T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/common.py:403- Finding
Sensitive API credentials, audio, transcripts, and biometric data may be transmitted over plaintext HTTP
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
scripts/common.py:403-419; insecure HTTP use is documented inSKILL.md:71-81, 104-106andreferences/configuration.md:20-21, 82-83
Vulnerability Type: Plaintext transmission of sensitive information
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
python resolved_url = url or os.environ.get("VOSCRIPT_URL") resolved_key = api_key or os.environ.get("VOSCRIPT_API_KEY") if not resolved_url: raise ValueError(t("url_empty")) if not resolved_key: raise ValueError(t("key_empty")) self.url = resolved_url.rstrip("/") self.api_key = resolved_key self.timeout = timeout self._session = requests.Session() self._session.headers.update( { "X-API-Key": self.api_key, "Accept": "application/json", } )The documentation explicitly permits plaintext HTTP:
text - VOSCRIPT_URL: Service address, for example http://localhost:7880 - Local deployment: http://localhost:7880 - LAN deployment: http://<nas-ip>:7880 or a custom domainIt also recommends HTTP as a fallback for certificate problems:
text For self-signed certificate issues, contact the deployment administrator for a trusted certificate or use HTTP instead.The documented upload sends both the credential and audio over the configured transport:
bash curl -X POST "$VOSCRIPT_URL/api/transcribe" \ -H "X-API-Key: $VOSCRIPT_API_KEY" \ -F "file=@/path/to/audio.wav"Technical Analysis
VoScriptClientaccepts either HTTP or HTTPS and unconditionally attaches the static API key to its session. It does not reject or require explicit confirmation for plaintext HTTP on non-loopback hosts.This behavior is especially sensitive because the client handles:
- Static API credentials.
- User-selected audio recordings.
- Full transcript text and original filenames.
- Speaker names and mappings.
- Persistent biometric voicepr ...[truncated 2123 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Require HTTPS whenever the destination is not a loopback address.
- Permit plaintext HTTP only for
localhost,127.0.0.1, and::1, or behind an explicit high-friction option such as--allow-insecure-http. - Validate the parsed URL during client initialization and reject unsupported schemes, missing hostnames, embedded credentials, and non-loopback HTTP destinations.
- Remove the documentation recommendation to use HTTP when certificates fail.
- Support a configurable trusted CA bundle for private or self-signed deployments, while retaining certificate verification.
- Document secure reverse-proxy deployment with TLS and appropriate network access controls.
- Prefer short-lived, endpoint-scoped credentials over a static key with broad read, write, and delete capabilities.
- Rotate any API key that may already have been used over an untrusted plaintext connection.
