T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
apex-ia-trader.mjs:14- Finding
Plaintext Binance API credentials embedded in multiple executable files
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill advertises a Binance Futures scanner, but the package also contains under-disclosed automated trading programs with embedded Binance credentials and default-on leveraged execution paths.
Review this as more than a scanner. Do not install or run the trader scripts unless you intentionally want automated Binance Futures trading, have rotated any exposed credentials, understand whether testnet or live endpoints are configured, and have explicit controls for order confirmation, leverage, stop loss, and account permissions.
apex-ia-trader.mjs:14Plaintext Binance API credentials embedded in multiple executable files
apex-ia-aggressive.mjs:21Default-enabled automatic leveraged trading exceeds the declared scanner scope
start-apex-completo.sh:6Complete launcher starts an account-authorized trader as a background process
realtime-scanner.js:154Runtime npm installation executes mutable third-party dependency code
webapp/server.js:14Unauthenticated web API permits cross-origin signal access and outbound request abuse
src/scanner.ts:327Unbounded Agent-controlled scan parameters can amplify Binance API requests
The skill is described as a market scanner, but the code enables automated leveraged futures trading by default via autoTrade = true and related position-management logic. This is dangerous because users expecting passive analysis could unknowingly authorize live or testnet account actions, and the mismatch obscures the true risk profile of the skill.
The skill contains signed Binance request support and account-changing API operations inconsistent with a scanner-only description. This is dangerous because it gives the skill the ability to modify leverage, place orders, and affect account state while appearing to be a read-only analysis tool.
These functions open and close market positions, calculate targets, and maintain internal position state, clearly exceeding the described scope of scanning. In context, this is especially dangerous because futures market orders with leverage can create immediate financial exposure and losses without users realizing the skill is an execution bot.
The implemented behavior appears narrower and different than advertised: fixed 1h timeframe only, spot API instead of Futures, only SMA crossover logic, undeclared local signal file reads, and extra API endpoints beyond the described scanner. This mismatch is dangerous because it undermines informed consent, can expose local data through filesystem access, and may lead users to rely on incorrect market assumptions.
The implemented behavior appears narrower and different than advertised: fixed 1h timeframe only, spot API instead of Futures, only SMA crossover logic, undeclared local signal file reads, and extra API endpoints beyond the described scanner. This mismatch is dangerous because it undermines informed consent, can expose local data through filesystem access, and may lead users to rely on incorrect market assumptions.
The implemented behavior appears narrower and different than advertised: fixed 1h timeframe only, spot API instead of Futures, only SMA crossover logic, undeclared local signal file reads, and extra API endpoints beyond the described scanner. This mismatch is dangerous because it undermines informed consent, can expose local data through filesystem access, and may lead users to rely on incorrect market assumptions.
The implemented behavior appears narrower and different than advertised: fixed 1h timeframe only, spot API instead of Futures, only SMA crossover logic, undeclared local signal file reads, and extra API endpoints beyond the described scanner. This mismatch is dangerous because it undermines informed consent, can expose local data through filesystem access, and may lead users to rely on incorrect market assumptions.
The implemented behavior appears narrower and different than advertised: fixed 1h timeframe only, spot API instead of Futures, only SMA crossover logic, undeclared local signal file reads, and extra API endpoints beyond the described scanner. This mismatch is dangerous because it undermines informed consent, can expose local data through filesystem access, and may lead users to rely on incorrect market assumptions.
The implemented behavior appears narrower and different than advertised: fixed 1h timeframe only, spot API instead of Futures, only SMA crossover logic, undeclared local signal file reads, and extra API endpoints beyond the described scanner. This mismatch is dangerous because it undermines informed consent, can expose local data through filesystem access, and may lead users to rely on incorrect market assumptions.
Hardcoded Binance API credentials are embedded directly in the skill file, making them trivially extractable by anyone with file access, logs, backups, or repository history. In a trading context this is especially dangerous because the credentials authorize authenticated exchange actions, potentially including account access and order placement.
Using hardcoded exchange credentials for authenticated requests without clear user disclosure creates both a secret-exposure risk and an unauthorized-action risk. Anyone reusing or obtaining the file may unknowingly operate with embedded credentials or exfiltrate them for direct account abuse.
The skill is presented as a market scanner, but this code also places leveraged futures orders, manages positions, and closes trades automatically. That mismatch is dangerous because users may grant trust or run the skill expecting passive analysis, while it can perform destructive financial actions with real exchange APIs if demo mode is changed or reused elsewhere.
The skill enables automatic leveraged trading without per-trade confirmation, while configured for aggressive behavior and with stop loss disabled by default. In this context, silent execution is a serious safety issue because market orders can create immediate financial loss before the user realizes the tool is acting autonomously.
The code hardcodes an API key and performs signed exchange requests without any prominent warning, consent flow, or safety disclosure. This is dangerous because users may run the skill without realizing it can authenticate to exchange endpoints and potentially act on account data or trading permissions.
The skill is described as a scanner, but this code contains full trade execution and position-closing logic for Binance Futures orders. That mismatch is dangerous because users may grant trust or credentials expecting passive market analysis while the code is capable of taking direct trading actions on their account.
The auto-trading path expands the skill from signal generation into autonomous execution of futures trades. In the context of a tool presented as a scanner, this creates a harmful capability gap where financial loss can occur without users understanding they enabled order placement.
Automatic trade execution can place market orders without a per-order confirmation prompt, creating a direct path to unintended financial loss. This is particularly dangerous for futures trading, where leverage and rapid price movement can amplify losses beyond what users expect from a scanning tool.
The main loop automatically executes trades from generated signals when autoTrade is enabled, turning scan results into live actions. This is especially risky because the overall skill description suggests an analytical scanner, not an autonomous trading bot operating on a derivatives exchange.
Hardcoded Binance API credentials are embedded directly in source code. Even if USE_DEMO is currently true, exposed credentials can be copied, reused, or accidentally promoted to production patterns later, and they normalize unsafe secret handling in code distributed to others.
The code uses hardcoded API credentials without any warning, consent prompt, or disclosure to the user. This is dangerous because users may run the skill unaware that private exchange credentials are embedded and actively used for authenticated requests.
Automatic trading is enabled by default, and the main loop will execute market orders based on generated signals without explicit confirmation. This is dangerous because default-on auto-execution can cause unintended leveraged trades immediately after startup.
The manifest claims confirmation using Pivot SuperTrend, RSI, volume, and confluence, but the implemented scan logic only evaluates SMA 8/21 cross/touch conditions. This discrepancy is dangerous because it misrepresents how signals are produced, causing users to trust trades based on controls that do not actually exist.
Hardcoded API credentials in source code are a direct secret-exposure vulnerability. Anyone with access to the file can reuse the credentials to access the linked Binance account on the configured environment, potentially reading balances and placing or managing futures orders.
The code includes signed account-access and trading-request capability via API key/secret handling even though the skill is presented as a scanner. In this context, unnecessary authenticated exchange access greatly increases risk because the skill can query private account data and submit trades beyond the user's likely expectations.
The skill is described as a scanner, but it contains active trade execution and position-closing functions that submit authenticated Binance Futures market orders. This mismatch is dangerous because users may grant trust or run the skill expecting passive analysis while it can perform irreversible financial actions on their account.