T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:9- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party CLI Installation and Unverified Tool Retrieval
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, line 9 and lines 35–39
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned dependency installation and unspecified component retrieval
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
bash Requires the `agentself` CLI. If unavailable, install it with `uv tool install agentself` or `pipx install agentself`, then run the version check below.bash agentself install --tools agentself init agentself --json showTechnical Analysis
The Skill instructs the Agent to install the
agentselfpackage without specifying an exact version, cryptographic hash, lockfile, signed artifact, or verified package source. Consequently, the code executed during installation may differ from the code that was originally reviewed.The installed CLI is subsequently authorized to run
agentself install --tools, which may retrieve additional components. The Skill does not identify those components or specify their sources, versions, checksums, signatures, or required privileges.Although the Skill checks the CLI schema and warns about unexpected executable paths, these checks occur after installation and do not establish the integrity of the package or its dependencies. A compromised package can execute arbitrary installation-time code before any version check takes place.
This is particularly sensitive because the declared CLI functionality includes access to identity data, secrets, email, and a live wallet capable of moving real funds. The available file does not directly instruct the Agent to transmit secret values, and there is no direct evidence of deliberate exfiltration. However, compromise of the installed dependency could enable such behavior.
Attack Path
- The Agent loads the Skill and determines that the
agentselfCLI is unavailable. - Following the Skill instructions, it runs
uv tool install agentselforpipx install agentself. - The package manager resolves the latest ...[truncated 1497 chars]
- The Agent loads the Skill and determines that the
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin
agentselfto a specifically reviewed version rather than installing an unconstrained release. - Require cryptographic hashes for the package and all transitive dependencies through a reproducible lockfile or equivalent mechanism.
- Identify the authoritative package registry, publisher, and source repository, and verify package provenance before installation.
- Prefer signed, reproducible artifacts and verify signatures before executing installed code.
- Document every component retrieved by
agentself install --tools, including its source, exact version, checksum, signature, purpose, and required permissions. - Require explicit user confirmation before installing the CLI, retrieving additional tools, accessing email, or initiating live-wallet operations.
- Perform installation and initial validation in a sandbox with restricted filesystem, credential, process, and network access.
- Ensure integrity verification occurs before any package-controlled code executes; a post-installation schema check is not sufficient.
- Apply destination allowlisting and least-privilege controls to any network operations involving identity, email, wallet, or secret data.
- Include the referenced workflow documentation and audited CLI implementation in the review scope before authorizing sensitive operations.
- Pin
