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Agent Swarm Orchestrator

v1.1.0

Orchestrate OpenClaw Agent Swarm workflows for multi-project coding automation with Obsidian task intake, Claude coding, Codex review, GitLab MR flow, merge+...

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MIT-0
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LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
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Purpose & Capability
The name/description (agent swarm orchestrator for Obsidian→coding→review→GitLab flow) match the provided scripts: spawning worktrees, running a coding agent, running a review agent, creating MRs, syncing main, and writing back to Obsidian. Asking for GitLab, Claude, Codex, tmux, jq, and openclaw tools is coherent with the described functionality. The only mismatch is metadata claiming no required env/config while the README and scripts expect local auth/config files (e.g., ~/.claude.json, glab auth, openclaw CLI config).
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Instruction Scope
Scripts perform wide-ranging privileged actions: reading/writing ~/agent-swarm/*, modifying Obsidian notes, cloning/pushing to local repos, creating/removing git worktrees, creating MRs and merging them, and starting tmux sessions that run CLAUDE/CODEX CLIs. The SKILL.md also instructs the agent to act immediately on certain user intents (e.g., 'merge') without asking for confirmation and to set Claude/Codex to bypass permission prompts. Those behaviors expand scope beyond passive orchestration and enable potentially destructive automatic repository changes or merges triggered by messages/notifications.
Install Mechanism
There is no remote download or installer; files are provided in the skill and a 'portable install' copy is suggested. No external archives/URLs are fetched by an installer. This lowers supply-chain risk compared to arbitrary downloads.
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Credentials
The skill metadata lists no required env vars or credentials, but the runtime instructions and scripts clearly require credentials/configuration for multiple external systems: Claude CLI OAuth (~/.claude.json and related trust settings), Codex/OpenAI CLI auth, glab (GitLab) authentication or SSH keys, and openclaw CLI credentials for notifications. Those are necessary for its operation but are not declared in the skill manifest. The scripts also include flags that bypass permission/approval prompts (e.g., --dangerously-skip-permissions, --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox), which reduces runtime human oversight and increases risk if misconfigured.
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Persistence & Privilege
The skill will create files and long-lived artifacts under the user's home (~/agent-swarm, worktrees, logs) and instructs adding cron entries to run scanners and monitors. While always:false, the SKILL.md encodes an intent→action mapping that tells the agent to perform merges and spawn tasks immediately upon particular user messages or notifications without additional confirmation. Combined with push/merge privileges this gives a broad autonomous capability that could be risky if notifications or message contexts are spoofed or misinterpreted.
What to consider before installing
This package is functionally consistent with its stated purpose (automating agent-driven code work), but it deserves caution before installing. Things to consider: 1) Credential surface: The scripts assume you have active auth for Claude (~/ .claude.json), Codex/OpenAI, GitLab (glab/SSH keys), and openclaw; the skill does not declare or restrict these. Only install this into an account whose repo and messaging credentials you trust to be used by automation. 2) Automatic merges and writebacks: The orchestrator can clone, modify, commit, push, create MRs, and merge them (and write back to your Obsidian notes). If you enable the cron jobs or the intent→action mapping, merges may run automatically on agent output. Consider requiring manual approvals for merges or running in a less-privileged repository/account. 3) Bypassing safeguards: The code intentionally uses flags that skip permission prompts and bypass approval/sandbox checks for Claude/Codex — this reduces human review and increases the risk of unsafe code being committed. Remove or review these flags before use. 4) Isolation recommendation: Run this on a dedicated machine/account or with limited-scoped GitLab tokens (least privilege), restrict what projects the registry.json lists, and test on a sandbox repository first. 5) Inspect and adapt: Review and edit the scripts to force explicit confirmations for destructive actions (merge, rebase with conflicts, worktree removal), log and alert to separate channels you control, and ensure notification targets (Telegram chat IDs or webhooks) are correct and trusted. 6) Backup: Back up important repositories and disable automatic cron entries until you are confident in behavior. If you want, I can: (a) list all lines that perform network pushes/merges or modify notes, (b) propose edits to add manual confirmation gates, or (c) generate a minimal safe configuration (registry.json example + reduced-perm cron lines) for a sandboxed test.

Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.

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License

MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.

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