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Security audit

Clawhub Gomboc Security Main V0.2.0

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill appears to perform the advertised code remediation workflow, but its examples give automation and an unpinned container access to your code and Gomboc token, with commit/push remediation and weak safeguards.

Install only if you trust Gomboc and are comfortable sending repository context to its service. Avoid the Docker MCP mode unless you pin the image digest, bind it to 127.0.0.1, and restrict workspace/token scope. Do not use --commit/--push or autonomous remediation on important branches without review and branch protection, and avoid printing or storing the PAT in shell profiles or logs.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (5)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error
Location
scripts/docker-compose.yml:4
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Container Receives the API Token and Workspace Access

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/docker-compose.yml:7
Finding

MCP Service Is Published on All Host Interfaces Without Documented Request Authentication

Content
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Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/cli-wrapper.py:244
Finding

Token Status Command Reveals a Reusable Prefix of the Secret

Content
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10 else "***" print(f"✅ GOMBOC_PAT is set (masked: {masked})") ``` ### Technical Analysis For tokens longer than ten characters, the command prints the first ten characters of `GOMBOC_PAT`. This contradicts the comment that the actual token is never printed and the security documentation's claim that tokens are never logged or displayed. A token prefix may expose identifying or entropy-bearing material. It can also help correlate a credential across terminal recordings, support logs, screenshots, or multiple systems. There is no functional need to reveal any part of the secret merely to confirm that an environment variable is set. ### Attack Path 1. A user runs `config --show-token` in a recorded terminal, CI job, shared support session, or screen-sharing session. 2. The first ten token characters are written to output. 3. Another party obtains the output through logs, recordings, screenshots, or terminal history. 4. The disclosed prefix is correlated with other leaked credential material or used to reduce uncertainty during credential-recovery attacks. ### Impact Assessment This does not disclose the complete PAT by itself, so direct account takeover is not established. It unnecessarily reveals secret material and weakens credential confidentiality. The practical scope depends on token format, entropy distribution, and whether additional portions of the token are exposed elsewhere. ]]>
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
references/setup.md:23
Finding

Documentation Encourages Plaintext PAT Storage and Full Token Printing

Content
View full analysis
> ~/.bashrc source ~/.bashrc ``` The troubleshooting guide recommends printing the complete token: ```text 1. Check port 3100 is not in use: `lsof -i :3100` 2. Check GOMBOC_PAT is set: `echo $GOMBOC_PAT` 3. Check Docker is running: `docker ps` ``` ### Technical Analysis Writing the complete PAT to `~/.bashrc` stores a reusable credential in plaintext. Shell profiles are commonly included in backups, diagnostic bundles, dotfile repositories, and support archives. Their permissions and synchronization behavior are not controlled by this Skill. Running `echo $GOMBOC_PAT` exposes the complete credential to terminal output. That output may be captured by screen sharing, terminal recording, CI logs, support transcripts, or shell automation. Merely checking whether the variable is set does not require revealing its value. These instructions directly conflict with `SECURITY.md`, which states that tokens are never printed and describes the project as following token-management best practices. ### Attack Path 1. A user follows the persistent setup instruction and places the complete PAT in `~/.bashrc`. 2. The profile is copied into a backup, dotfile repository, support bundle, or another account-readable location. 3. Alternatively, the user follows troubleshooting guidance and prints the PAT in a logged or shared terminal. 4. An attacker or unintended recipient obtains the complete credential. 5. The attacker uses the PAT to authenticate to Gomboc services within its assigned scope. ### Impact Assessment Disclosure of the complete PAT permits impersonation of the user against services that accept t ...[truncated 214 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
references/github-action.md:23
Finding

GitHub Actions Examples Use Mutable Tags in Secret-Bearing Write-Capable Workflows

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
Findings (24)

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.getenv (line 31, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/cli-wrapper.py (reported line 41)May include surrounding context.

python
method="POST"
        )
        
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as response:
            result = json.loads(response.read())
            
            if "errors" in result:

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/mcp-integration.md (reported line 76)May include surrounding context.

md
- Python 3.7+
- Gomboc account (free at https://app.gomboc.ai)
- Personal Access Token from Gomboc

## 1. Get a Token

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/setup.md (reported line 7)May include surrounding context.

md
- Python 3.7+
- Gomboc account (free at https://app.gomboc.ai)
- Personal Access Token from Gomboc

## 1. Get a Token

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

md
1. Sign up at https://app.gomboc.ai (Community Edition is free)
2. Go to Settings → API Tokens
3. Generate a new Personal Access Token
4. Copy the token (starts with `gpt_`)

## 2. Set Environment Variable

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

md
1. Sign up at https://app.gomboc.ai (Community Edition is free)
2. Go to Settings → API Tokens
3. Generate a new Personal Access Token
4. Copy the token (starts with `gpt_`)

## 2. Set Environment Variable

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 144)May include surrounding context.

md
1. Sign up at https://app.gomboc.ai (Community Edition is free)
2. Go to Settings → API Tokens
3. Generate a new Personal Access Token
4. Copy the token (starts with `gpt_`)

## 2. Set Environment Variable

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/setup.md (reported line 13)May include surrounding context.

md
1. Sign up at https://app.gomboc.ai (Community Edition is free)
2. Go to Settings → API Tokens
3. Generate a new Personal Access Token
4. Copy the token (starts with `gpt_`)

## 2. Set Environment Variable

YARA rule 'backdoor_persistence': Backdoor persistence with malicious payloads (shell commands, SSH key injection, hidden root users) [malware]

High
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/setup.md (reported line 25)May include surrounding context.

oc account (free at https://app.gomboc.ai)

  • Personal Access Token from Gomboc

1. Get a Token

  1. Sign up at https://app.gomboc.ai (Community Edition is free)
  2. Go to Settings → API Tokens
  3. Generate a new Personal Access Token
  4. Copy the token (starts with gpt_)

2. Set Environment Variable

bash
export GOMBOC_PAT="gpt_your_token_here"

Or add to your shell profile:

bash
echo 'export GOMBOC_PAT="gpt_your_token_here"' >> ~/.bashrc
source ~/.bashrc

3. Verify Setup

bash
bash scripts/verify-setup.sh

Should output:

text
✅ GOMBOC_PAT is set
✅ Python 3 found: Python 3.7+
✅ CLI wrapper found
✅ API connection successful
✅ Setup verification complete!

4. Run Your First Scan

bash
python scripts/cli-wrapper.py scan --path ./src

Troubleshooting

"GOMBOC_PAT not set"

bash
export GOMBOC_PAT="your_token"

"API connection failed"

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This markdown file states that the CLI makes real API calls, manages authentication, and can apply fixes directly to the codebase, but it does not warn users about code modification, external data transmission, or authentication/privacy implications. For markdown files, SQP-2 applies when descriptions omit warnings about behaviors affecting user data, privacy, or system integrity.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The README promotes scanning and automatic fix generation but does not clearly warn users that running the tool can modify code or working-tree contents. In an agent skill context, that omission is more dangerous because autonomous systems may invoke remediation commands without explicit human confirmation, increasing the risk of unintended file changes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly promotes direct remediation with commit and push behavior, but does not provide clear cautions about destructive changes, review requirements, repository safety, or rollback expectations. In an agent context, encouraging autonomous modification of code and infrastructure without guardrails increases the risk of unintended commits, broken deployments, or unsafe changes being applied automatically.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The documented gomboc config --show-token command reveals a sensitive credential, yet the skill provides no warning about secret exposure in terminals, logs, shell history, screenshots, or agent transcripts. In agent and CI/CD settings, such a command materially increases the chance of inadvertent credential disclosure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The documented workflow includes an auto-remediation step that commits and pushes code changes directly from CI using --commit --push, but it does not prominently warn users that enabling this behavior grants automation the ability to modify repository contents. This is risky because users may copy the example as-is and unintentionally allow automated changes on push or PR events, increasing the chance of unsafe, incorrect, or policy-violating code being written back to the repository without adequate human review.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The guide instructs users to configure a Personal Access Token and invoke scan/fix workflows against an MCP service without warning that source code, metadata, or remediation context may be transmitted to the server or upstream service. In a code-remediation setting, this can lead to unintentional disclosure of proprietary or sensitive repository contents.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The documented commands include fix, remediate, and commit:true, which can modify repository contents and create commits, but the guide does not warn users about these side effects. In an agent-executed context, omission of this warning increases the risk of unintended code changes being applied automatically, especially if users assume commands are read-only.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/mcp-integration.md (reported line 53)May include surrounding context.

Health Check

bash
curl http://localhost:3100/health

Scan

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The setup guide instructs users to place a personal access token directly into an exported environment variable and persist it in ~/.bashrc, but it does not warn about credential sensitivity, local file exposure, shell/profile persistence, or safer secret-handling alternatives. While common in developer docs, this increases the chance of accidental token leakage through shared accounts, backups, dotfile sync, screenshots, or improper terminal/history practices.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SECURITY.md (reported line 17)May include surrounding context.

md
from pathlib import Path

GOMBOC_PAT = os.getenv("GOMBOC_PAT")
GOMBOC_API_URL = "https://api.app.gomboc.ai/graphql"

def call_gomboc_api(query, variables=None):
    """Call Gomboc GraphQL API."""

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SECURITY.md (reported line 61)May include surrounding context.

md
from pathlib import Path

GOMBOC_PAT = os.getenv("GOMBOC_PAT")
GOMBOC_API_URL = "https://api.app.gomboc.ai/graphql"

def call_gomboc_api(query, variables=None):
    """Call Gomboc GraphQL API."""

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/cli-wrapper.py (reported line 18)May include surrounding context.

python
from pathlib import Path

GOMBOC_PAT = os.getenv("GOMBOC_PAT")
GOMBOC_API_URL = "https://api.app.gomboc.ai/graphql"

def call_gomboc_api(query, variables=None):
    """Call Gomboc GraphQL API."""

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/verify-setup.sh (reported line 46)May include surrounding context.

sh
from pathlib import Path

GOMBOC_PAT = os.getenv("GOMBOC_PAT")
GOMBOC_API_URL = "https://api.app.gomboc.ai/graphql"

def call_gomboc_api(query, variables=None):
    """Call Gomboc GraphQL API."""

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The code warns that '--apply will modify your code' and the CLI help defines '--apply' as 'Apply fixes', which communicates that invoking this flag changes local code. However, the fix() function never uses args.apply beyond printing the warning and only calls generateFixes then prints results, so the documented behavior contradicts the actual implementation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The remediate command can trigger remote code modifications and optionally commit and push them based only on CLI flags, with no explicit confirmation or dry-run step. In an agent or automation context, this increases the chance of unintended destructive changes being applied to a repository and propagated to remotes without sufficient operator awareness.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
79% confidence
Finding

The top-level documentation presents this as a 'CLI Tool' for 'scanning and fixing code issues' and a 'fully functional wrapper around the Gomboc API'. In practice, every substantive operation sends paths and commands to the external GraphQL service, so the local code does not itself scan or fix code; it is strictly a network client wrapper.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.