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Security audit

开悟吧

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill can automatically install other skills and surface server-provided agent-change instructions without enough scoping or user approval.

Review this skill carefully before installing. It is not judged malicious from the artifacts, but it gives the kaiwu8 service and local configuration significant influence over your OpenClaw environment. Only use it if you trust the service, the configured API endpoint, and any skills it may install; prefer a version that previews required installs and activation changes before applying them.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
activate.py:240
Finding

Remote API Responses Can Inject Instructions and Poison Persistent Agent Configuration

Content
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Remediation
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T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
activate.py:225
Finding

Remote Service Can Select and Install Unpinned Third-Party Skills

Content
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`. 5. The selected package is wri ...[truncated 734 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
activate.py:99
Finding

API Key Can Be Transmitted to an Arbitrary or Insecure Configured Endpoint

Content
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Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (8)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The declared purpose sounds like simple feature activation, but the described behavior extends to downloading and installing third-party skills, modifying the local skill environment, writing local state, and communicating with a remote service. This mismatch is dangerous because users may invoke the skill without understanding that it can change their system and expand code execution by pulling additional components.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises execution of a local script, remote API access, automatic activation, and downloading missing skills, yet declares no explicit tool scope or permissions. That creates an over-privileged and opaque trust boundary where shell, filesystem, network, and environment access may be exercised without clear user/admin review.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill documentation omits a clear warning that invocation will automatically activate features and download missing skills from ClawHub. Silent auto-activation and package retrieval can lead to unreviewed code installation, unexpected charges/entitlements changes, or trust of remote content without informed consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The module-level documentation describes Step 6 as 'Xiaobai 理解并执行(精准追加到 agents.md)', implying the script will drive or cause downstream modification of agents.md as part of activation. In the actual implementation, L249 states the agent will interpret the returned what/why/how and that 'kaiwu8 不执行写入', and the code only prints the instructions without modifying agents.md or invoking another component to do so.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The script invokes an external package-management command to install skills based on server-supplied requires_skills values, without any allowlist, signature verification, or user confirmation. This creates a supply-chain and trust-boundary risk: a compromised API, account, or backend could cause arbitrary third-party skill installation, which may later execute code in the agent environment.

Content

Scanner excerpt · activate.py (reported line 139)May include surrounding context.

python
for attempt in range(retries):
        try:
            result = subprocess.run(
                ["clawhub", "install", slug],
                capture_output=True,
                text=True,

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The script performs network-driven actions—automatic skill installation and activation-state persistence—without obtaining explicit user consent at execution time. Because the trigger is a simple phrase and the backend controls which skills are required, a user may unknowingly authorize installation of additional components and local state changes, increasing the risk of unintended code introduction and persistent configuration changes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The description and trigger condition specify only the phrase "开悟吧" as the invocation, which imposes a single-language interaction pattern. The file does not mention that this is optional, user-configurable, or justified as a region-specific skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The natural-language description says the script runs when the user says "开悟吧", which fixes invocation to one language/locale. There is no indication that users may choose another language or that this restriction is intentionally documented as a locale-specific skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.