages secret discovery from the local environment and can lead to unauthorized credential access and downstream exfiltration or misuse.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

High

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 99% confidence

Finding

The plain-language instruction to check a local .env file for an API key is a direct credential-access action. In an agentic context, this crosses from ordinary setup guidance into instructing the system to retrieve secrets from local storage, which is highly sensitive.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

YARA rule 'backdoor_persistence': Backdoor persistence with malicious payloads (shell commands, SSH key injection, hidden root users) [malware]

High

• Category: YARA Match
• Confidence: 75% confidence

Finding

YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 130)May include surrounding context.

powershell

# Set for current session
Check .env file for api key

$env:VLMRUN_API_KEY="your-api-key-here"

# Set permanently (User-level)
[System.Environment]::SetEnvironmentVariable('VLMRUN_API_KEY', 'your-api-key-here', 'User')

macOS/Linux:

bash

# Set for current session
export VLMRUN_API_KEY="your-api-key-here"

# Set permanently (add to ~/.bashrc or ~/.zshrc)
echo 'export VLMRUN_API_KEY="your-api-key-here"' >> ~/.bashrc
source ~/.bashrc

Verify environment variable:

Read .env file to find api keys

bash

# Windows PowerShell
echo $env:VLMRUN_API_KEY

# macOS/Linux
echo $VLMRUN_API_KEY

Step 6: Verify Installation

Test that everything works:

bash

# Test geocoding (should work without API key)
uv run scripts/geocode_city.py "Paris, France"

# Test vlmrun (if API key is set)
vlmrun --help

Installation Complete! You're ready to generate travel brochures.

Quick Start (Recommended)

Ssd 3

High

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 99% confidence

Finding

The verification step again instructs reading a .env file to find API keys, reinforcing secret harvesting behavior. Repeated credential-access guidance materially increases the risk that an agent will access secrets it should not inspect.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 50% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 248)May include surrounding context.

md

### OpenStreetCam API

- **Base URL**: `https://api.openstreetmap.org/`
- **Documentation**: [API Reference](https://api.openstreetcam.org/api/doc.html)
- **Key Endpoints**:
  - `POST /1.0/list/nearby-photos/` - Get photos near coordinates

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium

• Category: MCP Least Privilege
• Confidence: 86% confidence

Finding

The skill advertises and instructs use of shell, network access, and file writes but does not declare any explicit tool scope or permissions boundaries. In an agent setting, missing scope increases the chance the skill can run with broader-than-necessary capabilities, making other risky instructions in the file more dangerous.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 44)May include surrounding context.

md

If Python is not installed or is an older version:
- **Windows**: Download from [python.org](https://www.python.org/downloads/)
- **macOS**: `brew install python@3.11` (or use python.org installer)
- **Linux**: `sudo apt install python3.11` (Ubuntu/Debian) or use your distribution's package manager

### Step 2: Install uv (Package Manager)

Session Persistence

Medium

• Category: Rogue Agent
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 71)May include surrounding context.

uv --version

text

### Step 3: Create Virtual Environment

Navigate to the skill directory and create a virtual environment:

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 96% confidence

Finding

The skill normalizes reading a .env file for secrets and echoing or handling the API key without any safeguards. Even verification steps that print credentials risk exposing them in terminal history, logs, screenshots, or agent transcripts.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium

• Category: Rogue Agent
• Confidence: 90% confidence

Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 129)May include surrounding context.

Set for current session

export VLMRUN_API_KEY="your-api-key-here"

Set permanently (add to ~/.bashrc or ~/.zshrc)

echo 'export VLMRUN_API_KEY="your-api-key-here"' >> ~/.bashrc source ~/.bashrc

text

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 98% confidence

Finding

Passing an API key directly on the command line exposes the secret to shell history, process listings, telemetry, and logs. In multi-user or monitored environments, this can leak the credential beyond the intended workflow.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 249)May include surrounding context.

md

import requests

OSC_BASE = "https://api.openstreetcam.org"
OSC_PHOTO_BASE = "https://api.openstreetcam.org/"
NEARBY_PHOTOS = f"{OSC_BASE}/1.0/list/nearby-photos/"
HEADERS = {"User-Agent": "TravelDestinationBrochure/1.0 (skill)"}

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 401)May include surrounding context.

md

import requests

OSC_BASE = "https://api.openstreetcam.org"
OSC_PHOTO_BASE = "https://api.openstreetcam.org/"
NEARBY_PHOTOS = f"{OSC_BASE}/1.0/list/nearby-photos/"
HEADERS = {"User-Agent": "TravelDestinationBrochure/1.0 (skill)"}

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 241)May include surrounding context.

md

import requests

OSC_BASE = "https://api.openstreetcam.org"
OSC_PHOTO_BASE = "https://api.openstreetcam.org/"
NEARBY_PHOTOS = f"{OSC_BASE}/1.0/list/nearby-photos/"
HEADERS = {"User-Agent": "TravelDestinationBrochure/1.0 (skill)"}

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 320)May include surrounding context.

md

import requests

OSC_BASE = "https://api.openstreetcam.org"
OSC_PHOTO_BASE = "https://api.openstreetcam.org/"
NEARBY_PHOTOS = f"{OSC_BASE}/1.0/list/nearby-photos/"
HEADERS = {"User-Agent": "TravelDestinationBrochure/1.0 (skill)"}

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 391)May include surrounding context.

md

import requests

OSC_BASE = "https://api.openstreetcam.org"
OSC_PHOTO_BASE = "https://api.openstreetcam.org/"
NEARBY_PHOTOS = f"{OSC_BASE}/1.0/list/nearby-photos/"
HEADERS = {"User-Agent": "TravelDestinationBrochure/1.0 (skill)"}

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/openstreetcam_api.md (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

md

import requests

OSC_BASE = "https://api.openstreetcam.org"
OSC_PHOTO_BASE = "https://api.openstreetcam.org/"
NEARBY_PHOTOS = f"{OSC_BASE}/1.0/list/nearby-photos/"
HEADERS = {"User-Agent": "TravelDestinationBrochure/1.0 (skill)"}

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/openstreetcam_api.md (reported line 7)May include surrounding context.

md

import requests

OSC_BASE = "https://api.openstreetcam.org"
OSC_PHOTO_BASE = "https://api.openstreetcam.org/"
NEARBY_PHOTOS = f"{OSC_BASE}/1.0/list/nearby-photos/"
HEADERS = {"User-Agent": "TravelDestinationBrochure/1.0 (skill)"}

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.