T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
toolflow-bundle/plugin/dist/entry.js:1555- Finding
Unrestricted Local File Access in the Default Safe Profile
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill has a coherent workflow purpose, but its bundled plugin can read arbitrary local files as a “safe” workflow action and persist those outputs, so it needs review before installation.
Install only if you are comfortable giving the plugin broad local-file read capability through workflows and storing workflow outputs in a local ledger. Keep elevated mode disabled unless needed, avoid command progress sinks, review workflow files before submitting them, and restrict the ledger/plugin configuration to a workspace you trust.
toolflow-bundle/plugin/dist/entry.js:1555Unrestricted Local File Access in the Default Safe Profile
toolflow-bundle/plugin/dist/entry.js:929Ledger Path Traversal Through Unvalidated Run Identifiers
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
}
});
// packages/runtime/dist/crypto/keyring.js
var require_keyring = __commonJS({
"packages/runtime/dist/crypto/keyring.js"(exports2) {
"use strict";
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
}
});
// packages/runtime/dist/crypto/keyring.js
var require_keyring = __commonJS({
"packages/runtime/dist/crypto/keyring.js"(exports2) {
"use strict";
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
}
});
// packages/runtime/dist/crypto/keyring.js
var require_keyring = __commonJS({
"packages/runtime/dist/crypto/keyring.js"(exports2) {
"use strict";
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
}
});
// packages/runtime/dist/crypto/keyring.js
var require_keyring = __commonJS({
"packages/runtime/dist/crypto/keyring.js"(exports2) {
"use strict";
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
}
});
// packages/runtime/dist/crypto/keyring.js
var require_keyring = __commonJS({
"packages/runtime/dist/crypto/keyring.js"(exports2) {
"use strict";
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
}
});
// packages/runtime/dist/crypto/keyring.js
var require_keyring = __commonJS({
"packages/runtime/dist/crypto/keyring.js"(exports2) {
"use strict";
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
}
});
// packages/runtime/dist/crypto/keyring.js
var require_keyring = __commonJS({
"packages/runtime/dist/crypto/keyring.js"(exports2) {
"use strict";
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
}
});
// packages/runtime/dist/crypto/keyring.js
var require_keyring = __commonJS({
"packages/runtime/dist/crypto/keyring.js"(exports2) {
"use strict";
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
}
});
// packages/runtime/dist/crypto/keyring.js
var require_keyring = __commonJS({
"packages/runtime/dist/crypto/keyring.js"(exports2) {
"use strict";
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
}
});
// packages/runtime/dist/crypto/keyring.js
var require_keyring = __commonJS({
"packages/runtime/dist/crypto/keyring.js"(exports2) {
"use strict";
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
}
});
// packages/runtime/dist/crypto/keyring.js
var require_keyring = __commonJS({
"packages/runtime/dist/crypto/keyring.js"(exports2) {
"use strict";
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
}
});
// packages/runtime/dist/crypto/keyring.js
var require_keyring = __commonJS({
"packages/runtime/dist/crypto/keyring.js"(exports2) {
"use strict";
The default progress reporter can spawn an arbitrary shell command from configuration/environment using shell: true, passing runtime data through environment variables. In this plugin context, that creates a hidden command-execution channel unrelated to the advertised tool action, so submitting or resuming workflows may trigger unintended code execution if configuration is influenced by an attacker or unsafe deployment.
The README instructs users to execute local shell scripts that install and verify a bundled plugin/runtime, modify the OpenClaw plugin setup, and run checks, but it provides no caution about reviewing the scripts, understanding side effects, or limiting privileges. This creates a social-engineering and supply-chain risk: users may run opaque installer code directly from the skill directory, which could alter local configuration or execute additional commands beyond what the README briefly describes.
The elevated apply_patch path writes attacker-controlled patch content to a temporary file and then applies it to an arbitrary resolved cwd via git apply, which can modify local files. In a skill/plugin context, this is dangerous because it enables filesystem mutation through a tool path without any user-facing warning or hard scoping to a safe workspace, increasing the risk of unauthorized code or config changes.
The tool is described as only compiling and classifying a workflow without running it, but dryRun calls resolveConfig, which can source progress command settings from environment variables, and the runtime includes a default reporter that spawns shell commands when configured. This is an intent-level contradiction because the documentation promises non-execution semantics while the codebase for the invoked path still admits command execution side effects through its runtime configuration surface.
The elevated runner writes a temporary patch file and applies it with git apply, which can modify workspace files, but the function contains no confirmation prompt, warning comment, or visible logging to disclose that a write/destructive operation is occurring. Although approval is enforced elsewhere, this code path itself lacks direct user disclosure for the filesystem changes it performs.
When progress reporting is configured with sink='command', the runtime spawns an arbitrary shell command from environment/config without any in-code consent gate at the operation point. Because this happens asynchronously during normal workflow execution, it creates an unexpected command-execution path that can be abused by anyone controlling environment variables or configuration.
The CLI presents the runtime as a 'Safe Profile' even though the same codebase can enable an elevated lane that executes commands and applies patches. This is a security-signaling flaw: operators may trust the tool as non-mutating or low-risk and enable or run it under false assumptions, increasing the chance of unsafe deployment or approval decisions.