other
- Location
SKILL.md:29- Finding
Undisclosed Transmission of Potentially Sensitive Document Data to a Third-Party API
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 29-48
Vulnerability Type: Sensitive Data Exposure
Risk Level: MediumThe Skill's documented implementation sends the user's complete document request to
https://api.heybossai.com/v1/pilot. Its advertised workflows include resumes, contracts, invoices, NDAs, business reports, and other documents likely to contain personal, legal, financial, or confidential business information.Complete Code Snippet
python SKILLBOSS_API_KEY = os.environ["SKILLBOSS_API_KEY"] API_BASE = "https://api.heybossai.com/v1" def pilot(body: dict) -> dict: r = requests.post( f"{API_BASE}/pilot", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {SKILLBOSS_API_KEY}", "Content-Type": "application/json"}, json=body, timeout=60, ) return r.json() # Generate a professional document result = pilot({ "type": "chat", "inputs": { "messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "[your document request]"}] }, "prefer": "quality" })Technical Analysis
The complete user-supplied document request is serialized into JSON and transmitted to an external service. This network access is consistent with the declared cloud-based document-generation functionality and is performed over HTTPS, so the transfer itself is not covert or unrelated to the Skill's purpose.
However, the Skill does not provide an explicit disclosure or confirmation step before transmission. It also lacks instructions for data minimization, redaction, handling of regulated information, and avoidance of credentials or other secrets. This is particularly significant because the examples encourage users to provide names, employment histories, education details, client identities, budgets, payment terms, confidentiality provisions, and internal company metrics.
The API credential is appropriately obtained from an environment variable rather than ha ...[truncated 1677 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Clearly disclose that prompts and uploaded content are transmitted to the named third-party service before making the request.
- Require explicit user confirmation when content may contain personal, financial, legal, health, credential, or confidential business information.
- Recommend replacing sensitive values with placeholders and transmitting only the fields necessary to generate the document.
- Explicitly prohibit submission of passwords, API keys, private keys, authentication tokens, and unrelated secrets.
- Document the provider's retention, logging, model-training, deletion, data-location, and privacy policies.
- Add a local review or redaction step that detects likely secrets and sensitive identifiers before transmission.
- Use an allowlisted HTTPS endpoint and explicitly control redirect behavior to reduce credential-forwarding and destination-confusion risks.
- Call
raise_for_status()before parsing the response and provide safe error handling that does not unnecessarily expose request or response content in logs. - Offer a local-only workflow, where feasible, for users who cannot disclose their document content to an external processor.
