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Security audit

Mac Dev Staging

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This looks like a legitimate Mac staging helper, but it should be reviewed because it enables remote access, installs mutable global tooling, and generates privileged Apache config from weakly validated inputs.

Install only if you are comfortable letting the skill change your Mac's local server posture. Review Remote Login before enabling it, keep SSH/SFTP limited to trusted users and networks, avoid untrusted input to the vhost renderer, and consider pinning npm tooling or installing it project-locally.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
scripts/bootstrap-npm-tooling.sh:15
Finding

Unpinned Global npm Package Installation Creates a Supply-Chain Risk

Content
View full analysis
/dev/null fi npm install -g browser-sync concurrently npm-check-updates vite echo echo "npm global prefix: $(npm prefix -g)" echo "Installed tooling:" npm list -g --depth=0 | egrep 'browser-sync|concurrently|npm-check-updates|vite' || true ``` ### Technical Analysis The script installs four packages from the npm registry without specifying exact versions, using a lockfile, or verifying package integrity. Consequently, the code installed by the script is determined by mutable npm registry state at execution time rather than by the audited Skill contents. npm packages can execute lifecycle scripts during installation. If one of the named packages or any transitive dependency is compromised, the malicious release can execute code with the privileges of the user running this bootstrap script. Global installation also makes the affected tools available outside this project and increases the duration and scope of exposure. The script attempts to use a writable global prefix and otherwise changes the user's npm global prefix to `$HOME/.local`. Under the documented workflow, compromise would ordinarily obtain the invoking user's privileges rather than root privileges. The impact would be greater if an operator independently ran the script through `sudo`, although the project does not instruct the operator to do so. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises one of the named npm packages, a transitive dependency, or its publishing account. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious release or dependency update containing an install-time lifecycle script or malicious runtime behavior. 3. An operator runs `scripts/b ...[truncated 1050 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/render-vhost.sh:16
Finding

Apache Configuration Injection in Virtual Host Renderer

Content
View full analysis
&2; usage; exit 1 ;; esac done [[ -n "$SERVER_NAME" && -n "$DOCROOT" ]] || { usage; exit 1; } [[ "$DOCROOT" = /* ]] || { echo "docroot must be absolute" >&2; exit 1; } ERROR_LOG="${ERROR_LOG:-/private/var/log/apache2/${SERVER_NAME}_error.log}" ACCESS_LOG="${ACCESS_LOG:-/private/var/log/apache2/${SERVER_NAME}_access.log}" cat < ServerName ${SERVER_NAME} DocumentRoot "${DOCROOT}" AllowOverride All Options Indexes FollowSymLinks Require all granted ErrorLog "${ERROR_LOG}" CustomLog "${ACCESS_LOG}" common EOF ``` ### Technical Analysis All four command-line values are interpolated directly into Apache configuration syntax. The script only checks that `DOCROOT` starts with `/`; it does not validate the hostname syntax or reject line breaks, carriage returns, quotation marks, control characters, or Apache directive delimiters. Shell quoting protects the script from ordinary shell command injection, but it does not make the resulting Apache configuration safe. A value containing a newline can terminate the intended directive and introduce another directive. Values placed inside double quotes can also contain a quote and escape their intended Apache argument context. `SERVER_NAME` is especially exposed because it is emitted without Apache quoting and is also incorporated into default log paths. `DOCROOT`, `ERROR ...[truncated 2208 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (7)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The declared purpose is local macOS PHP/MariaDB staging, but the skill also introduces a local gateway/controller surface and references coexistence with a main gateway. That mismatch widens the operational scope beyond simple web-stack setup, which can mislead reviewers and users about the networking and control-plane exposure being introduced.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill clearly instructs execution of shell commands and describes scripts that can render configs, install packages, and write receipts, yet it declares no explicit tool scope or allowed-tools boundary. In an agentic environment, this creates an overbroad execution surface where a caller may grant file-write and shell capabilities implicitly, increasing the risk of unintended system changes or abuse.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
79% confidence
Finding

Enabling Remote Login with sudo turns on SSH/SFTP access for the host, expanding the attack surface beyond local-only staging. Even though the skill advises reading additional guidance, presenting a direct command to enable remote access can lead to unnecessary exposure if users enable it without hardening authentication, user access, and network restrictions.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 177)May include surrounding context.

If Remote Login is off, enable it with macOS settings or:

bash
sudo systemsetup -setremotelogin on

Recommended pattern:

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

This markdown file instructs the user to enable Remote Login, including a sudo command, which changes the system's remote-access posture. Although later security notes recommend limiting exposure, the enablement section itself does not clearly warn the user before the potentially security-sensitive change is performed.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 131)May include surrounding context.

CLI path:

bash
sudo systemsetup -setremotelogin on

Verification

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/sftp-on-macos.md (reported line 25)May include surrounding context.

CLI path:

bash
sudo systemsetup -setremotelogin on

Verification

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/controller.sh (reported line 31)May include surrounding context.

sh
apache)
      case "$action" in
        start|stop|restart)
          sudo apachectl "$action"
          ;;
        *)
          echo "unsupported apache action: $action" >&2