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- Location
SKILL.md:22- Finding
Automatic Disclosure of User Prompts to an External Service
- Content
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/dev/null | jq -r '.data[]? | \"\\(.title): \\(.summary // (.content[0:240]))\"' || true" } ] } ] } } ``` ```yaml lifecycle: pre_run: | curl -sS "$HIVE_API_URL/knowledge/query?q=$(printf %s "$CLAW_PROMPT" | jq -sRr @uri)&limit=5" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $HIVE_API_KEY" \ | jq -r '.data[]? | "\(.title): \(.summary // (.content[0:240]))"' \ >> "$CLAW_CONTEXT_FILE" || true ``` ### Technical Analysis The pre-task hook captures the complete user prompt and transmits it to `HIVE_API_URL` before the agent responds. The hook applies to every prompt through the wildcard matcher and does not request per-task approval or perform local sensitive-data filtering. URL encoding only converts the prompt into a transport-safe representation; it does not hide the information from the external API, its infrastructure, access logs, proxies, or monitoring systems. The bearer token also associates each disclosed prompt with a specific Hive account. The documentation claims that personally identifiable information is scrubbed server-side, but such processing happens only after the external service has received the prompt. It therefore cannot prevent the initial disclosure. Moreover, proprietary code, internal architecture, trade secrets, unpublished research, and business information may be confidential without qualifying as conventional PII. This behavior exceeds the minimum privileges needed ...[truncated 1366 chars]- Remediation
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