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Security audit

Abstract Toolkit

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a real blockchain automation helper, but it can move mainnet funds with raw private keys and has weak safeguards around irreversible transactions.

Review this carefully before installing. Use only a dedicated low-value wallet, test on testnet or tiny amounts first, pin dependencies, and manually verify every destination, router, bridge route, contract function, and transaction before signing. Do not use a primary or treasury private key with this skill as written.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (3)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/relay-bridge.js:90
Finding

Bridge Script Sends Mainnet ETH Without Destination Routing Data

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/transfer.js:61
Finding

Successful Transfers Are Reported as Failures Due to Block-Scoped Transaction Variables

Content
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Remediation
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T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:103
Finding

Security-Sensitive Dependencies and Compiler Are Installed Without Version Pinning

Content
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Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (14)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The documented behavior and the described capability surface do not line up cleanly: the skill introduces AGW creation and references broad operational abilities without a tightly bounded, auditable implementation contract. In security-sensitive blockchain workflows, this mismatch can mislead users or orchestrators about what actions the skill may perform, increasing the risk of unintended wallet setup or asset-affecting operations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 22)May include surrounding context.

md
node scripts/check-balances.js <wallet> all

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 77)May include surrounding context.

md
node scripts/check-balances.js <wallet> all

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill clearly relies on sensitive environment-provided credentials such as WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY, but the manifest declares no explicit tool scope or permissions boundary. In an agent setting, missing scope declarations can cause overbroad access to secrets or make operators unaware that the skill is capable of initiating authenticated on-chain actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The documentation repeatedly instructs users to export WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY without any warning about credential sensitivity, secure storage, shell history leakage, or reuse risk. Exposing raw private keys in a general-purpose agent workflow materially increases the chance of secret theft and total wallet compromise.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill provides ready-to-run instructions for bridging, deploying contracts, transferring tokens, swapping assets, and writing to arbitrary contracts, yet it does not prominently warn that these are irreversible on-chain operations that may result in permanent fund loss. In an agent-driven context, this omission is especially dangerous because users may treat the workflow as routine automation rather than high-risk financial execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The documentation instructs users to export a raw wallet private key into an environment variable and immediately use it for blockchain operations, but provides no warning about secure handling, shell history exposure, process inspection, or safer alternatives. In a skill focused on deploying contracts and moving assets, this can directly lead to theft of funds if users copy real funded keys into insecure environments or shared agent/runtime contexts.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

In write mode, the script immediately submits whatever contract function, arguments, and ETH value were provided on the command line, with no confirmation, allowlist, simulation, or human review step. In an agent skill intended to deploy contracts, bridge assets, trade, and transfer funds on mainnet, this makes accidental or prompt-influenced irreversible transactions materially more dangerous.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The script directly submits approval and swap transactions once invoked, without any final confirmation step that shows the exact token, amount, router, path, and minimum output. In an agent skill context, this increases the chance of unintended irreversible asset movement due to bad parameters, prompt injection into tool usage, or operator error, especially because approvals and swaps can immediately change token balances and expose allowance to the configured router.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The script reads WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY from the environment to authorize blockchain transfers, which is a sensitive credential operation. Although the usage comment tells the user to set the variable, it does not warn about the security implications of exposing or mishandling a private key.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The script performs irreversible ETH and token transfers immediately after parsing CLI arguments, without any confirmation prompt, simulation, or recipient sanity checks. In an agent skill that is explicitly designed to move assets on mainnet, this increases the chance that a mistaken address, wrong token symbol/address, or malformed amount will result in permanent loss of funds.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.