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Security audit

GitHub Bug Report

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is for GitHub bug reporting, but it ships a hardcoded GitHub token and describes recurring automated follow-up comments, so users should review it before use.

Do not install or use this version with the embedded token. The publisher should revoke the exposed GitHub token, replace it with user-supplied credentials, add explicit confirmation before every GitHub write, sanitize logs/configuration before submission, and make follow-up reminders one-time or notification-only.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • System PersistenceInstalls backdoors, hooks, services, or scheduled tasks that survive the run
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (3)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/submit_issue.py:11
Finding

Hardcoded GitHub Personal Access Token Exposed in Code and Documentation

Content
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Remediation
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T06 · System Persistence

Error
Location
SKILL.md:50
Finding

Indefinite Scheduled Agent Task Can Perform Autonomous GitHub Comments

Content
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", "schedule": { "kind": "cron", "expr": "0 10 * * *", "tz": "Asia/Shanghai" }, "payload": { "kind": "agentTurn", "message": "Check whether GitHub issue # has received an official response. If not, bump it by commenting: Any update?" }, "sessionTarget": "isolated", "delivery": { "mode": "announce" } } ``` ## Technical Analysis The documentation describes this as a follow-up reminder after three days, but the expression `0 10 * * *` schedules execution every day at 10:00 in the configured time zone. It is not a one-time three-day schedule. The payload starts an isolated agent turn and directs it to perform an external GitHub write by posting a comment when no official response is found. No expiration, maximum execution count, deduplication rule, cleanup action, or requirement for renewed user confirmation is defined. The scheduled task therefore survives the original skill invocation and can continue causing external side effects across sessions. ### Attack Path 1. A user follows the documented issue-submission workflow. 2. The workflow creates the supplied cron task after issue submission. 3. The task persists beyond the initiating session. 4. At 10:00 each day, an isolated agent checks the selected GitHub issue. 5. If the agent determines that no official response exists, it posts an “Any update?” comment. 6. Because no termination or deduplication condition exists, this process can repeat indefinitely. ### Impact Assessment The task obtains persistent authority to initiate agent activity and potentially perform authenticated GitHub writes without obtaining fresh appr ...[truncated 372 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:38
Finding

Diagnostic Logs and Configuration May Be Published Without Secret Redaction

Content
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Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (23)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The documented behavior materially diverges from the declared purpose by embedding a fixed GitHub token and by omitting or incompletely implementing the promised workflow safeguards. Description-behavior mismatch is dangerous in agent skills because reviewers and users may approve a seemingly simple reporting skill while it actually contains hidden credential use and under-specified external actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

A live GitHub personal access token is embedded directly in the skill content, exposing repository access to anyone who can read or reuse the file. Hardcoded credentials are highly dangerous because they enable unauthorized API use, issue spam, repository reconnaissance, and potentially broader account compromise depending on token scope.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Credentialed API commands are provided without any warning that the token is sensitive or that reusing the command leaks authentication material into shell history, logs, screenshots, and copy-paste trails. This makes accidental credential disclosure and misuse much more likely in normal operation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The quick reference embeds a GitHub personal access token directly in example commands, exposing reusable credentials to anyone who can read the file. A live PAT can be abused for authenticated API access well beyond bug reporting, including reading private metadata or modifying repository resources depending on token scope.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The script hard-codes a live GitHub personal access token directly in source and automatically uses it for authenticated API calls. Anyone who can read the file can reuse the credential to create, modify, or potentially perform other repository actions allowed by the token, making this a clear secret exposure and unauthorized access risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill invokes network-capable actions such as curl to GitHub and instructs issue submission, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope or permission boundaries. This weakens governance and review because the skill can cause outbound requests and external side effects without transparent capability declaration.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The manifest description and the main skill content are written as mandatory Chinese-language instructions, with no indication that users may choose another language or locale. This creates a natural-language policy concern because the skill appears to enforce a specific language rather than offering a choice or documenting a justified locale restriction.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs external issue submission and creation of scheduled follow-up actions without a clear user-facing warning about those side effects. In an agent context, hidden writes to third-party services and autonomous future actions can cause unintended disclosure, spam, or persistent automation the user did not knowingly approve.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill first suggests using an environment-supplied token and then contradicts that guidance by publishing a fixed token inline. This inconsistency is especially risky because it normalizes insecure credential handling and may trick operators into believing the workflow is secret-safe when the credential is already exposed.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The user-facing checklist and examples are written entirely in Chinese, while the file title is in English and there is no statement that the skill is intended only for Chinese-speaking users. This creates an implicit language constraint without user opt-in or documented justification.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/quick-ref.md (reported line 11)May include surrounding context.

md
- [ ] 准备好预期 vs 实际结果
- [ ] 版本号准备好(查 openclaw --version)

## curl 快速命令

### 搜索现有 issue

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The reference includes an authenticated PATCH workflow that allows modifying existing GitHub issues, which expands capability beyond simple reporting and status checking. If used with the embedded token, this can enable unauthorized tampering with issue content, titles, or workflow history.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

Using an authentication token without any credential-handling safeguards is dangerous here because the token is embedded directly in code and silently applied to all API requests. In this context, the absence of warnings is secondary to the larger problem that the credential is exposed and can be abused by anyone with access to the script.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 78)May include surrounding context.

md
TOKEN = "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"
REPO = "openclaw/openclaw"
BASE_URL = f"https://api.github.com/repos/{REPO}"

HEADERS = {
    "Authorization": f"token {TOKEN}",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/quick-ref.md (reported line 16)May include surrounding context.

md
TOKEN = "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"
REPO = "openclaw/openclaw"
BASE_URL = f"https://api.github.com/repos/{REPO}"

HEADERS = {
    "Authorization": f"token {TOKEN}",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/quick-ref.md (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

md
TOKEN = "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"
REPO = "openclaw/openclaw"
BASE_URL = f"https://api.github.com/repos/{REPO}"

HEADERS = {
    "Authorization": f"token {TOKEN}",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/quick-ref.md (reported line 34)May include surrounding context.

md
TOKEN = "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"
REPO = "openclaw/openclaw"
BASE_URL = f"https://api.github.com/repos/{REPO}"

HEADERS = {
    "Authorization": f"token {TOKEN}",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/quick-ref.md (reported line 45)May include surrounding context.

md
TOKEN = "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"
REPO = "openclaw/openclaw"
BASE_URL = f"https://api.github.com/repos/{REPO}"

HEADERS = {
    "Authorization": f"token {TOKEN}",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/submit_issue.py (reported line 13)May include surrounding context.

python
TOKEN = "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"
REPO = "openclaw/openclaw"
BASE_URL = f"https://api.github.com/repos/{REPO}"

HEADERS = {
    "Authorization": f"token {TOKEN}",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/submit_issue.py (reported line 54)May include surrounding context.

python
TOKEN = "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"
REPO = "openclaw/openclaw"
BASE_URL = f"https://api.github.com/repos/{REPO}"

HEADERS = {
    "Authorization": f"token {TOKEN}",

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The script sends the provided title and body to the GitHub API using authenticated HTTP requests, which transmits user-supplied data to an external service. Although success and failure are printed afterward, there is no prior warning, confirmation, or explanatory comment/docstring disclosing that issue content will be uploaded to GitHub.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/submit_issue.py (reported line 25)May include surrounding context.

python
def create_issue(title, body):
    url = f"{BASE_URL}/issues"
    data = {"title": title, "body": body}
    resp = requests.post(url, headers=HEADERS, json=data)
    if resp.status_code == 201:
        issue = resp.json()
        print(f"✅ Issue 创建成功: #{issue['number']}")

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Natural-language strings in the docstring and console output are presented only in Chinese, which imposes a specific language on users without opt-in or alternatives. This matches the language/locale policy concern because no choice or justification is provided.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.