T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
README.md:35- Finding
Unpinned Installation Command Executes Mutable Supply-Chain Components
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
README.md:35(duplicated atREADME.md:222)
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party installer and package reference
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code Snippet
bash npx clawhub@latest install @margaretzybgl/optimize-promptTechnical Analysis
The documented installation command asks
npxto download and execute the mutablelatestrelease of the third-partyclawhubpackage. It also installs@margaretzybgl/optimize-promptwithout selecting an immutable version or integrity digest.Consequently, the code executed by this command can change after this repository has been audited. A compromise of the relevant package registry, publisher account, installer package, or subsequently resolved skill release could cause users to execute content that was not present in the reviewed project. Reviewing the current Python source does not establish the safety of future artifacts resolved through these mutable package references.
The project itself contains no evidence of malicious payloads, hidden network clients, command injection, persistence, credential access, or unsafe deserialization. The issue is specifically the mutable supply-chain installation path presented to users.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the publisher account, package registry, or release process for
clawhubor the installed skill package. - The attacker publishes a malicious release selected by the
latesttag or by the unversioned skill identifier. - A user follows the installation command from the README.
npxdownloads and executes the newly resolved installer package.- The malicious installer or skill artifact runs with the permissions of the user invoking the command.
- Depending on those permissions and the malicious payload, it could access user-readable files, credentials available to the process, project data, or modify local agent configuration.
...[truncated 555 chars]
- An attacker compromises the publisher account, package registry, or release process for
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
-
Pin the installer to a reviewed exact version rather than using
latest, for example:bash npx clawhub@<reviewed-version> install @margaretzybgl/optimize-prompt@<reviewed-version> -
Where supported, pin packages by immutable digest or lockfile integrity value in addition to the semantic version.
-
Apply the same correction to the duplicate installation command at
README.md:222. -
Publish expected package checksums or signed provenance and document how users can verify them before installation.
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Require multi-factor authentication and protected publishing workflows for package publisher accounts.
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Run installation with a non-privileged account in an isolated environment and avoid exposing unnecessary credentials or sensitive environment variables.
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Use a controlled registry or approved internal mirror for production deployments.
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Add automated documentation checks that reject mutable tags such as
latestin executable installation examples.
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