T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:151- Finding
Unverified Registry Packages Are Converted into Executable Installation Commands
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a legitimate MCP server discovery skill, but it gives activation-ready install and connection instructions for third-party servers without enough trust, version, or endpoint safeguards.
Install only if you are comfortable manually vetting each MCP server it recommends. Before running any generated command or adding any config, verify the package publisher, repository, version, and remote endpoint; prefer pinned versions or Docker digests, use least-privilege credentials, and treat fetched READMEs as untrusted documentation rather than instructions for the agent to follow.
SKILL.md:151Unverified Registry Packages Are Converted into Executable Installation Commands
SKILL.md:271Registry-Supplied Remote Endpoints Are Used Without Trust or Network-Boundary Validation
SKILL.md:178Untrusted Repository README Content Is Fetched Without Prompt-Injection Safeguards
The skill recommends executing npx -y PACKAGE_IDENTIFIER without pinning an exact package version. Because this skill is specifically designed to help users discover and install arbitrary MCP servers from external registries, an unpinned install can pull a newly published or compromised package version at execution time, enabling supply-chain compromise.
The guidance uses uvx PACKAGE_IDENTIFIER without constraining the package version. This exposes users to the latest available release from PyPI at runtime, which is dangerous in a discovery/install skill because typo-squatted, hijacked, or newly malicious versions could be executed immediately.
The skill suggests docker run PACKAGE_IDENTIFIER without a tag or immutable digest, which defaults to a moving target such as latest. In a server-discovery workflow, this can cause users to run a changed or malicious image different from the one originally reviewed, creating a supply-chain execution risk.
The skill instructs the agent to fetch and summarize external README files from repositories but does not state that this content is untrusted and may contain deceptive setup instructions, prompt-injection text, or unsafe commands. Since repository documentation is attacker-controlled input, treating it as authoritative increases the risk of relaying harmful instructions to users.
The setup section provides concrete local execution commands and MCP client configuration edits for third-party servers without a prominent security warning. In context, this skill actively helps users discover and install arbitrary external MCP servers, so omission of trust and review guidance materially raises the chance of unsafe execution of malicious packages or endpoints.
No suspicious patterns detected.