Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Content
.env __pycache__/ *.pyc .DS_Store
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
- Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Security audit
instagram-publish
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
Overview
This skill is a straightforward Instagram posting helper that handles an access token and publishes content only for its stated purpose.
Install only if you intend to let an agent post to the connected Instagram account. Keep the .env token private, prefer --dry-run before publishing, and use a test or low-risk account until you are comfortable with the workflow.
Vulnerability Patterns
- Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
- Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
- Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
- Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
- Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
- Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
- Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
- MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
- Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
- Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (33)
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Content
.env __pycache__/ *.pyc .DS_Store
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
- Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Content
```bash git clone <本仓库> ~/.claude/skills/instagram-publish cd ~/.claude/skills/instagram-publish cp .env.example .env ``` ## 设置步骤
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
- Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Content
```bash git clone <本仓库> ~/.claude/skills/instagram-publish cd ~/.claude/skills/instagram-publish cp .env.example .env ``` ## 设置步骤
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
- Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Content
--- name: instagram-publish description: Use when publishing images to Instagram via the Graph API from a Creator or Business account. Triggers when the user wants to automate Instagram posting, push an image with caption to their account, set up Instagram API access for the first time, or troubleshoot Instagram Graph API errors like "Media download has failed" or "Unsupported post request". Assumes one-time Meta App setup is complete and an Access Token is available. --- # Instagram Publish
- Confidence
- 70% confidence
- Finding
- Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Content
--- name: instagram-publish description: Use when publishing images to Instagram via the Graph API from a Creator or Business account. Triggers when the user wants to automate Instagram posting, push an image with caption to their account, set up Instagram API access for the first time, or troubleshoot Instagram Graph API errors like "Media download has failed" or "Unsupported post request". Assumes one-time Meta App setup is complete and an Access Token is available. --- # Instagram Publish
- Confidence
- 70% confidence
- Finding
- Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Content
## Quick Start (after Part 1 setup is done) ```bash # 1. Put credentials in .env (one time) cp .env.example .env # edit .env with ACCESS_TOKEN (and optionally IG_USER_ID)
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
- Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Content
## Quick Start (after Part 1 setup is done) ```bash # 1. Put credentials in .env (one time) cp .env.example .env # edit .env with ACCESS_TOKEN (and optionally IG_USER_ID)
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
- Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Content
## Quick Start (after Part 1 setup is done) ```bash # 1. Put credentials in .env (one time) cp .env.example .env # edit .env with ACCESS_TOKEN (and optionally IG_USER_ID)
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
- Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Content
## Quick Start (after Part 1 setup is done) ```bash # 1. Put credentials in .env (one time) cp .env.example .env # edit .env with ACCESS_TOKEN (and optionally IG_USER_ID)
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
- Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Content
## Quick Start (after Part 1 setup is done) ```bash # 1. Put credentials in .env (one time) cp .env.example .env # edit .env with ACCESS_TOKEN (and optionally IG_USER_ID)
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
- Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Content
## Quick Start (after Part 1 setup is done) ```bash # 1. Put credentials in .env (one time) cp .env.example .env # edit .env with ACCESS_TOKEN (and optionally IG_USER_ID)
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
- Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Content
## Quick Start (after Part 1 setup is done) ```bash # 1. Put credentials in .env (one time) cp .env.example .env # edit .env with ACCESS_TOKEN (and optionally IG_USER_ID)
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
- Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Content
## Quick Start (after Part 1 setup is done) ```bash # 1. Put credentials in .env (one time) cp .env.example .env # edit .env with ACCESS_TOKEN (and optionally IG_USER_ID)
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
- Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Content
## Quick Start (after Part 1 setup is done) ```bash # 1. Put credentials in .env (one time) cp .env.example .env # edit .env with ACCESS_TOKEN (and optionally IG_USER_ID)
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
- Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Content
## Quick Start (after Part 1 setup is done) ```bash # 1. Put credentials in .env (one time) cp .env.example .env # edit .env with ACCESS_TOKEN (and optionally IG_USER_ID)
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
- Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Content
## Quick Start (after Part 1 setup is done) ```bash # 1. Put credentials in .env (one time) cp .env.example .env # edit .env with ACCESS_TOKEN (and optionally IG_USER_ID)
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
- Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Content
## Quick Start (after Part 1 setup is done) ```bash # 1. Put credentials in .env (one time) cp .env.example .env # edit .env with ACCESS_TOKEN (and optionally IG_USER_ID)
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
- Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Content
## Quick Start (after Part 1 setup is done) ```bash # 1. Put credentials in .env (one time) cp .env.example .env # edit .env with ACCESS_TOKEN (and optionally IG_USER_ID)
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
- Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Content
## Quick Start (after Part 1 setup is done) ```bash # 1. Put credentials in .env (one time) cp .env.example .env # edit .env with ACCESS_TOKEN (and optionally IG_USER_ID)
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
- Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Content
## Quick Start (after Part 1 setup is done) ```bash # 1. Put credentials in .env (one time) cp .env.example .env # edit .env with ACCESS_TOKEN (and optionally IG_USER_ID)
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
- Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Content
## Quick Start (after Part 1 setup is done) ```bash # 1. Put credentials in .env (one time) cp .env.example .env # edit .env with ACCESS_TOKEN (and optionally IG_USER_ID)
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
- Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Credential Access
High
- Category
- Privilege Escalation
- Content
"or 2-10 URLs for a carousel. Each URL must be reachable by Meta's servers.", ) parser.add_argument("--caption", default="", help="Caption text (hashtags OK)") parser.add_argument("--env", default=".env", help="Path to .env file (default: ./env)") parser.add_argument("--api-version", default=API_VERSION, help=f"Graph API version (default: {API_VERSION})") parser.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true", help="Validate token and build container, but skip publish") args = parser.parse_args()- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
- Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Missing User Warnings
Medium
- Confidence
- 91% confidence
- Finding
- The usage section shows commands that will perform a real Instagram publish, but the README does not place an explicit warning immediately next to the primary publish example that it posts live to the connected account. In an agent-skill context, this can increase the chance of unintended external side effects, especially if a user or agent treats the example as a harmless test command.
Lp3
Medium
- Category
- MCP Least Privilege
- Confidence
- 92% confidence
- Finding
- The skill performs credential handling, file reads, and outbound network/API activity but does not declare any explicit tool scope or permission boundaries. In an agent environment, that omission increases the risk of over-broad execution and makes it harder to enforce least privilege around token access and publishing actions.
Static analysis
Detected: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.
Critical
- Code
- suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
- Location
- README.md:44
File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.
Critical
- Code
- suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
- Location
- README.zh-cn.md:44
File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.
Critical
- Code
- suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
- Location
- SKILL.md:162