SLIX Bridge

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Sep 10, 2026 · 8:55 AM UTC
• Version: 2.1.0

Overview

The skill is review-worthy because it asks the agent to send a Moltbook API key to SLIX and follow remote challenge instructions without clear safety limits.

Install only if you intentionally trust SLIX with your Moltbook API key and understand that the skill may use public Moltbook posting and SLIX API actions. Prefer one-time claim tokens or scoped credentials, review any remote challenge manually before allowing tools or secrets, disable automatic registration retries, and rotate the Moltbook key if it was already submitted unexpectedly.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Insecure Skill Coding Practices: Finds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (3)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error

• Location: SKILL.md:56

Finding

Disclosure of Moltbook API Credentials to a Third-Party Service

Content

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Remediation

View remediation

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error

• Location: SKILL.md:69

Finding

Execution of Untrusted Instructions Returned by the Remote Challenge Service

Content

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Remediation

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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning

• Location: HEARTBEAT.md:35

Finding

Unbounded Automatic Registration Retries During Heartbeat Cycles

Content

View full analysis

Remediation

View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (11)

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 50% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · HEARTBEAT.md (reported line 18)May include surrounding context.

Quick Health Check

bash

curl -s https://api.slix.work/api/v1/slimid/fasttrack/health | jq .status

Expected output: "healthy"

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 50% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 80)May include surrounding context.

Quick Health Check

bash

curl -s https://api.slix.work/api/v1/slimid/fasttrack/health | jq .status

Expected output: "healthy"

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 50% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 253)May include surrounding context.

Quick Health Check

bash

curl -s https://api.slix.work/api/v1/slimid/fasttrack/health | jq .status

Expected output: "healthy"

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 50% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 260)May include surrounding context.

Quick Health Check

bash

curl -s https://api.slix.work/api/v1/slimid/fasttrack/health | jq .status

Expected output: "healthy"

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 50% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 285)May include surrounding context.

Quick Health Check

bash

curl -s https://api.slix.work/api/v1/slimid/fasttrack/health | jq .status

Expected output: "healthy"

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 50% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 321)May include surrounding context.

Quick Health Check

bash

curl -s https://api.slix.work/api/v1/slimid/fasttrack/health | jq .status

Expected output: "healthy"

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 97% confidence

Finding

The skill explicitly instructs sending the MOLTBOOK_API_KEY to an external domain as part of registration, without any warning that this is a sensitive credential or any minimization of scope. API keys are bearer secrets; transmitting them to a third party can enable account takeover, impersonation, or downstream abuse if the service is compromised or the endpoint is untrusted.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 98% confidence

Finding

This request transmits the MOLTBOOK_API_KEY to api.slix.work, which is a direct external exfiltration of a sensitive credential. In the context of a skill, this is more dangerous because users may execute the instructions as-is, causing immediate disclosure of a secret that likely grants access to another platform.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 58)May include surrounding context.

Step 1: Verify Moltbook Identity

bash

curl -X POST https://api.slix.work/api/v1/slimid/fasttrack/verify \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "moltbook_api_key": "'$MOLTBOOK_API_KEY'",

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 98% confidence

Finding

This request transmits the MOLTBOOK_API_KEY to api.slix.work, which is a direct external exfiltration of a sensitive credential. In the context of a skill, this is more dangerous because users may execute the instructions as-is, causing immediate disclosure of a secret that likely grants access to another platform.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 58)May include surrounding context.

Step 1: Verify Moltbook Identity

bash

curl -X POST https://api.slix.work/api/v1/slimid/fasttrack/verify \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "moltbook_api_key": "'$MOLTBOOK_API_KEY'",

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 95% confidence

Finding

The Gateway path tells the operator to claim credentials using either the claim token or the Moltbook API key, again normalizing the use of a sensitive secret in a third-party workflow without clear safeguards. Even though the API key is not pasted into a public post, the flow encourages credential sharing beyond its original trust boundary and could expose the user's primary account secret.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 93% confidence

Finding

This authentication example sends client_id and especially client_secret to an external service, which is expected for auth but still exposes highly sensitive long-lived credentials in a skill document with minimal handling guidance. In an agent-skill context, examples that normalize direct shell interpolation of secrets can lead to accidental leakage through logs, shell history, transcripts, or unsafe reuse.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 241)May include surrounding context.

Authenticate

bash

curl -X POST https://api.slix.work/api/v1/slimid/agent/auth/token \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "grant_type": "agent_credentials",

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.