T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
orchestrator.py:139- Finding
Attacker-Controlled Input Permits Audit Log Injection
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
orchestrator.py, lines 139–150 and line 213
Vulnerability Type: Audit log injection through insufficient output encoding
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
python def append_audit_log(output_dir: Path, action: str, details: str = "") -> None: """Append an entry to the audit log.""" log_file = output_dir / "analysis_log.md" now = datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S UTC") entry = f"- **{now}**: {action}" if details: entry += f" -- {details}" entry += "\n" with open(log_file, "a") as f: if not log_file.exists() or log_file.stat().st_size == 0: f.write("# Analysis Audit Log\n\n") f.write(entry)The function is called with the raw command-line input:
python append_audit_log(output_dir, f"Routed to {skill}", f"input={args.input}, method={method}")Technical Analysis
The value of
args.inputis fully controlled by the command-line caller. It is interpolated directly into a Markdown audit-log entry without normalization, escaping, or rejection of control characters.An input containing carriage returns, newline characters, or Markdown syntax can terminate the intended log entry and insert arbitrary additional content. Because the resulting file is represented as an audit trail, consumers may incorrectly treat injected lines as authentic records produced by the application.
The attack requires the input to trigger successful skill detection or to be accompanied by a valid
--skillargument. No command execution occurs through this flaw; the vulnerability affects the integrity of the generated audit log.Attack Path
- An attacker invokes the program with a valid forced skill or an input containing a recognized routing keyword.
- The attacker embeds newline characters and forged Markdown audit entries in
--input. - The routing operation ...[truncated 1030 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Store audit records in a structured format such as JSON Lines rather than constructing Markdown from untrusted values.
- Serialize each record with a standard JSON encoder so newline characters and other control characters are escaped.
- If Markdown output must be retained, replace or encode
\r,\n, and other control characters before interpolation. - Escape Markdown metacharacters in all untrusted fields.
- Consider recording command-line arguments as structured arrays instead of concatenated strings.
- Add tests proving that multiline input, Markdown headings, list markers, and control characters cannot create additional logical records.
- If logs are security-sensitive, apply restrictive file permissions and consider authenticated or append-only logging to make later tampering detectable.