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Security audit

Youtube Summarizer

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a real video summarizer, but it automatically uses sensitive browser cookies and sends transcripts to external LLM services in ways users should review carefully.

Review this skill before installing. It is suitable only if you are comfortable with video transcripts and metadata being sent to configured or fallback LLM providers, and with Bilibili mode reading Chrome browser cookies. Avoid using it on private, licensed, internal, or account-restricted videos unless you first disable external fallback behavior and browser-cookie use, and prefer pinned dependencies plus a private temporary work directory.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (4)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
scripts/summarize.py:170
Finding

Authenticated Browser Requests Are Made with TLS Certificate Verification Disabled

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/summarize.py:552
Finding

Video Transcripts Are Automatically Disclosed to an Anonymous Third-Party LLM

Content
View full analysis
Optional[str]: """Generate summary using LLM API (multi-backend fallback chain).""" prompt = SUMMARY_PROMPT_TEMPLATE.format( title=title, channel=channel, duration=duration, transcript=transcript[:8000] ) env_url = os.environ.get("LLM_API_URL") env_key = os.environ.get("LLM_API_KEY") env_model = os.environ.get("LLM_MODEL", "gpt-4o-mini") if env_url and env_key: print(f" 🔑 Using LLM_API_URL env var: {env_url}", file=sys.stderr) result = _call_llm(env_url, env_key, env_model, prompt) if result: return result oc_token = os.environ.get("OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN") if oc_token: api_url = env_url or "http://localhost:18789/v1/chat/completions" print(f" 🔑 Using OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN → {api_url}", file=sys.stderr) result = _call_llm(api_url, oc_token, env_model, prompt) if result: return result gh_token = os.environ.get("GITHUB_TOKEN") or os.environ.get("GH_TOKEN") if gh_token: print(" 🔑 Trying GitHub Copilot API...", file=sys.stderr) copilot_token = get_copilot_session_token(gh_token) if copilot_token: copilot_model = os.environ.get("LLM_MODEL", "claude-haiku-4.5") result = _call_llm( "https://api.githubcopilot.com/chat/completions", copilot_token, copilot_model, prompt ) if result: return result poll_key = os.environ.get("POLLINATIONS_API_KEY") if poll_key: print(" 🔑 Trying Pollinations API (with key)...", file=sys.stderr) result = _call ...[truncated 2896 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
setup.sh:40
Finding

Setup Installs Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies Without Integrity Verification

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/summarize.py:153
Finding

Predictable Shared Temporary Files Permit Symlink Overwrites and Persistent Data Exposure

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
Findings (28)

Tainted flow: 'url' from requests.get (line 114, network input) → subprocess.run (code execution)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

External input (network, user) flows to a code execution sink. This enables remote code execution or command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/summarize.py (reported line 263)May include surrounding context.

python
url = f"https://www.youtube.com/@{channel_id}/videos"

    try:
        result = subprocess.run(
            [
                "yt-dlp",
                "--flat-playlist",

Tainted flow: 'gh_token' from os.environ.get (line 525, credential/environment) → requests.get (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/summarize.py (reported line 453)May include surrounding context.

python
def get_copilot_session_token(gh_token: str) -> Optional[str]:
    try:
        import requests
        r = requests.get(
            "https://api.github.com/copilot_internal/v2/token",
            headers={
                "Authorization": f"token {gh_token}",

Tainted flow: 'api_url' from os.environ.get (line 519, credential/environment) → requests.post (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill sends full prompts containing video transcript content to an API endpoint controlled by environment variables, and can attach bearer credentials to that request. In an agent environment, this creates a data-exfiltration path where sensitive transcript content and API keys may be transmitted to an arbitrary external service without explicit validation or user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/summarize.py (reported line 480)May include surrounding context.

python
}
        if api_key:
            headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {api_key}"
        response = requests.post(
            api_url,
            headers=headers,
            json={

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill also performs frame extraction, image insertion, AI-based frame selection, and persistent local configuration writes that are not clearly captured by the summary-focused description. While not inherently malicious, these extra behaviors increase data processing scope and storage footprint beyond what a user may reasonably infer.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill also performs frame extraction, image insertion, AI-based frame selection, and persistent local configuration writes that are not clearly captured by the summary-focused description. While not inherently malicious, these extra behaviors increase data processing scope and storage footprint beyond what a user may reasonably infer.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

YARA rule 'info_stealer': Information stealer patterns (credential harvesting, browser data theft) [malware]

High
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

Accessing browser cookies from Chrome is behavior commonly associated with credential harvesting because it reads sensitive authentication material from the user's browser profile. Although the apparent goal is to bypass Bilibili restrictions for downloading, in a skill context this is still dangerous because it reaches into unrelated credentials and session state.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/summarize.py (reported line 173)May include surrounding context.

python
.path.join(output_dir, f"bili_{video_id}_audio.mp3")
    frames_dir = os.path.join(output_dir, f"bili_{video_id}_frames")
    transcript_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"bili_{video_id}_transcript.txt")

    print(f"🎬 Bilibili: {video_id}", file=sys.stderr)

    # Step 1: Download video
    print("  📥 Downloading video...", file=sys.stderr)
    download_cmd = [
        "yt-dlp",
        "--cookies-from-browser", "chrome",
        "--no-check-certificates",
        "-f", "bestvideo[height<=720]+bestaudio/best[height<=720]",
        "--merge-output-format", "mp4",
        "-o", video_path,
        url,
    ]
    subprocess.run(download_cmd, check=True, timeout=300)

    # Step 2: Extract audio
    print("  🎵 Extracting audio...", file=sys.stderr)
    subprocess.run([
        "ffmpeg", "-y", "-i", video_path,
        "-vn", "-acodec", "libmp3lame", "-q:a", "2",
        audio_path,
    ], check=True, timeout=120, capture_output=True)

    # Step 3: Whisper transcription
    print

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The use of --no-check-certificates disables TLS certificate verification during video download, making the tool susceptible to man-in-the-middle interception or content tampering. That weakens transport security precisely when downloading untrusted remote media and potentially authenticated resources.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/summarize.py (reported line 174)May include surrounding context.

python
download_cmd = [
        "yt-dlp",
        "--cookies-from-browser", "chrome",
        "--no-check-certificates",
        "-f", "bestvideo[height<=720]+bestaudio/best[height<=720]",
        "--merge-output-format", "mp4",
        "-o", video_path,

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The summarization flow transmits transcript content to external LLM providers, including fallback to anonymous and environment-configured services, without a clear warning that user data is leaving the local environment. Transcripts may contain proprietary, personal, or sensitive content, so silent transmission meaningfully increases privacy and compliance risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The manifest description says the skill handles both YouTube and Bilibili video transcript extraction and summarization. However, the README explicitly states '此 Skill 仅支持 YouTube' ('this skill only supports YouTube'), which is a direct mismatch in declared behavior and supported platforms.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The README states that extracted transcripts and content may be sent automatically to multiple third-party LLM endpoints, including anonymous/free services, without an explicit warning about data disclosure. In a summarization skill, users may paste or process sensitive, copyrighted, or private material, so silent transmission can lead to confidentiality, compliance, or policy violations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises significant capabilities—shell execution, network access, filesystem reads/writes, and environment-variable use—without declaring an explicit tool scope or permission boundary. That makes review and runtime governance harder, and increases the chance an agent invokes the skill with broader access than users expect.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill contains substantial end-user instructions in Chinese, but it does not indicate that language is selectable or that the skill is intentionally limited to Chinese-speaking users. This can violate a language/locale policy when a skill implicitly forces one language without user opt-in.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The documentation notes Chrome cookies are used to bypass Bilibili anti-scraping, but does not present this as a clear security/privacy warning. Reading browser cookies can expose authenticated session material and may surprise users who did not intend to grant access to local browser state.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The Bilibili download path invokes yt-dlp with --cookies-from-browser chrome, which accesses locally stored browser session cookies without an explicit warning or consent step. In a skill ecosystem, reading browser cookies is highly sensitive because it touches authentication material unrelated to the stated summarization task and can expose account-bound data or session secrets.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/summarize.py (reported line 180)May include surrounding context.

python
"-o", video_path,
        url,
    ]
    subprocess.run(download_cmd, check=True, timeout=300)

    # Step 2: Extract audio
    print("  🎵 Extracting audio...", file=sys.stderr)

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/summarize.py (reported line 184)May include surrounding context.

python
# Step 2: Extract audio
    print("  🎵 Extracting audio...", file=sys.stderr)
    subprocess.run([
        "ffmpeg", "-y", "-i", video_path,
        "-vn", "-acodec", "libmp3lame", "-q:a", "2",
        audio_path,

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The Whisper transcription call forces language="zh", which constrains processing to Chinese regardless of the actual audio language or user preference. This is a natural-language locale policy issue because the file does not offer language selection or explain a justified region-specific limitation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/summarize.py (reported line 210)May include surrounding context.

python
if not skip_frames:
        print(f"  🖼️  Extracting keyframes (every {frame_interval}s)...", file=sys.stderr)
        os.makedirs(frames_dir, exist_ok=True)
        subprocess.run([
            "ffmpeg", "-y", "-i", video_path,
            "-vf", f"fps=1/{frame_interval}", "-q:v", "2",
            os.path.join(frames_dir, "frame_%03d.jpg"),

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/summarize.py (reported line 263)May include surrounding context.

python
url = f"https://www.youtube.com/@{channel_id}/videos"

    try:
        result = subprocess.run(
            [
                "yt-dlp",
                "--flat-playlist",

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/summarize.py (reported line 311)May include surrounding context.

python
def get_video_details(video_id: str) -> Optional[Dict]:
    """Get detailed video metadata using yt-dlp"""
    try:
        result = subprocess.run(
            [
                "yt-dlp",
                "--no-warnings",

Tainted flow: 'url' from requests.get (line 114, network input) → requests.get (network output)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/summarize.py (reported line 385)May include surrounding context.

python
def _download_caption(url: str) -> Optional[str]:
    try:
        import requests
        r = requests.get(url, timeout=15)
        if r.status_code == 200 and r.text.strip():
            return r.text
    except Exception:

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

This request exchanges a locally available GitHub token for a Copilot session token, extending use of ambient credentials to a third-party service. While the destination is GitHub rather than an arbitrary host, silently consuming developer tokens in a summarization skill expands credential exposure and may surprise users.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/summarize.py (reported line 454)May include surrounding context.

python
try:
        import requests
        r = requests.get(
            "https://api.github.com/copilot_internal/v2/token",
            headers={
                "Authorization": f"token {gh_token}",
                "Editor-Version": "vscode/1.95.0",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

This external POST sends the summarization prompt, which includes transcript text, to a remote API and may include authorization credentials. Because the endpoint can be environment-controlled and multiple fallback services are tried automatically, the skill creates a significant outbound data channel beyond what a user may reasonably expect.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/summarize.py (reported line 480)May include surrounding context.

python
}
        if api_key:
            headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {api_key}"
        response = requests.post(
            api_url,
            headers=headers,
            json={

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill harvests multiple environment-provided credentials and uses them to obtain third-party model access beyond simple local processing. In an agent context, this broadens the trust boundary substantially and may cause unintended use of ambient credentials, especially when users invoke the skill expecting only transcript extraction and summarization.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

This call sends user-derived transcript content to the GitHub Copilot chat completions API after obtaining a session token, creating external disclosure of processed content. In the context of a summarizer skill, this is sensitive because remote transmission is automatic and tied to ambient credentials rather than explicit user authorization.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/summarize.py (reported line 532)May include surrounding context.

python
if copilot_token:
            copilot_model = os.environ.get("LLM_MODEL", "claude-haiku-4.5")
            result = _call_llm(
                "https://api.githubcopilot.com/chat/completions",
                copilot_token,
                copilot_model,
                prompt