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Security audit

rumoro

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed Rumoro API helper for social listening, with expected external API use and remote account changes that are aligned with its purpose.

Install this only if you want an agent to use Rumoro and send relevant brand, competitor, keyword, alert, and triage data to Rumoro's API. Prefer a read-only API key for analysis-only work, and use a write key only when you intend the agent to create tracking keywords, alerts, channels, notes, or other account changes that may affect billing.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (6)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill's activation text is broad enough to trigger on common requests about products, competitors, or public opinion, which can cause the agent to invoke this skill in many ordinary conversations. That increases the chance of unnecessary external API calls and disclosure of user-provided business context to a third-party service without sufficiently explicit user intent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 12)May include surrounding context.

md
Rumoro finds public posts that mention the words a company cares about, scores each one for relevance, sentiment and intent, and serves them through a REST API. This skill calls that API with curl.

- Base URL: `https://api.rumoro.dev/v1`
- Every request sends `Authorization: Bearer $RUMORO_API_KEY`
- Full agent guide: `https://mcp.rumoro.dev/mcp/guide`. Read it before the first write in a session.
- Every operation, field and error: `https://api.rumoro.dev/v1/openapi.json`

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 15)May include surrounding context.

md
Rumoro finds public posts that mention the words a company cares about, scores each one for relevance, sentiment and intent, and serves them through a REST API. This skill calls that API with curl.

- Base URL: `https://api.rumoro.dev/v1`
- Every request sends `Authorization: Bearer $RUMORO_API_KEY`
- Full agent guide: `https://mcp.rumoro.dev/mcp/guide`. Read it before the first write in a session.
- Every operation, field and error: `https://api.rumoro.dev/v1/openapi.json`

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The example performs authenticated requests to an external API and therefore creates a concrete egress channel for user-derived search terms and operational metadata. Because the skill is designed for social listening, the transmitted content may include sensitive internal brand-monitoring interests or competitor-tracking activity.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 29)May include surrounding context.

Reads take query parameters. Writes send JSON.

bash
curl -sS "https://api.rumoro.dev/v1/mentions?relevant=true&since=2026-10-01T00:00:00Z&limit=20" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $RUMORO_API_KEY"

curl -sS -X POST "https://api.rumoro.dev/v1/keywords" \

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The example performs authenticated requests to an external API and therefore creates a concrete egress channel for user-derived search terms and operational metadata. Because the skill is designed for social listening, the transmitted content may include sensitive internal brand-monitoring interests or competitor-tracking activity.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 29)May include surrounding context.

Reads take query parameters. Writes send JSON.

bash
curl -sS "https://api.rumoro.dev/v1/mentions?relevant=true&since=2026-10-01T00:00:00Z&limit=20" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $RUMORO_API_KEY"

curl -sS -X POST "https://api.rumoro.dev/v1/keywords" \

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

This example shows a state-changing POST request using a bearer token to create tracked keywords on an external service. Because it can modify remote state and incur billing, accidental or over-broad invocation could create unauthorized resources, leak strategic topics, and generate cost for the user.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 32)May include surrounding context.

curl -sS "https://api.rumoro.dev/v1/mentions?relevant=true&since=2026-10-01T00:00:00Z&limit=20"
-H "Authorization: Bearer $RUMORO_API_KEY"

curl -sS -X POST "https://api.rumoro.dev/v1/keywords"
-H "Authorization: Bearer $RUMORO_API_KEY" -H "Content-Type: application/json"
-d '{"term": "driftwood", "kind": "brand"}'

text

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.