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Security audit

Loomal Skill

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a disclosed Loomal integration for agent email, vault, calendar, identity, and payments, with sensitive powers that depend on the user's chosen API-key scopes.

Install only if you trust Loomal and the @loomal/mcp package, use a narrow per-task API key, avoid combining mail, vault, calendar, signing, and payment scopes unless needed, and confirm any public calendar or USDC payment action carefully.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
README.md:28
Finding

Automatic Execution of a Security-Sensitive Third-Party npm Package

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: README.md:28-32; duplicated in SKILL.md:35-39
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain exposure through automatic third-party package retrieval and execution
Risk Level: Medium

Complete Code Snippet:

markdown
The skill teaches the agent *when* to use Loomal. The MCP server provides the actual tools. Register it once per machine — the npm package version is pinned for supply-chain safety:

```bash
openclaw mcp set loomal '{"command":"npx","args":["-y","@loomal/mcp@0.5.0"],"env":{"LOOMAL_API_KEY":"loid-..."}}'
text

The equivalent setup instruction in `SKILL.md` is:

```markdown
Register the Loomal MCP server (the user runs this; it stores their API key locally). The npm package version is pinned for supply-chain safety — bump it intentionally when you want a newer release:

```bash
openclaw mcp set loomal '{"command":"npx","args":["-y","@loomal/mcp@0.5.0"],"env":{"LOOMAL_API_KEY":"loid-..."}}'
text

### Technical Analysis

The documented setup uses `npx -y` to retrieve and execute `@loomal/mcp@0.5.0` from the npm ecosystem without interactive review. Pinning the package version reduces exposure to unexpected future upgrades, but it does not independently verify the package contents, publisher identity, registry response, or artifact integrity.

The downloaded package is outside the audited project and was not available for source review. It executes while receiving `LOOMAL_API_KEY` through its environment. According to the Skill documentation, this key can delegate access to email, stored credentials, live TOTP codes, calendars, identity signatures, and USDC payment operations. Consequently, trust in the external package and its distribution channel becomes part of the security boundary.

The pre-scan warning about sending sensitive information over the network corresponds to declared functionality such as using credentials with user-selected services and tran
...[truncated 1773 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Avoid runtime installation through npx -y for a component that handles credentials and payment capabilities. Install the MCP package through a controlled deployment process before use.
  2. Use a lockfile and verify the package tarball against an independently obtained integrity hash or signature.
  3. Audit and vendor the exact MCP implementation and its transitive dependencies where operationally feasible.
  4. Disable npm lifecycle scripts during installation unless the package demonstrably requires them and those scripts have been reviewed.
  5. Run the MCP server in a sandbox with restricted filesystem, process, and outbound-network access.
  6. Permit outbound connections only to explicitly trusted Loomal endpoints and intended user-selected destinations.
  7. Issue separate, short-lived API keys for individual agents or tasks and grant only the minimum required scopes.
  8. Do not combine mail, vault, calendar, signing, and payment scopes unless a single task genuinely requires all of them.
  9. Rotate or revoke the key immediately after task completion or any suspected package compromise.
  10. Validate the active identity and scopes with identity_whoami before sensitive operations.
  11. Document a verified package digest alongside the pinned version and update both through an explicit security review process.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The README explicitly suggests the action "Make my calendar public" without any adjacent warning that this exposes event metadata via a public iCal URL. In a skill that manages email, credentials, and scheduling for an agent, normalizing public calendar exposure can lead to unintended disclosure of meetings, participant data, locations, and routines if users or agents invoke it without understanding the privacy consequences.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.