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Security audit

Tavily Extract

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward Tavily URL extraction helper, with its external API use aligned to its stated purpose.

Install only if you are comfortable sending target URLs and optional query terms to Tavily for extraction. Avoid internal, private, signed, personal, regulated, or confidential URLs unless your organization approves Tavily for that data.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill declares it requires an environment variable and, by design, sends user-supplied URLs to an external service, but it does not declare an explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. This creates a transparency and policy-enforcement gap: users and host frameworks may not realize the skill needs network access and secrets, increasing the risk of unintended data exposure or execution in contexts that would otherwise restrict it.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill documentation does not clearly warn users that submitted URLs, query terms, and the fetched page contents are sent to Tavily's external extraction API. This is dangerous because users may unknowingly send internal URLs, sensitive documents, or proprietary content to a third party, creating confidentiality, privacy, and compliance risks.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/extract.mjs (reported line 93)May include surrounding context.

js
if (query && chunksPerSource) body.chunks_per_source = chunksPerSource;
if (timeout) body.timeout = timeout;

const resp = await fetch("https://api.tavily.com/extract", {
  method: "POST",
  headers: {
    "Content-Type": "application/json",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/extract.mjs (reported line 93)May include surrounding context.

js
if (query && chunksPerSource) body.chunks_per_source = chunksPerSource;
if (timeout) body.timeout = timeout;

const resp = await fetch("https://api.tavily.com/extract", {
  method: "POST",
  headers: {
    "Content-Type": "application/json",