Security audit

APEX IA Pro

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This package is advertised mainly as a Binance Futures scanner, but it also ships auto-trading scripts with embedded exchange credentials and default automatic order execution behavior.

Install only after reviewing exactly which entrypoint OpenClaw will run. Treat the scanner tool as separate from the bundled trader scripts, revoke any exposed Binance credentials, and do not run the automatic trader or launcher unless you intentionally want testnet/live futures orders and have verified risk limits, stop behavior, and account permissions.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (70)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High

Confidence: 99% confidence
Finding: The skill metadata describes a market scanner, but the code performs authenticated Binance Futures account actions including leverage changes, market order placement, take-profit orders, and position closure. This mismatch is dangerous because a user or host system may grant the skill lower scrutiny or broader trust than warranted, while the code can directly mutate trading accounts and incur financial loss.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium

Confidence: 93% confidence
Finding: The description claims confirmation using Pivot SuperTrend, RSI, volume, and confluence, but the implemented logic only checks SMA 8/21 cross or near-touch conditions. In a trading skill, this discrepancy is risky because users may rely on a falsely represented strategy and enable automation based on nonexistent safeguards or filters.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High

Confidence: 100% confidence
Finding: Binance API credentials are hardcoded directly in the source file, exposing secrets to anyone who can read the skill, logs, repository, or package contents. Because the code uses these credentials for signed Futures requests, disclosure could allow unauthorized account access, order placement, leverage changes, and other sensitive actions.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium

Confidence: 94% confidence
Finding: The comments and user-facing presentation frame the tool as a scanner, while the surrounding code can automatically execute leveraged futures trades and manage open positions. This misleading framing increases the chance that users run the skill expecting passive analysis when it actually performs high-risk account mutations.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High

Confidence: 98% confidence
Finding: The skill is presented as a market scanner, but this code can place futures orders, set stop-loss/take-profit orders, and manage open positions. That mismatch is dangerous because users may grant trust and API access expecting passive analysis while the skill is capable of active trading with financial consequences.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High

Confidence: 92% confidence
Finding: The description claims confirmation using Pivot SuperTrend, RSI, volume, and confluence, but the scanner only evaluates SMA crossover/proximity. This is a security-relevant integrity issue because users may rely on materially overstated strategy safeguards and enable automated trading based on weaker logic than advertised.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High

Confidence: 100% confidence
Finding: A Binance API key is hardcoded directly in source code, which exposes a credential to anyone with file access and encourages unsafe secret handling. In the context of a trading-related skill, leaked keys can enable account reconnaissance or trading actions depending on the key permissions, making this especially dangerous.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium

Confidence: 88% confidence
Finding: Labeling the module as a scanner while the overall program can execute trades is misleading and weakens informed user consent. In a financial tool, deceptive or inaccurate labeling increases the chance that a user runs code with trading privileges without understanding the operational risk.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High

Confidence: 98% confidence
Finding: The skill is presented as a scanner, but the code enables automatic Binance Futures trading with leverage and starts in autoTrade mode. This mismatch can cause users or host systems to grant trust and permissions appropriate for passive analysis while the skill performs financially destructive actions.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High

Confidence: 100% confidence
Finding: Hard-coded Binance API credentials expose secret material to anyone who can read the skill file, logs, backups, or repository history. Even though USE_DEMO is true, embedded credentials normalize unsafe secret handling and could be swapped to production or reused elsewhere, enabling unauthorized account access and trading.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High

Confidence: 98% confidence
Finding: The skill actively opens, closes, and manages leveraged futures positions despite being described as a scanning tool. In context, this is dangerous because users may deploy it with network access and exchange credentials under the assumption that it only analyzes markets, leading to unexpected loss-causing transactions.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium

Confidence: 86% confidence
Finding: The UI reinforces the impression of a scanner while the process runs in aggressive automatic trading mode. This deceptive presentation reduces user awareness of risk and increases the chance that harmful trades occur without informed consent.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High

Confidence: 99% confidence
Finding: The skill is ներկայացված as a scanner/detector, but it contains authenticated trading functions that place and close Binance Futures orders. This mismatch is dangerous because users may run it expecting passive analysis while the code can actively execute leveraged trades, creating financial loss and account-risk exposure.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium

Confidence: 93% confidence
Finding: The manifest claims confirmations from Pivot SuperTrend, RSI, volume, and confluence, but the implemented logic only evaluates SMA relationships and proximity/crossing. This is dangerous because it misrepresents the strategy's safeguards, potentially leading users to trust trades based on controls that do not actually exist.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High

Confidence: 99% confidence
Finding: The file hardcodes Binance API credentials directly in source and uses them for signed account and order requests. Hardcoded secrets can be extracted by anyone with file access, enabling unauthorized account queries or trading actions and making secret rotation difficult.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium

Confidence: 88% confidence
Finding: The startup/UI messaging claims a more sophisticated, confirmation-based indicator system than the code actually implements. In a trading context, inaccurate inline documentation materially increases user trust in unsafe automation and can cause users to authorize trading under false assumptions.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High

Confidence: 98% confidence
Finding: The skill is presented as a market scanner, but this code actively places, manages, and closes Binance Futures orders. That mismatch is security-relevant because users may grant trust or run the skill expecting passive analysis, while it can perform authenticated leveraged trading with real exchange side effects.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium

Confidence: 89% confidence
Finding: The description claims Pivot SuperTrend, RSI, volume, and confluence-based analysis, but the implementation only computes SMA 8/21 cross/touch logic. This is dangerous because users may rely on nonexistent safeguards or signal quality filters when the bot is actually making simpler and riskier trading decisions than advertised.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High

Confidence: 100% confidence
Finding: Hardcoded Binance API credentials are embedded directly in the source file, allowing anyone with code access to reuse them for authenticated account actions. In a trading bot context, exposed credentials can enable unauthorized balance access, order placement, leverage changes, and account manipulation.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium

Confidence: 95% confidence
Finding: The bot opens leveraged market positions and explicitly treats stop-loss and take-profit placement as optional, continuing even if protective orders fail. That creates unbounded downside relative to the intended controls, especially in volatile futures markets where an unattended position can incur severe losses quickly.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High

Confidence: 97% confidence
Finding: The implementation materially diverges from the declared skill behavior: the metadata promises an SMA/Pivot SuperTrend/RSI/volume multi-timeframe scanner, but the code executes a different SMC strategy using PDH/PDL, structure breaks, and FVG. This is dangerous because users and downstream systems may grant trust, permissions, or make trading decisions based on false capability descriptions, creating a supply-chain style integrity risk and increasing the chance of unsafe or unintended execution.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium

Confidence: 88% confidence
Finding: The comments claim stronger asset vetting than the code enforces, such as listing age, correlation, and stricter anti-pump criteria, while runtime checks only verify 24h volume and price-change percentage. This can mislead operators into believing risk controls exist when they do not, causing unsafe market exposure and erroneous trust in the scanner's filtering safeguards.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High

Confidence: 98% confidence
Finding: The skill metadata advertises a passive multi-timeframe scanner using SMA/Pivot SuperTrend/RSI/volume confluence, but the implementation is an SMC strategy that can automatically place futures trades. This mismatch is dangerous because users may grant trust or permissions based on the declared purpose while the code performs materially riskier actions than disclosed.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High

Confidence: 99% confidence
Finding: The code performs authenticated Binance Futures actions including leverage changes, market orders, stop-loss/take-profit placement, and position closing, which goes far beyond a scanner. In the context of an agent skill, this is highly dangerous because it can directly cause financial loss and unauthorized account activity if invoked with valid credentials.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium

Confidence: 86% confidence
Finding: The CHOQUE detection comments and implementation disagree, indicating the strategy logic may be inverted relative to the documented market structure assumptions. For an autotrading system, such logic mismatch can trigger systematically wrong trades and undermine any safety expectations users derive from the comments.

VirusTotal

65/65 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.dangerous_exec, suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical

Code: suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location: realtime-scanner.js:155

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical

Code: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location: apex-ia-aggressive.mjs:13

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical

Code: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location: apex-ia-all.mjs:13

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical

Code: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location: apex-ia-final-20x.mjs:53

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical

Code: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location: apex-ia-final.mjs:13

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical

Code: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location: apex-ia-robot.mjs:13

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical

Code: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location: apex-ia-smc.mjs:53

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical

Code: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location: apex-ia-trader.mjs:14