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Security audit

释空悟之家

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is only Markdown and does not contain malware, but it asks to govern every conversation and route future sub-agents without clear user control.

Install only if you intentionally want this Chinese-language role protocol to shape agent behavior. Review the every-conversation loading rule and sub-agent scheduling instructions first, because they may affect delegation and context sharing even though the package contains no executable code.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:14
Finding
Persistent Role and Sub-Agent Orchestration Instruction Hijacking## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md:14-22` **Corroborating Locations**: `PROTOCOL.md:5-17`, `PROTOCOL.md:22-34`, `ROLES.md:3-37` **Vulnerability Type**: `T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking` **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code Snippet The following is an English translation of the complete affected segment from `SKILL.md:14-22`: ```markdown ## Scheduling Rules - **Xiaofeng** schedules Fengwu and all future sub-agents. - **Kongkong** operates independently, is not scheduled by Xiaofeng, and reports directly to Yuge. - Sub-agents are partners, not subordinates. ## Startup Loading Load this skill at the beginning of every conversation to ensure that all members collaborate under the same set of rules. ``` The behavior is reinforced by `PROTOCOL.md`, which prescribes the following translated orchestration mechanism: ```markdown ### Xiaofeng Schedules Sub-Agents - Fengwu: directly scheduled by Xiaofeng. - Future partners: uniformly scheduled by Xiaofeng. - Scheduling method: `sessions_spawn(runtime="subagent")` ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill defines a persistent fictional authority hierarchy rather than a narrowly scoped, task-specific capability. It directs the agent to load these rules at the beginning of every conversation, assigns control over sub-agent delegation to a named role, restricts communication paths, and prescribes how technical conflicts must be resolved. When loaded as agent instructions, these rules can compete with the goals and orchestration decisions appropriate to the current session. In particular, the explicit reference to `sessions_spawn(runtime="subagent")` attempts to influence tool use and delegate work according to the embedded hierarchy, regardless of whether delegation is necessary for the user's task. This is instruction hijacking rather than agent memory poisoning or system persistence. The reviewed files do not write to long-term memory, install startup services, or modify the host system. T ...[truncated 1534 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove the requirement to load the role hierarchy automatically at the beginning of every conversation. 2. Replace fictional authority assignments with a task-scoped description of the skill's legitimate functionality. 3. State explicitly that system, developer, safety, platform, and current user instructions take precedence over all skill content. 4. Make sub-agent delegation conditional on a concrete task requirement rather than assigning unconditional control over all present and future sub-agents. 5. Require explicit user approval before invoking `sessions_spawn` when delegation could consume additional resources or expand data exposure. 6. Remove mandatory communication routes and conflict-resolution authority that are unrelated to the skill's functional purpose. 7. Define least-privilege boundaries for delegated agents, including the minimum tools, context, files, and session duration required. 8. Add a clear prohibition against forwarding secrets or unrelated conversation context to spawned agents. 9. Ensure the skill is activated only when explicitly relevant to the user's request, rather than automatically in every session.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
This markdown file contains operational instructions entirely in Chinese and does not indicate that users may choose another language or that the protocol is intentionally limited to a Chinese-speaking audience. That can violate a language/locale policy when skills are expected to be accessible without forcing a specific language by default.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.