T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:90- Finding
Unverified and Unpinned Third-Party Skill Installation
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:90-103, with supporting evidence in_meta.json:10-14,README.md:10, andskills-index.md:7-104
Vulnerability Type: Third-party supply-chain risk caused by unverified skill discovery and installation
Risk Level: HighEvidence
The following is a faithful English rendering of the installation policy defined in
SKILL.md:text ## Skill Installation Strategy For each recommended skill: 1. Already installed locally → Skip 2. Available on ClawdHub → Recommend installation 3. Available as open source on GitHub → Recommend downloading 4. Not available from either source → Ask whether to create a new skill ## Installation Execution Stage - Core skills: Batch install or create after user confirmation - Optional skills: Install according to the user's selection - Provide alternatives when installation fails - Missing skills: Ask whether to create them immediatelyThe project metadata grants the capabilities needed to access and install remote content:
json "permissions": { "bash": true, "network": true, "filesystem": "skills-directory" }The indexed dependencies are identified primarily by generic names and broad source labels such as ClawdHub rather than by immutable package identities. Examples include
data-analyzer,web-scraper,code-reviewer,security-scanner,excel-handler, andtest-runner.Technical Analysis
The skill instructs an agent to discover and install third-party skills from ClawdHub or GitHub. However, it does not require:
- An allowlist of trusted publishers or repositories
- Exact repository URLs or verified package identifiers
- Immutable commit hashes or locked versions
- Cryptographic signatures or checksums
- Source-code review before installation
- Manifest and permission review
- Detection of typosquatting or dependency confusion
- Separate approval for each r ...[truncated 2611 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Replace generic marketplace names with exact package coordinates, including the verified publisher, canonical repository URL, and immutable commit hash or version.
- Maintain an explicit allowlist of trusted registries, organizations, repositories, and signing identities.
- Require cryptographic signature verification or a trusted checksum before installing any downloaded artifact.
- Review the complete source, manifest, installation hooks, scripts, and requested permissions before approval.
- Display provenance information for every recommendation, including publisher, repository, revision, checksum, permissions, and audit status.
- Require separate approval for each resolved dependency rather than one approval for an entire batch.
- Run newly installed skills in a sandbox with no credentials and minimal network, command, and filesystem access.
- Apply least privilege by enabling Bash, network, and filesystem permissions only during the specific installation operation that requires them.
- Detect package-name similarity, ownership changes, unexpected source changes, and typosquatting before installation.
- Generate and retain a lockfile or installation record containing immutable revisions and integrity hashes for reproducible audits and upgrades.
- Revise the documentation's “safe installation” claim unless these provenance, integrity, and permission controls are enforced.
