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Security audit

Cogmate Client

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

The skill appears to do what it says, but it handles access tokens in ways that can easily leak them.

Install only if you trust the Cogmate endpoint and understand that your token and queries may expose private knowledge. Prefer HTTPS-only endpoints, use the narrowest token scope available, avoid full-scope tokens unless necessary, do not paste real tokens into shared logs or transcripts, and rotate any token that may have appeared in URLs, shell history, server logs, or monitoring systems.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (5)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The documentation explicitly requires authentication tokens to be sent in the URL query string, which exposes them through browser history, reverse proxies, server logs, analytics systems, and referrer leakage. In this skill's context, the token grants access to a personal knowledge system, so disclosure can enable unauthorized retrieval of private knowledge data.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding
The examples use plain HTTP while transmitting both a sensitive token and potentially sensitive query content, allowing interception or modification by anyone on the network path. Because this skill is intended to access personal knowledge systems, using unauthenticated cleartext transport materially increases the risk of credential theft and private data exposure.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The documentation explicitly instructs clients to pass bearer-style access tokens in the URL query string. Query parameters are routinely exposed via browser history, proxy/server logs, referrer headers, monitoring systems, and shared links, which can leak valid tokens and enable unauthorized API access. The fact that this is API guidance makes the issue more dangerous because consumers are likely to copy this insecure pattern into production integrations.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The script places the authentication token directly into the URL query string before calling curl. Query parameters are commonly exposed via shell history, process listings, proxy/server/access logs, browser or intermediary telemetry, and monitoring systems, so the credential can be disclosed to parties who should not have it.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
exit 1
fi

curl -s -X POST "${COGMATE_URL}/api/ask?token=${TOKEN}" \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -d "{\"question\": \"${QUESTION}\"}" | \
    python3 -c "import sys,json; r=json.load(sys.stdin); print(r.get('answer','No answer'))"
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
curl -s -X POST "${COGMATE_URL}/api/ask?token=${TOKEN}" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d

VirusTotal

64/64 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.