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Security audit

会议纪要卡片 · 马甲实战版

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

The skill performs the advertised transcript-to-SVG/PNG workflow, but its PNG converter can automatically install a Python package into the host environment without clear upfront disclosure.

Review this before installing if you do not want skills to modify your Python environment. Prefer running it in a virtual environment or container and preinstalling pinned rendering dependencies yourself; also remember that meeting transcripts may contain sensitive business information even though the inspected artifacts do not show external transcript upload or credential access.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (4)

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Content
try:
        import cairosvg
    except ImportError:
        subprocess.check_call([sys.executable, "-m", "pip", "install",
                               "--break-system-packages", "-q", "cairosvg"])
        import cairosvg
    cairosvg.svg2png(url=svg_path, write_to=png_path, scale=scale)
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The script automatically runs pip install at runtime with --break-system-packages, which introduces package-management and code-fetching behavior into a file-conversion utility. This can execute unreviewed code from package indexes during normal use, alters the host environment unexpectedly, and expands the attack surface if package sources, dependency resolution, or network paths are compromised.

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding
The skill declares no permissions, yet its documented behavior requires reading local transcript files and invoking a shell command to run a conversion script. This creates a transparency and policy-enforcement gap: users and platforms may treat the skill as low-risk while it still accesses files and executes subprocesses.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The skill’s stated purpose is document-to-SVG/PNG conversion, but the detected behavior includes runtime package installation and spawning external rendering tooling. Installing packages at runtime and invoking Node/Puppeteer subprocesses materially expands the attack surface, can introduce supply-chain risk, and gives the skill networked code-execution behavior not apparent from the description.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding
Automatically installing a Python package during execution is unnecessary for a simple SVG-to-PNG conversion path and gives the skill an unexpected capability to modify the system and retrieve code from external sources. In an agent or automation environment, this is more dangerous because a document-processing skill should not silently change the runtime environment or depend on network-retrieved code at execution time.

VirusTotal

VirusTotal findings are pending for this skill version.

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Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.