T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
scripts/requirements.txt:1- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Creates Supply-Chain Risk
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
scripts/requirements.txt:1;SKILL.md:16-18
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned and integrity-unverified third-party dependency
Risk Level: MediumComplete Code Snippets:
scripts/requirements.txt:1text olca-ipc>=2.4.0SKILL.md:16-18yaml install: - kind: uv package: olca-ipcTechnical Analysis
The project installs
olca-ipcfrom a package repository without pinning an exact audited version or verifying a cryptographic hash. The requirementolca-ipc>=2.4.0permits the resolver to install any later compatible release, while the installation metadata does not specify a version at all.Consequently, the effective dependency code can change after this Skill has been reviewed. Builds are not reproducible, and a malicious or compromised future package release could be selected automatically. Python packages may execute code during installation, and package module-level code executes when
scripts/lca_bridge.pyimportsolca_ipcandolca_schema.This finding does not establish that the current
olca-ipcpackage is malicious. The vulnerability is the project's failure to constrain and integrity-check the externally supplied executable dependency.Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the upstream package, its maintainer account, or a package-distribution channel and publishes a malicious release satisfying
>=2.4.0. - A user installs the Skill dependency using the declared
uvpackage configuration orscripts/requirements.txt. - The dependency resolver selects the compromised release because no exact version or hash restricts the accepted artifact.
- Malicious package code executes during installation or when
lca_bridge.pyimports the package. - The payload operates with the privileges of the user running the installation or bridge script.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could provide arbitrar ...[truncated 394 chars]
- An attacker compromises the upstream package, its maintainer account, or a package-distribution channel and publishes a malicious release satisfying
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Pin
olca-ipcto a specific, reviewed version instead of using a lower-bound constraint:text olca-ipc==2.4.0 - Generate and commit a dependency lockfile that records all transitive dependency versions.
- Require cryptographic hashes for downloaded artifacts, such as through a hash-locked requirements file:
text olca-ipc==2.4.0 --hash=sha256:<verified-artifact-hash> - Make the installation metadata in
SKILL.mduse the same exact version as the locked dependency configuration. - Use an explicitly trusted package index and disable unintended fallback indexes to reduce dependency-confusion exposure.
- Review dependency updates before changing the pin, verify package provenance and signatures where available, and run automated dependency and malware scanning in CI.
- Install and execute the Skill in a least-privileged, isolated environment with only the filesystem and network access required to communicate with openLCA.
- Pin
