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Security audit

Japanese Translation And Tutor

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent Japanese translation/tutoring skill that discloses its SkillBoss API use, with the main risk being that submitted text is sent to a third-party service.

Install only if you are comfortable sending text you ask it to translate or explain to SkillBoss API Hub. Avoid using it for secrets, confidential business documents, regulated personal data, or private messages unless that external processing is acceptable.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (5)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The manifest includes broad trigger phrases such as "help me understand" and "translate" that can match many ordinary conversations, causing the skill to activate outside clearly translation-related requests. Over-broad activation can silently route unrelated user text into this skill and, because the skill sends content to an external API, increases the chance of unintended third-party data exposure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill description and usage guidance do not clearly warn that user-provided text will be transmitted to SkillBoss API Hub for processing. Users may provide sensitive messages, emails, or documents expecting local handling, creating a privacy and consent issue when that content is sent to a third party without clear disclosure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

This code transmits arbitrary user-supplied text to an external API endpoint, which is a real data-flow risk rather than a mere implementation detail. In the context of a translation skill, users may submit private messages, emails, or other sensitive Japanese text, so third-party transmission can expose confidential content if not clearly disclosed and controlled.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 99)May include surrounding context.

md
SKILLBOSS_API_KEY = os.environ["SKILLBOSS_API_KEY"]

def translate_japanese(text: str) -> str:
    r = requests.post(
        "https://api.skillboss.com/v1/pilot",
        headers={
            "Authorization": f"Bearer {SKILLBOSS_API_KEY}",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

This code transmits arbitrary user-supplied text to an external API endpoint, which is a real data-flow risk rather than a mere implementation detail. In the context of a translation skill, users may submit private messages, emails, or other sensitive Japanese text, so third-party transmission can expose confidential content if not clearly disclosed and controlled.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 99)May include surrounding context.

md
SKILLBOSS_API_KEY = os.environ["SKILLBOSS_API_KEY"]

def translate_japanese(text: str) -> str:
    r = requests.post(
        "https://api.skillboss.com/v1/pilot",
        headers={
            "Authorization": f"Bearer {SKILLBOSS_API_KEY}",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 100)May include surrounding context.

md
def translate_japanese(text: str) -> str:
    r = requests.post(
        "https://api.skillboss.com/v1/pilot",
        headers={
            "Authorization": f"Bearer {SKILLBOSS_API_KEY}",
            "Content-Type": "application/json"