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Security audit

skill-governance

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This governance skill is understandable, but it asks agents to persist task records, sync sensitive summaries externally, and manage other skills automatically without clear user approval.

Install only if you want a strong governance workflow and can prevent automatic memory writes, external note/mobile sync, and skill-management actions unless you explicitly approve them. Treat archived decisions and next actions as records to review, not instructions future agents should automatically obey.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (4)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:10
Finding
Global Directives Hijack Agent Goals, Task Acceptance, and Output Behavior## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 10-12, 20-28, 39-48, 69-76, and 124-128 **Vulnerability Type**: `T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking` **Risk Level**: Critical ### Vulnerable Skill Text The following is an English translation of the relevant source text: ```text # GLOBAL PRIME DIRECTIVE System optimization objective: [ Maximize Output / (Noise × Cognitive Load) ] Any action that increases noise or cognitive load without increasing output must be rejected. ``` ```text Only data satisfying one of the following conditions may enter analysis: * Growth rate greater than 30% * Deviation from historical average greater than 2σ * Directly affects cash flow or decisions Otherwise, discard it automatically. ``` ```text Capacity less than or equal to 4 prohibits: * Architecture refactoring * Coordination of more than two skills * Highly complex research ``` ```text This is a mandatory rule. Before the task ends, at least one of the following must be generated: * File * Structured note * Decision record Otherwise, the task may not be marked complete. ``` ```text Every skill invocation must contain: * One-sentence conclusion * Key data * Confidence statement ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill declares a “global prime directive” and labels several behavioral rules as mandatory. These instructions attempt to control whether the Agent accepts a task, which input it retains, whether it may complete a task, and the structure of every response. This behavior is not limited to providing optional governance advice. When loaded into an Agent context, the Skill can compete with the user’s current objective and the host’s ordinary task-handling behavior. In particular, automatic data disposal may remove information relevant to the user’s request, while capacity-based prohibitions may cause unrelated work to be refused. The package contains no executable scripts, so the exploit operates entirely through instruction-layer influence rather than nati ...[truncated 1070 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove the “global prime directive” and all claims of mandatory priority. 2. State explicitly that the Skill is subordinate to system, developer, safety, and user instructions. 3. Convert rejection and prohibition rules into optional recommendations requiring user confirmation. 4. Never discard source data solely because it fails a generic statistical threshold. 5. Restrict governance checks to tasks for which the user explicitly requests governance analysis. 6. Permit the Agent to complete a task without creating an artifact unless artifact creation is part of the user’s request. 7. Make the output contract optional and task-specific rather than applying it to every Skill invocation.

T02 · Agent Memory Poisoning

Error
Location
SKILL.md:78
Finding
Mandatory Task Archiving Can Poison Persistent Agent Memory## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 78-84 and 140-142 **Vulnerability Type**: `T02: Agent Memory Poisoning` **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Skill Text The following is an English translation of the relevant source text: ```text ## Automatic archiving The following file must be generated: /memory/YYYY-MM-DD-task.md The structure is fixed: # Decisions # Core data # Next actions # Confidence ``` ```text 6. Mandatory archive generation ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill requires every governed task to write decisions, core data, future actions, and confidence information to a persistent `/memory/` location. It provides no consent requirement, trust-boundary check, sensitivity filter, retention policy, or validation of content originating from the task. An attacker can place misleading rules, fabricated decisions, or adversarial “next actions” in task content. If the Agent follows the mandatory archival instruction, that untrusted content can become durable state and may influence later sessions that consult the memory directory. The reviewed package does not contain code proving that `/memory/` exists or that the write will succeed. The risk arises when the host Agent exposes a persistent memory-writing capability and obeys this Skill text. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker supplies a task containing manipulated decisions, false core data, or malicious next-step instructions. 2. The governance Skill requires the task to be archived before completion. 3. The Agent writes the attacker-influenced content to `/memory/YYYY-MM-DD-task.md`. 4. The memory persists beyond the current task. 5. A later Agent session retrieves or relies on the archived decisions or next actions. 6. The poisoned state affects future reasoning or task execution. ### Impact Assessment The potential privilege obtained is persistent write influence over Agent memory through the Agent’s legitimate storage capability. The scope may extend across future sessio ...[truncated 309 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Disable persistent memory writes by default. 2. Require explicit, informed user consent before archiving each task. 3. Store only a minimal factual summary and exclude raw prompts, secrets, credentials, and untrusted instructions. 4. Treat task-derived decisions and next actions as untrusted data rather than executable instructions. 5. Add provenance metadata identifying the user, task, source, and creation time. 6. Require confirmation before future sessions act on archived “next actions.” 7. Define retention, review, correction, and deletion controls. 8. Prefer task-local ephemeral storage when cross-session persistence is unnecessary.

other

Error
Location
SKILL.md:86
Finding
Sensitive Financial and Strategic Summaries Are Mandated for Unspecified External Synchronization## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 86-93 **Vulnerability Type**: `other: Unsafe External Data Synchronization` **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Skill Text The following is an English translation of the relevant source text: ```text If the task type is: * Financial * Strategic * Major decision A summary must be generated for external synchronization (notes or mobile device). It must not remain only in the local cache. ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill directs the Agent to move summaries of particularly sensitive task categories outside local cache. It does not identify the destination, owner, service, authentication model, transport security, retention policy, or fields that must be redacted. This creates an undefined trust-boundary crossing for financial, strategic, and major-decision information. The instruction is especially risky because it is mandatory rather than consent-based. No network URL, synchronization implementation, credentials, or executable transfer logic appears in the reviewed package. Therefore, direct exfiltration is not proven from the project contents alone. The vulnerability becomes exploitable when the host Agent has access to an external notes, messaging, synchronization, or mobile-device tool. ### Attack Path 1. A user provides confidential financial, strategic, or major-decision information. 2. The Skill classifies the task as requiring advanced-task synchronization. 3. The Agent generates a summary containing sensitive information. 4. The mandatory rule prevents the summary from remaining solely in local storage. 5. The Agent invokes an available external notes or mobile synchronization tool. 6. Confidential content crosses an undefined trust boundary without a specified destination or explicit per-transfer approval. ### Impact Assessment The affected scope includes confidential task summaries and potentially the underlying financial or strategic data included in them. If an external synch ...[truncated 379 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove mandatory external synchronization and use a local-only default. 2. Require explicit user approval for every transfer. 3. Display the exact destination, recipient, service, and content before transmission. 4. Restrict synchronization to allowlisted services and authenticated accounts. 5. Use encrypted transport and access-controlled storage. 6. Redact credentials, financial identifiers, personal information, and confidential strategy details. 7. Apply data-minimization and retention policies. 8. Record an auditable transfer event without storing the sensitive payload in logs. 9. If no approved synchronization destination is configured, skip synchronization rather than selecting one implicitly.

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
SKILL.md:52
Finding
Governance Skill Claims Unauthorized Control Over Other Skills and Bundles## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 52-62 and 96-100 **Vulnerability Type**: `T05: Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation` **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Skill Text The following is an English translation of the relevant source text: ```text Detect keywords: * Research -> research.bundle * Review -> analytics.bundle * Deploy -> automation.bundle * Negotiation / Strategy -> decision.bundle Automatically execute: mount bundle At task completion: unmount bundle ``` ```text Unused for 30 days -> move to archived_skills/ Still not restored after 60 days -> mark as a deletion candidate A notification must be sent before deletion. A 24-hour buffer supports: restore <skill_name> ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill claims authority to mount and unmount bundles based only on detected keywords and to relocate or prepare unrelated skills for deletion based on inactivity. It does not define authorization checks, ownership validation, bundle allowlists, trusted resolution rules, or explicit user approval. If the host grants the Skill access to skill-management tools, a normal governance request could trigger operations affecting resources beyond the task’s legitimate scope. Automatically mounting unresolved bundles also expands the active capability set and attack surface. The reviewed package contains no scripts implementing these actions. Consequently, successful exploitation depends on the host interpreting the instructions and exposing privileged skill-management functions. ### Attack Path 1. The governance Skill is loaded in an Agent with bundle or skill-management permissions. 2. An attacker or ordinary task supplies a trigger keyword such as “Deploy” or “Strategy.” 3. The Skill directs the Agent to mount the corresponding bundle automatically. 4. The newly mounted bundle gains active-session access without explicit approval. 5. Separately, inactivity rules cause other skills to be moved into `arc ...[truncated 702 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Require explicit user approval before every mount, unmount, archive, restore, or deletion operation. 2. Apply least-privilege permissions so advisory governance Skills cannot administer unrelated Skills. 3. Maintain an allowlist of approved bundle identifiers and resolve them through a trusted registry. 4. Validate ownership and authorization before changing another Skill’s lifecycle state. 5. Replace automatic keyword triggers with recommendations or dry-run plans. 6. Present the exact affected Skills and consequences before executing changes. 7. Never delete automatically; require a separate authenticated administrative action. 8. Keep tamper-evident audit logs and provide rollback for all lifecycle changes. 9. Treat bundle mounting as a capability expansion requiring the same approval controls as installing or enabling a new component.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

Missing User Warnings

High
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The skill requires external synchronization of summaries for financial, strategic, or major decision tasks, which are explicitly sensitive categories, without user approval or data-sharing boundaries. This creates a real risk of confidential information leaving the local environment and being exposed to third-party systems, mobile devices, or note platforms.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The skill mandates automatic creation of a local archive file under /memory without requiring user awareness, consent, or a configurable storage policy. This can cause unintended persistence of potentially sensitive task data, increasing exposure through local compromise, later retrieval, or retention beyond user expectations.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding
The output contract requires every skill invocation to include fixed Chinese labels such as `一句话结论`, `关键数据`, and `置信度说明`. This imposes a specific language format without any documented user opt-in or alternative locale selection.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.