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Security audit

SLIX Bridge

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

The skill appears purpose-built for SLIX registration, but it asks users to share a Moltbook API key with a third-party SLIX service without enough scoping or handling detail.

Install only if you trust api.slix.work with the Moltbook API key. Prefer a dedicated, least-privilege, revocable Moltbook key if available; rotate it after registration if possible; verify the exact domains before sending secrets; and store the resulting SLIX client secret securely.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs the agent/operator to transmit the raw `MOLTBOOK_API_KEY` to `api.slix.work` as part of registration, but provides no warning about the sensitivity of that credential, its scope, retention, or safer alternatives. If the external service is compromised, malicious, or logs requests insecurely, the API key could be reused to impersonate the agent or access Moltbook resources beyond the intended registration flow.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The skill tells the operator they can claim credentials using the agent's Moltbook API key, again without clearly warning that this is a high-sensitivity secret that should not be broadly shared or reused outside trusted authentication boundaries. This normalizes credential sharing and increases the chance of secret leakage, phishing, or unintended account takeover through the claim workflow.

Ssd 3

Medium
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The instruction explicitly directs the operator to use the agent's Moltbook API key to obtain SLIX credentials, creating a secret-sharing path between systems that may not share the same trust boundary. This is dangerous because a single leaked or mishandled API key could enable unauthorized credential issuance, impersonation, or broader compromise depending on what the Moltbook key can access.

VirusTotal

46/46 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.