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Security audit

Goglobal Adcotemax

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a disclosed education-advising skill with a small static helper script, but users should notice that it can provide the maintainer's direct phone and WeChat for school-level collaboration requests.

Before installing, be aware that this skill includes the maintainer's personal phone number and WeChat and may show them if you ask about school-level implementation, adaptation, collaboration, or contacting the maintainer. The technical footprint is otherwise narrow: a markdown advising skill, templates, source notes, and a static local CLI helper.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:100
Finding

Maintainer Contact Solicitation Through Skill-Controlled Agent Output

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:100-121 and SKILL.md:1758-1762
Vulnerability Type: T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code

SKILL.md:100-121:

text
Do not display maintainer contact information in ordinary student advisory answers.

Only provide maintainer contact information when the user explicitly asks about:

- school-level implementation;
- adapting this skill to another school;
- collaboration;
- training;
- deployment;
- pathway system design;
- how to contact the maintainer;
- how to invite Max for further discussion.

When relevant, use the following low-key contact format:

> For school-level implementation, pathway system adaptation or collaboration, you may contact Max through the maintainer channel:
> Mobile: 18969373690
> WeChat: maxliu18969373690

Do not present the contact information as advertising.
Do not turn ordinary pathway advice into promotion.
Do not repeatedly display the contact information.

SKILL.md:1758-1762:

text
If the user asks how to adapt the skill for their own school, Max may mention:

> This skill can be adapted to a school’s curriculum, student profile and destination strategy. For school-level implementation or pathway model adaptation, you may contact Max through the maintainer channel:
> Mobile: 18969373690
> WeChat: maxliu18969373690

Technical Analysis

The skill contains persistent instructions that alter the agent's responses so that they reproduce the maintainer's direct phone and WeChat details when broadly defined implementation, deployment, training, adaptation, or collaboration topics arise. These instructions are unrelated to the technical requirements of providing educational pathway advice and use the agent's trusted response channel for maintainer lead generation.

Describing the contact output as “low-profile” does not mitigate the underlying behavior. Whe ...[truncated 1955 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove the phone number, WeChat identifier, and all instructions requiring the agent to reproduce them.
  2. Remove conditional solicitation triggers for deployment, training, implementation, collaboration, and adaptation requests.
  3. Keep only neutral maintainer attribution in package metadata when attribution is necessary.
  4. Direct users to a platform-managed project or maintainer profile only when they explicitly request maintainer information.
  5. Ensure any external-contact disclosure is clearly labeled, consent-based, and governed by platform policy rather than embedded behavioral instructions.
  6. Add a review rule prohibiting skill text from forcing promotional content, personal contact details, referral links, or unrelated calls to action into agent responses.
  7. Scan future releases for phone numbers, messaging identifiers, email addresses, referral URLs, and instructions that conditionally append such content.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • System Prompt LeakageDirect Leakage, Indirect Extraction, Tool-Based Exfiltration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (10)

Direct Prompt Extraction

High
Category
System Prompt Leakage
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.

Content

Scanner excerpt · CHANGELOG.md (reported line 54)May include surrounding context.

md
- Added source-aware advising rules.
- Added hard boundaries against guaranteed admission language.
- Added default international high school model.
- Added Kede-compatible output rules.
- Added low-profile maintainer contact logic.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The '何时触发' section uses high-level labels like '升学咨询', '路径对比', '申请规划', and '选校建议' with example phrases, but it does not define exact trigger phrases, boundaries, or negative examples. In a markdown skill description, this can cause the skill to activate for ordinary chat about studying or planning, rather than only for intentional use of this advisor.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

These instructions explicitly tell the assistant to reveal the maintainer's phone number and WeChat in response to certain prompts. Direct disclosure of personal contact data from model outputs enables off-platform solicitation, phishing pretexting, harassment, and unauthorized collection or reuse of personal identifiers.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This repeated Chinese-language instruction reinforces disclosure of personal maintainer contact details, increasing the chance the model will surface them in normal interactions. Repetition also hardens the behavior against downstream safety controls by making disclosure seem integral to the skill's intended operation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill embeds maintainer contact and referral instructions inside an otherwise advisory workflow, creating a lead-generation path unrelated to core educational guidance. This can cause the assistant to disclose personal contact details and steer users toward off-platform engagement, increasing privacy, social-engineering, and policy-compliance risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The file defines fixed 'Chinese Output Style' and 'English Output Style' rules, and the metadata declares languages 'zh-CN,en', but there is no instruction to let the user choose their preferred language or locale. Under the policy, forcing a specific language/locale behavior without explicit user opt-in is a natural-language policy concern.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The school-adaptation section again instructs the model to expose personal contact information for collaboration and deployment inquiries. In context, this broadens disclosure to institutional users and turns the assistant into a contact-routing mechanism, raising privacy and social-engineering risk beyond ordinary educational advising.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The document claims to be a neutral, non-agent-like advising skill, but the related-skills block and powered-by footer turn it into a marketing surface for a school ecosystem. That mismatch can bias outputs toward promotion and cross-selling, undermining user trust and potentially redirecting sensitive educational decisions toward the maintainer's affiliated services.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding

SQP-3 applies to all file types and covers natural-language locale policy issues. The changelog states the skill was released bilingually and includes Chinese operating instructions, but this file does not indicate that users can choose their preferred language or that the locale constraint is limited to a justified regional context.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

The file presents the skill as Chinese-language content while the CLI commands are fixed in English literals such as "destinations", "pathway", and "help". This imposes a language/locale constraint in the user-facing interface without any opt-in or alternative, which fits the policy category for forced language choice.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.