T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Error
- Location
SKILL.md:83- Finding
Untrusted TTS text may be interpolated into a shell command
- Content
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/dev/null ``` ``` The same unsafe command-construction pattern also appears in the TTS example at `SKILL.md:50-57` and the example workflow at `SKILL.md:114-128`. ### Technical Analysis The Skill instructs the agent to fetch webpage content or generate a response and substitute that content into the `--text` argument of a shell command. The documentation does not require use of a structured process API, argument array, securely created input file, or another mechanism that keeps content separate from shell syntax. If an implementation constructs the displayed command as a string and replaces `"Your response text"` with fetched or user-controlled content, shell-significant characters can break the intended quoting context. Command substitutions such as `$(...)` and backticks are evaluated even within double quotes when they appear in shell source. Embedded quotes can also terminate the argument and introduce redirections, separators, or additional commands. The instruction stating that commands from fetched content must not be executed is a policy guardrail, but it does not technically prevent indirect execution caused by unsafe shell interpolation. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker publishes a public webpage containing shell syntax in article text, such as command substitution or a ...[truncated 1454 chars]- Remediation
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