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Security audit

Tavily Search

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward Tavily web-search wrapper that sends user-provided searches to Tavily and does not show hidden persistence, privilege escalation, or unrelated data access.

Install only if you are comfortable sending search terms and selected search options to Tavily. Avoid using confidential prompts, secrets, personal data, or proprietary internal identifiers as search queries unless Tavily's data handling terms meet your needs.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill requires environment access for TAVILY_API_KEY and performs outbound web/API requests, but the manifest does not declare an explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. This weakens least-privilege controls and makes the skill's actual capabilities less transparent to operators reviewing whether it can access secrets or send data off-box.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The documentation explains how to run searches but does not clearly warn that user queries are transmitted to Tavily's external API, and options like --raw-content may increase the amount of third-party data returned and handled. In a skill that brokers web search, this omission can lead users or upstream agents to unknowingly send sensitive prompts, internal identifiers, or proprietary research terms to an external service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/search.mjs (reported line 100)May include surrounding context.

js
if (includeDomains.length > 0) body.include_domains = includeDomains;
if (excludeDomains.length > 0) body.exclude_domains = excludeDomains;

const resp = await fetch("https://api.tavily.com/search", {
  method: "POST",
  headers: {
    "Content-Type": "application/json",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/search.mjs (reported line 100)May include surrounding context.

js
if (includeDomains.length > 0) body.include_domains = includeDomains;
if (excludeDomains.length > 0) body.exclude_domains = excludeDomains;

const resp = await fetch("https://api.tavily.com/search", {
  method: "POST",
  headers: {
    "Content-Type": "application/json",

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.