ClawHub
Back to skill

Security audit

Japanese Translation And Tutor

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This translation skill is coherent and disclosed, but users should know translated text is sent to SkillBoss using their API key.

Install this if you are comfortable sending the Japanese text you translate to SkillBoss and using a SkillBoss API key. Prefer a dedicated or revocable key, and avoid translating confidential messages unless SkillBoss handling is acceptable for that content.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
SKILLBOSS_API_KEY = os.environ["SKILLBOSS_API_KEY"]

def translate_japanese(text: str) -> str:
    r = requests.post(
        "https://api.skillboss.com/v1/pilot",
        headers={
            "Authorization": f"Bearer {SKILLBOSS_API_KEY}",
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The skill sends user-provided text to an external third-party API endpoint for processing. This creates a real data exfiltration surface because any Japanese text the user submits—including sensitive messages, emails, or documents described in the skill—may be transmitted off-platform without explicit minimization, consent, or redaction controls.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
SKILLBOSS_API_KEY = os.environ["SKILLBOSS_API_KEY"]

def translate_japanese(text: str) -> str:
    r = requests.post(
        "https://api.skillboss.com/v1/pilot",
        headers={
            "Authorization": f"Bearer {SKILLBOSS_API_KEY}",
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The skill sends user-provided text to an external third-party API endpoint for processing. This creates a real data exfiltration surface because any Japanese text the user submits—including sensitive messages, emails, or documents described in the skill—may be transmitted off-platform without explicit minimization, consent, or redaction controls.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.